118,037 research outputs found
Consumer Loss Aversion and the Intensity of Competition
Consider a differentiated product market in which all consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the time they make their purchasing decision. Initially, consumers become informed about the prices of all products in the market but do not know the match values. Some consumers have reference-dependent utilities—i.e., they form a reference-point distribution with respect to match value and price that will make them realize gains or losses if their eventually chosen product performs better or, respectively, worse than their reference point in both dimensions. Loss aversion in the match-value dimension leads to a less competitive outcome, while loss aversion in the price dimension leads to a more competitive equilibrium than a market in which consumers are not subject to reference dependence. Depending on the weights consumers attach to the price and the match-value dimension, a market with loss-averse consumers may be more or less competitive than a market with consumers that do not have reference-dependent utilities. We also show that consumer loss aversion tends to lead to higher prices if the market accommodates a larger number of ?rms
Consumer Loss Aversion and the Intensity of Competition
Consider a differentiated product market in which all consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the time they make their purchasing decision. Initially, consumers become informed about the prices of all products in the market but do not know the match values. Some consumers have reference-dependent utilities—i.e., they form a reference-point distribution with respect to match value and price that will make them realize gains or losses if their eventually chosen product performs better or, respectively, worse than their reference point in both dimensions. Loss aversion in the match-value dimension leads to a less competitive outcome, while loss aversion in the price dimension leads to a more competitive equilibrium than a market in which consumers are not subject to reference dependence. Depending on the weights consumers attach to the price and the match-value dimension, a market with loss-averse consumers may be more or less competitive than a market with consumers that do not have reference-dependent utilities. We also show that consumer loss aversion tends to lead to higher prices if the market accommodates a larger number of ?rms.Loss Aversion; Reference-Dependent Utility; Behavioral Industrial Organization; Imperfect Competition; Product Differentiation
Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers
Abstract: We develop a theory of imperfect competition with loss-averse consumers. All consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the time they make their purchasing decision. However, a share of consumers are initially uncertain about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and an expected price distribution, while other consumers are perfectly informed all the time. We derive pricing implications in duopoly with asymmetric ?rms. In particular, we show that a market may exhibit more price variation the larger the share of uninformed, loss-averse consumers. We also derive implications for ?rm strategy and public policy concerning ?rms’ incentives to inform consumers about their match value prior to forming their reference point
Choice of new attributes in the 'Elimination by Aspects' duopoly
The "Elimination by aspects" (EBA) duopoly of product differentiation (Laurent, 2006a) was constructed from the discrete model of probabilistic choice worked out by Tversky (1972a,b). In this framework, an unique price equilibrium exists with a "differentiation by attributes", which embodies horizontal and vertical differentiations as possible special cases. This paper extends this analysis by studying a two-stage game in which firms choose the specific attributes of their product and then compete in prices. At the price equilibrium, the "competitive effect", present in pure vertical differentiation models, is replaced by a "differentiation effect" in this EBA duopoly. Subgame perfect Nash equilibria are shown to exist with exogenous costs but also with attributes-dependent unit and fixed costs. At the equilibrium, products are generally differentiated both horizontally and vertically. But a purely vertical outcome may also occur when costs of innovation are strongly convex or when consumers are very sensible to the price levels. When costs are endogenous, the social optimum is achieved for a pure horizontal differentiation. Thus, there is too much differentiation at the equilibrium: the vertical dimension induces a strong raise of prices, which also reduces the welfare.elimination-by-aspects ; product differentiation ; quality choices ; welfare analysis
“Ineffective” competition: a puzzle?
Conventionally, we think of an increase in competition as weakly decreasing prices, increasing the number of consumers served, thus increasing consumer surplus, decreasing firms profits, etc. Here, we demonstrate that, under some tame circumstances, an increase in competition may lead to a price increase in a horizontally differentiated market. We show this relationship for the petrol market in German cities
Network industries in the new economy
In this paper we discuss two propositions: the supply and demand of knowledge, and network externalities. We outline the characteristics that distinguish knowledge- intensive industries from the general run of manufacturing and service businesses. Knowledge intensity and knowledge specialisation has developed as markets and globalisation have grown, leading to progressive incentives to outsource and for industries to deconstruct. The outcome has been more intensive competition. The paper looks at what is potentially the most powerful economic mechanism: positive feedback, alternatively known as demand-side increasing returns, network effects, or network externalities. We present alternative demand curves that incorporate positive feedback and discuss their potential economic and strategic consequences. We argue that knowledge supply and demand, and the dynamics of network externalities create new situations for our traditional industrial economy such that new types of economies of scale are emerging and "winner takes all" strategies are having more influence. This is the first of a pair of papers. A second paper will take the argument further and look at the nature of firms' strategies in the new world, arguing that technology standards, technical platforms, consumer networks, and supply chain strategies are making a significant contribution to relevant strategies within the new economy
Data Gaps in Evidence-Based Research on Small Water Enterprises in Developing Countries
This paper assess the literature on small water enterprises -- water delivery operations that predominantly provide water at the community level. A research agenda is recommended to advance knowledge on effective SWE service
The Taste for Variety: A Hedonic Analysis
Based on the model of consumers' variety-seeking behavior introduced by Anderson et al. (1992), this paper derives a hedonic price function for a households' consumption bundle. The price a consumer pays for her consumption bundle reflects the values of the underlying attributes of goods purchased but also accounts for any preference for variety that she might have. The empirical analysis is conducted for 3,240 German households and their expenditure on 182 different soft drinks over a six-month period. We find that consumers have a preference for variety in food consumption, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the per-unit price is found to be significantly larger for higher income households, as well as households where the principal wage earner has a high level of education. Larger households tend to spend less on soft drinks per unit.consumer demand, taste for variety, food products, hedonic analysis, Germany, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, C21, D12,
Modeling the Psychology of Consumer and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics
Marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and
consumers actually behave in markets. Marketing models are usually applications of
economic theories. These theories are general and produce precise predictions, but they
rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms. Theories based on
rationality limits could prove similarly general and precise, while grounding theories in
psychological plausibility and explaining facts which are puzzles for the standard
approach.
Behavioral economics explores the implications of limits of rationality. The goal is to
make economic theories more plausible while maintaining formal power and accurate
prediction of field data. This review focuses selectively on six types of models used in
behavioral economics that can be applied to marketing.
Three of the models generalize consumer preference to allow (1) sensitivity to reference
points (and loss-aversion); (2) social preferences toward outcomes of others; and (3)
preference for instant gratification (quasi-hyperbolic discounting). The three models are
applied to industrial channel bargaining, salesforce compensation, and pricing of virtuous
goods such as gym memberships. The other three models generalize the concept of gametheoretic
equilibrium, allowing decision makers to make mistakes (quantal response
equilibrium), encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking (cognitive hierarchy),
and equilibrate by learning from feedback (self-tuning EWA). These are applied to
marketing strategy problems involving differentiated products, competitive entry into
large and small markets, and low-price guarantees.
The main goal of this selected review is to encourage marketing researchers of all kinds
to apply these tools to marketing. Understanding the models and applying them is a
technical challenge for marketing modelers, which also requires thoughtful input from
psychologists studying details of consumer behavior. As a result, models like these could
create a common language for modelers who prize formality and psychologists who prize
realism
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