The Liar Paradox: A Consistent and Semantically Closed Solution

This thesis develops a new approach to the formal de nition of a truth predicate that allows a consistent, semantically closed defiition within classical logic. The approach is built on an analysis of structural properties of languages that make Liar Sentences and the paradoxical argument possible. By focusing on these conditions, standard formal dfinitions of semantics are shown to impose systematic limitations on the definition of formal truth predicates. The alternative approach to the formal definition of truth is developed by analysing our intuitive procedure for evaluating the truth value of sentences like "P is true". It is observed that the standard procedure breaks down in the case of the Liar Paradox as a side effect of the patterns of naming or reference necessary to the definition of Truth as a predicate. This means there are two ways in which a sentence like "P is true" can be not true, which requires that the T-Schema be modified for such sentences. By modifying the T-Schema, and taking seriously the effects of the patterns of naming/ reference on truth values, the new approach to the definition of truth is developed. Formal truth definitions within classical logic are constructed that provide an explicit and adequate truth definition for their own language, every sentence within the languages has a truth value, and there is no Strengthened Liar Paradox. This approach to solving the Liar Paradox can be easily applied to a very wide range of languages, including natural languages

Taking Our Actual Constitution Seriously

In this review, by concentrating on the general aim of Dworkin\u27s book, I hope to contribute to the discussion this book is sure to generate. What does the moral reading of our Constitution amount to, and what alternative do we have to endorsing such a reading? I ask these questions from what I would call a jurisprudentialperspective. For, while I do teach Jurisprudence, I do not teach Constitutional Law, other than some constitutional law themes that find their way into my Property and Wills & Trusts courses. Accordingly, I am not well placed to review the details orthe nuances of developments after Roe v. Wade,2 or the progeny spawned by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 two cases that dominate Parts I and II, respectively, of the book. But this personal limitation leaves me room perhaps for a more considered review of Dworkin\u27s main thrust in this book, which is directed toward makinghis view of the Constitution credible, or palatable, to his reader. Dworkin\u27s theory of how to read the Constitution is, after all, central to his argument

Implications of Foundational Crisis in Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research

As a result of a sequence of so-called foundational crises, mathematicians have come to realize that foundational inquiries are difficult and perhaps never ending. Accounts of the last of these crises have appeared with increasing frequency in the legal literature, and one piece of this Article examines these invocations with a critical eye. The other piece introduces a framework for thinking about law as a discipline. On the one hand, the disciplinary framework helps explain how esoteric mathematical topics made their way into the legal literature. On the other hand, the mathematics can be used to examine some aspects of interdisciplinary legal research

Les Ombres aveugles de Narcisse

L'objective principal de cette étude est d'observer comment certains des attributs evolutives essentiels de l'humanité, comme la criativité, l'imagination et la association, peuvent devenir une maladie dangereuse, à labri des ombres brumeuses de l'inteligence

Marxism and Deconstruction

Originally published in 1982. Aside from Jacques Derrida's own references to the "possible articulation" between deconstruction and Marxism, the relationship between the two has remained largely unexplored. In Marxism and Deconstruction, Michael Ryan examines that multifaceted relationship but not through a mere comparison of two distinct and inviolable entities. Instead, he looks at both with an eye to identifying their common elements and reweaving them into a new theory of political practice. To accomplish his task, Ryan undertakes a detailed comparison of deconstruction and Marxism, relating deconstruction to the dialectical tradition in philosophy and demonstrating how deconstruction can be used in the critique of ideology. He is a forceful critic of both the politics of deconstruction and the metaphysical aspect of Marxism (as seen from a deconstructionist perspective). Besides offering the first book-length study of Derrida in this context, Ryan makes the first methodic attempt by an American scholar to apply deconstruction to domains beyond literature. He proposes a deconstructive Marxism, one lacking the metaphysical underpinnings of conservative "scientific" Marxist theory and employing deconstructive analysis both for Marxist political criticism and to further current anti-metaphysical developments within Marxism. Marxism and Deconstruction is an innovative and controversial contribution to the fields of literary criticism, philosophy, and political science

Jevons, Debreu and the foundations of mathematical economics: an historical and semiotic analysis

This thesis analyses whether the criticism that 20th c economic theory is too abstract, and lacking in economic meaning as a consequence of being mathematical, is justified, from a methodological perspective that is epistemological in character (cf ch2 and Cheix, 1996). Using, firstly the 'external' historical approach, that compares. Economics to the sciences (especially Mathematics chs 5, 6, 7, 8); and, secondly, the semiotic approach, that enquires into the contribution of notation to meaning, the thesis examines the historical and cognitive raison d'etre of mathematics in Economics. The thesis identifies (chs l, 2) 20th c mathematical-economics with model building and neoclassical theory. The main lines of argument are developed with reference to Jevons' Theory of Political Economy and Debreu's Theory of Value. This limitation is practical but not unnecessarily restrictive as the authors are major neo-classical writers, and mathematical economics has developed along the lines they envisaged. Further, neo-classical ideas have established themselves as paradigms of 20th c Economics, and have influenced theories in the social sciences and their mathematization. It is shown that Jevons (ch5) used the symbolism, and in particular, the linearity property of differentials to unify economic theory and the sciences on the pattern of Physics. For him however, the mathematization of economics involved also empirical and experimental inquiries using statistics. For the case of Debreu (ch6) it is shown how he used set-theoretic formalism and fixed point theorems to provide equilibrium theory with logico-mathematical content. This content is viewed as an axiomatic and deductive structure implying equilibrium. The definitions of mathematical economic models discussed in Part 3 show that economics was mathematized through influences not only from Physics, but also from Logic, and, more widely from the 20th c (socio-cultural) trend of model building in science. It is argued that this latter trend is not exclusively, or even necessarily, rooted in neo-classical economics. The semiotic analysis of chs 5 and 6 reveals how notations connect different interpretative levels ('isotopies') of mathematical theories, and how inconsistences may arise between these levels. The general conclusion of the thesis given certain methodological provisos, is that mathematization, in itself, is not a cause of, or explanation for, the emptiness of economic theories

Bowdoin College Catalogue (2011-2012)

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