Iterated reflection principles over full disquotational truth

Iterated reflection principles have been employed extensively to unfold epistemic commitments that are incurred by accepting a mathematical theory. Recently this has been applied to theories of truth. The idea is to start with a collection of Tarski-biconditionals and arrive by finitely iterated reflection at strong compositional truth theories. In the context of classical logic it is incoherent to adopt an initial truth theory in which A and 'A is true' are inter-derivable. In this article we show how in the context of a weaker logic, which we call Basic De Morgan Logic, we can coherently start with such a fully disquotational truth theory and arrive at a strong compositional truth theory by applying a natural uniform reflection principle a finite number of times

Absoluteness via Resurrection

The resurrection axioms are forcing axioms introduced recently by Hamkins and Johnstone, developing on ideas of Chalons and Velickovi\'c. We introduce a stronger form of resurrection axioms (the \emph{iterated} resurrection axioms $\textrm{RA}_\alpha(\Gamma)$ for a class of forcings $\Gamma$ and a given ordinal $\alpha$), and show that $\textrm{RA}_\omega(\Gamma)$ implies generic absoluteness for the first-order theory of $H_{\gamma^+}$ with respect to forcings in $\Gamma$ preserving the axiom, where $\gamma=\gamma_\Gamma$ is a cardinal which depends on $\Gamma$ ($\gamma_\Gamma=\omega_1$ if $\Gamma$ is any among the classes of countably closed, proper, semiproper, stationary set preserving forcings). We also prove that the consistency strength of these axioms is below that of a Mahlo cardinal for most forcing classes, and below that of a stationary limit of supercompact cardinals for the class of stationary set preserving posets. Moreover we outline that simultaneous generic absoluteness for $H_{\gamma_0^+}$ with respect to $\Gamma_0$ and for $H_{\gamma_1^+}$ with respect to $\Gamma_1$ with $\gamma_0=\gamma_{\Gamma_0}\neq\gamma_{\Gamma_1}=\gamma_1$ is in principle possible, and we present several natural models of the Morse Kelley set theory where this phenomenon occurs (even for all $H_\gamma$ simultaneously). Finally, we compare the iterated resurrection axioms (and the generic absoluteness results we can draw from them) with a variety of other forcing axioms, and also with the generic absoluteness results by Woodin and the second author.Comment: 34 page

The Implicit Commitment of Arithmetical Theories and Its Semantic Core

According to the implicit commitment thesis, once accepting a mathematical formal system S, one is implicitly committed to additional resources not immediately available in S. Traditionally, this thesis has been understood as entailing that, in accepting S, we are bound to accept reflection principles for S and therefore claims in the language of S that are not derivable in S itself. It has recently become clear, however, that such reading of the implicit commitment thesis cannot be compatible with well-established positions in the foundations of mathematics which consider a specific theory S as self-justifying and doubt the legitimacy of any principle that is not derivable in S: examples are Tait’s finitism and the role played in it by Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, Isaacson’s thesis and Peano Arithmetic, Nelson’s ultrafinitism and sub-exponential arithmetical systems. This casts doubts on the very adequacy of the implicit commitment thesis for arithmetical theories. In the paper we show that such foundational standpoints are nonetheless compatible with the implicit commitment thesis. We also show that they can even be compatible with genuine soundness extensions of S with suitable form of reflection. The analysis we propose is as follows: when accepting a system S, we are bound to accept a fixed set of principles extending S and expressing minimal soundness requirements for S, such as the fact that the non-logical axioms of S are true. We call this invariant component the semantic core of implicit commitment. But there is also a variable component of implicit commitment that crucially depends on the justification given for our acceptance of S in which, for instance, may or may not appear (proof-theoretic) reflection principles for S. We claim that the proposed framework regulates in a natural and uniform way our acceptance of different arithmetical theories

A Theory of Implicit Commitment for Mathematical Theories

The notion of implicit commitment has played a prominent role in recent works in logic and philosophy of mathematics. Although implicit commitment is often associated with highly technical studies, it remains so far an elusive notion. In particular, it is often claimed that the acceptance of a mathematical theory implicitly commits one to the acceptance of a Uniform Reflection Principle for it. However, philosophers agree that a satisfactory analysis of the transition from a theory to its reflection principle is still lacking. We provide an axiomatization of the minimal commitments implicit in the acceptance of a mathematical theory. The theory entails that the Uniform Reflection Principle is part of one's implicit commitments, and sheds light on the reason why this is so. We argue that the theory has interesting epistemological consequences in that it explains how justified belief in the axioms of a theory can be preserved to the corresponding reflection principle. The theory also improves on recent proposals for the analysis of implicit commitment based on truth or epistemic notions

Kelley-Morse set theory does not prove the class Fodor principle

We show that Kelley-Morse KM set theory does not prove the class Fodor principle, the assertion that every regressive class function F : S → Ord defined on a stationary class S is constant on a stationary subclass. Indeed, for every ω ≤ λ ≤ Ord, it is relatively consistent with KM that there is a class function F : Ord → λ that is not constant on any stationary class, and moreover λ is the least ordinal for which such a counterexample function exists. As a corollary of this result, it is consistent with KM that there is a class A ⊆ ω × Ord such that each section An = {α| (n,α) ∈ A} contains a class club, but nAn is empty. Consequently, it is relatively consistent with KM that the class club filter is not σ-closed