An Analysis of Multiple Layered Networks

Current infrastructure network models of single functionality do not typically account for the interdependent nature of infrastructure networks. Infrastructure networks are generally modeled individually, as an isolated network or with minimal recognition of interactions. This research develops a methodology to model the individual infrastructure network types while explicitly modeling their interconnected effects. The result is a formulation built with two sets of variables (the original set to model infrastructure characteristics and an additional set representing cuts of interdependent elements). This formulation is decomposed by variable type using Benders Partitioning and solved to optimality using a Benders Partitioning algorithm. Current infrastructure network models of single functionality do not typically account for the interdependent nature of infrastructure networks, Infrastructure networks are generally modeled individually, as an isolated network or with minimal recognition of interactions, This research develops a methodology to model the individual infrastructure network types while explicitly modeling their interconnected effects, The result is a formulation built with two sets of variables (the original set to model infrastructure characteristics and an additional set representing cuts of interdependent elements) This formulation is decomposed by variable type using Benders\u27 Partitioning and solved to optimality using a Benders\u27 Partitioning algorithm

Cascade effects of load shedding in coupled networks

Intricate webs of interlinked critical infrastructures such as electrical grid, telecommunication, and transportation are essential for the minimal functioning of contemporary societies and economies. Advances in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) underpin the increasing interconnectivity of these systems which created new vulnerabilities that can be seriously affected by hardware failure, link cut, human error, natural disaster, physical-attacks and cyber-attacks. Failure of a fraction on nodes may lead to failure of dependent nodes in the other networks. Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to investigate the cascades phenomena caused by load shedding between two interconnected networks using Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld sandpile modeling. We have found that, large avalanche occurred when node degree and/interconnectivity link become dense. In addition, the coupled random-regular networks have been found to be more robust than the coupled Erdos-Renyi networks. However, coupled random-regular networks are vulnerable to random attack and coupled Erdos-Renyi networks are vulnerable to target attack due to the degree distribution

Enhanced Interconnection Model in Geographically Interdependent Networks

Interconnection between telecommunication networks and other critical infrastructures is usually established through nodes that are spatially close, generating a geographical interdependency. Previous work has shown that in general, geographically interdependent networks are more robust with respect to cascading failures when the interconnection radius (r) is large. However, to obtain a more realistic model, the allocation of interlinks in geographically interdependent networks should consider other factors. In this paper, an enhanced interconnection model for geographically interdependent networks is presented. The model proposed introduces a new strategy for interconnecting nodes between two geographical networks by limiting the number of interlinks. Results have shown that the model yields promising results to maintain an acceptable level in network robustness under cascading failures with a decrease in the number of interlinks

An emergent security risk : critical infrastructures and information warfare

This paper examines the emergent security risk that information warfare poses to critical infrastructure systems, particularly as governments are increasingly concerned with protecting these assets against attack or disruption. Initially it outlines critical infrastructure systems and the notion of information warfare. It then discusses the potential implications and examining the concerns and vulnerabilities such cyber attacks would pose, utilising exemplar online attack occurrences. It then examines the current Australian situation before suggesting some considerations to mitigate the potential risk that information warfare poses to critical infrastructure systems, and by association: government, industry and the wider community.<br /

Strengthening the cyber resilience of the financial sector

The debate about the cyber resilience of the financial sector has become more important in recent years. In this article the authors endeavour to clarify the meaning of this concept and why it has become a topic of growing concern for financial institutions and authorities. They analyse how cyber resilience in the financial sector has evolved in recent years, its current situation and the trends observed. Lastly, they define the way in which the different actors involved work towards enhancing it. In particular, they describe the various regulatory and supervisory actions conducted by the sectoral authorities in this field

Modelling Telecommunications Operators and Adversaries using Game Theory

Telecommunications systems being inherently distributed and collaborative in nature present a plurality of attack surfaces to malicious entities and hence vulnerable to many potential attacks even indirectly demanding a need in prioritising security. The choice of security implementations depends upon the currently understood threats, future possible threat vectors, and the dependencies between systems. Executing these choices while contemplating the financial aspects is exceptionally difficult. It is thus critical to have a perceptible decision support framework for better security decision-making. This thesis studies the strategic nature of the interaction between the Telecoms operators and attackers utilising game theory to understand their strategic decision-making characteristics strengthening security decisions. To understand the security investment decision-making criteria of operators, this thesis utilises static security investment games. Through these games, we study the effects of security investment decision of an operator on other operators' behaviour. We determine conditions supporting the security investment decisions and propose strategic recommendations supplementing the dependency conditions. We then study attackers' behaviour considering them with strategic incentives in contrary to their strictly-bounded rationality in traditional game-theoretic modelling approaches. We utilise a behavioural approach and design a decision-flow model capturing the choices of attackers in the attack process. An outcome of this work is a generalised attack framework. Moreover, using this framework, we derive attack strategies optimising attackers' effort. Through this work, we are probing the foundations for drawing inferences about attackers' strategic characteristics from a cybersecurity perspective