Decentralized Convergence to Nash Equilibria in Constrained Deterministic Mean Field Control

This paper considers decentralized control and optimization methodologies for large populations of systems, consisting of several agents with different individual behaviors, constraints and interests, and affected by the aggregate behavior of the overall population. For such large-scale systems, the theory of aggregative and mean field games has been established and successfully applied in various scientific disciplines. While the existing literature addresses the case of unconstrained agents, we formulate deterministic mean field control problems in the presence of heterogeneous convex constraints for the individual agents, for instance arising from agents with linear dynamics subject to convex state and control constraints. We propose several model-free feedback iterations to compute in a decentralized fashion a mean field Nash equilibrium in the limit of infinite population size. We apply our methods to the constrained linear quadratic deterministic mean field control problem and to the constrained mean field charging control problem for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles.Comment: IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control (cond. accepted

Controlled Matching Game for Resource Allocation and User Association in WLANs

In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the traditional user association based on the strongest received signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or heterogeneous performance. Our goal is to propose an alternative game-theoretic approach for association. We model the joint resource allocation and user association as a matching game with complementarities and peer effects consisting of selfish players solely interested in their individual throughputs. Using recent game-theoretic results we first show that various resource sharing protocols actually fall in the scope of the set of stability-inducing resource allocation schemes. The game makes an extensive use of the Nash bargaining and some of its related properties that allow to control the incentives of the players. We show that the proposed mechanism can greatly improve the efficiency of 802.11 with heterogeneous nodes and reduce the negative impact of peer effects such as its MAC anomaly. The mechanism can be implemented as a virtual connectivity management layer to achieve efficient APs-user associations without modification of the MAC layer

The Governance of Services

The problem of assessing a system of governance for composite services in the social economy is approached by means of original methods.The main innovation is that the welfare structure of a society is separated from the legal transaction- or institutional structure.As both the various types of services and the various modes of management are defined in terms of relations between sets of persons, these structures can be compared and the performance of a managementsystem can be assessed.The dynamics of a wide range of hybrid forms of organization - between market and hierarchy - is analyzed in this framework. The approach elaborates on the new institutional economics, and the social theory of micromotives and macrobehavior in exchange and transactions.welfare and transactions;hybrid organizations;typology of services;typology of modes of governance;institutional economics

Navigation of brain networks

Understanding the mechanisms of neural communication in large-scale brain networks remains a major goal in neuroscience. We investigated whether navigation is a parsimonious routing model for connectomics. Navigating a network involves progressing to the next node that is closest in distance to a desired destination. We developed a measure to quantify navigation efficiency and found that connectomes in a range of mammalian species (human, mouse and macaque) can be successfully navigated with near-optimal efficiency (>80% of optimal efficiency for typical connection densities). Rewiring network topology or repositioning network nodes resulted in 45%-60% reductions in navigation performance. Specifically, we found that brain networks cannot be progressively rewired (randomized or clusterized) to result in topologies with significantly improved navigation performance. Navigation was also found to: i) promote a resource-efficient distribution of the information traffic load, potentially relieving communication bottlenecks; and, ii) explain significant variation in functional connectivity. Unlike prevalently studied communication strategies in connectomics, navigation does not mandate biologically unrealistic assumptions about global knowledge of network topology. We conclude that the wiring and spatial embedding of brain networks is conducive to effective decentralized communication. Graph-theoretic studies of the connectome should consider measures of network efficiency and centrality that are consistent with decentralized models of neural communication

Distributed Learning in Multi-Armed Bandit with Multiple Players

We formulate and study a decentralized multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem. There are M distributed players competing for N independent arms. Each arm, when played, offers i.i.d. reward according to a distribution with an unknown parameter. At each time, each player chooses one arm to play without exchanging observations or any information with other players. Players choosing the same arm collide, and, depending on the collision model, either no one receives reward or the colliding players share the reward in an arbitrary way. We show that the minimum system regret of the decentralized MAB grows with time at the same logarithmic order as in the centralized counterpart where players act collectively as a single entity by exchanging observations and making decisions jointly. A decentralized policy is constructed to achieve this optimal order while ensuring fairness among players and without assuming any pre-agreement or information exchange among players. Based on a Time Division Fair Sharing (TDFS) of the M best arms, the proposed policy is constructed and its order optimality is proven under a general reward model. Furthermore, the basic structure of the TDFS policy can be used with any order-optimal single-player policy to achieve order optimality in the decentralized setting. We also establish a lower bound on the system regret growth rate for a general class of decentralized polices, to which the proposed policy belongs. This problem finds potential applications in cognitive radio networks, multi-channel communication systems, multi-agent systems, web search and advertising, and social networks.Comment: 31 pages, 8 figures, revised paper submitted to IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, April, 2010, the pre-agreement in the decentralized TDFS policy is eliminated to achieve a complete decentralization among player

Stochastic network formation and homophily

This is a chapter of the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Networks