Venture Capital as Human Resource Management

Venture capitalists add value to portfolio firms by obtaining and transferring information about senior managers across firms over time. Information transfer occurs on a significant scale and takes place both among a single venture capitalist%u2019s portfolio firms and between different venture capitalists%u2019 firms via a network of venture capitalists, which venture capitalists use to locate and relocate managers. Cross-sectional differences are associated with differences in the intensity with which venture capitalists network. The observable factors relevant in explaining the intensity with which venture capitalists network include: 1) the value of the information transmitted through the network, 2) the riskiness of the activities of portfolio firms, 3) the size of the venture capital fund, 4) the degree of difficulty in enticing executives to manage portfolio firms, and 5) the reputation of the venture capitalist for successfully recycling managers. These factors reflect costs and benefits to venture capitalists of participating in the network.

Venture capital as human resource management

Part of the way venture capitalists add value to portfolio firms is by obtaining and transferring information about senior managers across firms over time. Information transfer occurs on a significant scale and takes place both among a single venture capitalists portfolio firms and between different venture capitalists firms via a network of venture capitalists, which venture capitalists use to locate and relocate managers. We collect and analyze survey data on the operation of this human resource network. Theoretical and empirical analyses indicate that cross-sectional differences among portfolio firms are associated with differences in the intensity with which venture capitalists network. The observable factors relevant in explaining the intensity with which venture capitalists network include: 1) the value of the information transmitted though the network, 2) the riskiness of the activities of the portfolio firms, 3) the size of the venture capital fund, 4) the degree of difficulty in enticing executives to manage portfolio firms, and 5) the reputation of the venture capitalist for successfully recycling managers. We show that each of these factors reflects the costs and benefits to venture capitalists of participating in the network.

Building Assets to Reduce Poverty and Injustice

Outlines the basic ideas for Ford's Asset Building & Community Development Program to support the development of financial holdings, natural resources, social bonds, and marketable skills for low-income people in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the U.S

Estimating Optimal Landfill Sizes and Locations in North Dakota

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Land Economics/Use,

Property Rights and Environmental Policy: A New Zealand Perspective

This paper is intended to lay out a preliminary foundation for applying a property rights perspective to environmental policy issues facing New Zealand. It does not attempt to apply such an approach to any specific issue. Rather it summarises the core principles behind effective rights regimes (illustrated by the evolution of rights over time), reviews how such regimes have been applied to environmental issues internationally, and describes current natural resource rights regimes in New Zealand. The purpose of applying property rights to the environment can vary widely and reflect quite different perspectives. Regulation by any form, however, whether command-and-control or market-based, creates or modifies property rights. While private property rights will not always be appropriate, the alternatives redefine and reallocate rights rather than eliminating them. A common or public property right remains a right held by someone. The choice is not therefore whether to modify property rights to improve environmental outcomes, but how to do so in a way that optimises national welfare. However, if more use of market-based instruments is appropriate, then the work required to create the legal, institutional and scientific framework to successfully implement them (including trading off social, economic and environmental outcomes) should not be under-estimated. Fishing and water rights demonstrate these difficulties and the payoff (for fisheries at least) that can be achieved.Property Rights, Transferability, Market Based Instruments (MBI), Environmental Policy, New Zealand

INCENTIVE-LOCATION PLANNING FOR WASTE-TO-ENERGY SYSTEM

Master'sMASTER OF ENGINEERIN

Kilo-instruction processors: overcoming the memory wall

Historically, advances in integrated circuit technology have driven improvements in processor microarchitecture and led to todays microprocessors with sophisticated pipelines operating at very high clock frequencies. However, performance improvements achievable by high-frequency microprocessors have become seriously limited by main-memory access latencies because main-memory speeds have improved at a much slower pace than microprocessor speeds. Its crucial to deal with this performance disparity, commonly known as the memory wall, to enable future high-frequency microprocessors to achieve their performance potential. To overcome the memory wall, we propose kilo-instruction processors-superscalar processors that can maintain a thousand or more simultaneous in-flight instructions. Doing so means designing key hardware structures so that the processor can satisfy the high resource requirements without significantly decreasing processor efficiency or increasing energy consumption.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Closing the Gap: A Comparison of Approaches to Encourage Early Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions

Das Kyoto-Protokoll zur UN-Klimarahmenkonvention setzt verbindliche Treibhausgasemissionsziele f�r Industriel�nder, die allerdings erst im Zeitraum 2008-2012 gelten. Da f�r die Zeit bis 2008 mit einem erheblichen Emissionsanstieg zu rechnen ist, wird �ber Ans�tze nachgedacht, schon vorher Anreize f�r Emissionsverringerungen zu setzen. Fr�hzeitige Emissionsverringerung reduziert das Risiko, klimatische Schwellenwerte zu �berschreiten, die nichtlineare Ver�nderungen im Klimasystem ausl�sen. Au�erdem wird der normale Investitionszyklus ausgenutzt, indem Neuinvestitionen emissions�rmer ausfallen. Dies verursacht keine oder nur geringe Kosten. Dazu bedarf es konkreter Anreize, die unterschiedlich ausfallen k�nnen. W�hrend in Nordamerika eine freiwillige vorzeitige Anrechnung von Emissionsverringerungsma�nahmen auf die Verpflichtungen des Kyoto-Protokolls diskutiert wird, werden in Europa konkrete marktwirtschaftliche Instrumente wie Emissions- oder Energiesteuer sowie Emissionsrechtshandel geplant und teilweise bereits umgesetzt. Die vorzeitige Anrechnung erzeugt einen Anreiz zur Emissionsverringerung in den erfa�ten Sektoren. Allerdings wirkt dieser Anreiz nur indirekt, da der Preis f�r Emissionsrechte von der Wahrscheinlichkeit der Umsetzung des Kyoto-Protokolls und davon abh�ngt, ob und in welchem Ma�e das Unternehmen zuk�nftigen Regulierungen unterworfen sein wird. Entscheidend ist nun die Wahl des Referenzszenarios, das zur Berechnung der Anzahl der Emissionsrechte herangezogen wird. In den nordamerikanischen Vorschl�gen werden dazu h�chst unterschiedliche Verfahren angewandt. Die Ber�cksichtigung bereits erfolgter Verringerungen sowie von Verringerungen im Ausland und Kohlenstoffspeicherung in Biomasse ist umstritten. Die Bestimmung des Referenzszenarios f�hrt unweigerlich dazu, da� manche Verringerungen nicht angerechnet werden; beispielsweise solche aus ver�ndertem Konsumverhalten. Vorzeitige Anrechnung f�hrt zu Umverteilungseffekten, die enorme Gr��enordnungen erreichen k�nnen. Jede Zuteilung von Emissionsrechten zwingt die Nichtteilnehmer zu h�heren Anstrengungen w�hrend der Zielperiode. Dabei handelt es sich voraussichtlich um die Unternehmen mit den h�chsten Verringerungskosten. Diese Effekte wirken desto st�rker, je h�her der Anteil von Emissionsrechten ist, der f�r vergangene oder fiktive Emissionsverringerungen ausgegeben wurde. Vorzeitige Anrechnung ist also ein Instrument mit deutlichen Schw�chen. Marktorientierte Instrumente sind eindeutig vorzuziehen. Auch kommt die vorzeitige Anrechnung nicht mit einfachen Regeln aus; der f�r ihre Einf�hrung notwendige Regelungsaufwand sollte lieber in die Schaffung von Anreizsystemen investiert werden, die bruchlos in die Zielperiode des Kyoto-Protokolls einm�nden. Falls diese jedoch politisch nicht durchsetzbar erscheinen, ist die vorzeitige Anrechnung dem Verzicht auf jegliche Klimapolitik vorzuziehen.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Contingent Valuation, Hypothetical Bias, and Experimental Economics

Although the contingent valuation method has been widely used to value a diverse array of nonmarket environmental and natural resource commodities, recent empirical evidence suggests it may not accurately estimate real economic values. The hypothetical nature of environmental valuation surveys typically results in responses that are significantly greater than actual payments. Economists have had mixed success in developing techniques designed to control for this "hypothetical bias." This paper highlights the role of experimental economics in addressing hypothetical bias, and identifies a gap in the existing literature by focusing on the underlying causes of this bias. Most of the calibration techniques used today lack a theoretical justification, and therefore these procedures need to be used with caution. We argue that future experimental research should investigate the reasons hypothetical bias persists. A better understanding of the causes should enhance the effectiveness of calibration techniques.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Auction Design without Commitment

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary equilibria are characterized in the language of vonNeumann-Morgenstern stable sets. This simplifies the analysis remarkably. In the one buyer case, we obtain the Coase conjecture: the buyer obtains all the surplus and efficiency is reached. However, in the multiple buyer case the seller can achieve more: she is able to commit to the English auction. Typically the converse also holds, the English auction is the only stable auction mechanism.Auction theory, commitment, stable sets