Typicality, graded membership, and vagueness

This paper addresses theoretical problems arising from the vagueness of language terms, and intuitions of the vagueness of the concepts to which they refer. It is argued that the central intuitions of prototype theory are sufficient to account for both typicality phenomena and psychological intuitions about degrees of membership in vaguely defined classes. The first section explains the importance of the relation between degrees of membership and typicality (or goodness of example) in conceptual categorization. The second and third section address arguments advanced by Osherson and Smith (1997), and Kamp and Partee (1995), that the two notions of degree of membership and typicality must relate to fundamentally different aspects of conceptual representations. A version of prototype theory—the Threshold Model—is proposed to counter these arguments and three possible solutions to the problems of logical selfcontradiction and tautology for vague categorizations are outlined. In the final section graded membership is related to the social construction of conceptual boundaries maintained through language use

An Ontology for Grounding Vague Geographic Terms

Many geographic terms, such as “river” and “lake”, are vague, with no clear boundaries of application. In particular, the spatial extent of such features is often vaguely carved out of a continuously varying observable domain. We present a means of defining vague terms using standpoint semantics, a refinement of the philosophical idea of supervaluation semantics. Such definitions can be grounded in actual data by geometric analysis and segmentation of the data set. The issues raised by this process with regard to the nature of boundaries and domains of logical quantification are discussed. We describe a prototype implementation of a system capable of segmenting attributed polygon data into geographically significant regions and evaluating queries involving vague geographic feature terms

Intelligent computational sketching support for conceptual design

Sketches, with their flexibility and suggestiveness, are in many ways ideal for expressing emerging design concepts. This can be seen from the fact that the process of representing early designs by free-hand drawings was used as far back as in the early 15th century [1]. On the other hand, CAD systems have become widely accepted as an essential design tool in recent years, not least because they provide a base on which design analysis can be carried out. Efficient transfer of sketches into a CAD representation, therefore, is a powerful addition to the designers' armoury.It has been pointed out by many that a pen-on-paper system is the best tool for sketching. One of the crucial requirements of a computer aided sketching system is its ability to recognise and interpret the elements of sketches. 'Sketch recognition', as it has come to be known, has been widely studied by people working in such fields: as artificial intelligence to human-computer interaction and robotic vision. Despite the continuing efforts to solve the problem of appropriate conceptual design modelling, it is difficult to achieve completely accurate recognition of sketches because usually sketches implicate vague information, and the idiosyncratic expression and understanding differ from each designer

Arguments Whose Strength Depends on Continuous Variation

Both the traditional Aristotelian and modern symbolic approaches to logic have seen logic in terms of discrete symbol processing. Yet there are several kinds of argument whose validity depends on some topological notion of continuous variation, which is not well captured by discrete symbols. Examples include extrapolation and slippery slope arguments, sorites, fuzzy logic, and those involving closeness of possible worlds. It is argued that the natural first attempts to analyze these notions and explain their relation to reasoning fail, so that ignorance of their nature is profound