Intransitivity and Vagueness

There are many examples in the literature that suggest that indistinguishability is intransitive, despite the fact that the indistinguishability relation is typically taken to be an equivalence relation (and thus transitive). It is shown that if the uncertainty perception and the question of when an agent reports that two things are indistinguishable are both carefully modeled, the problems disappear, and indistinguishability can indeed be taken to be an equivalence relation. Moreover, this model also suggests a logic of vagueness that seems to solve many of the problems related to vagueness discussed in the philosophical literature. In particular, it is shown here how the logic can handle the sorites paradox.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper appears in Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference (KR 2004

Computing Strong and Weak Permissions in Defeasible Logic

In this paper we propose an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent and compute three concepts of defeasible permission. In particular, we discuss different types of explicit permissive norms that work as exceptions to opposite obligations. Moreover, we show how strong permissions can be represented both with, and without introducing a new consequence relation for inferring conclusions from explicit permissive norms. Finally, we illustrate how a preference operator applicable to contrary-to-duty obligations can be combined with a new operator representing ordered sequences of strong permissions which derogate from prohibitions. The logical system is studied from a computational standpoint and is shown to have liner computational complexity

Implementing Default and Autoepistemic Logics via the Logic of GK

The logic of knowledge and justified assumptions, also known as logic of grounded knowledge (GK), was proposed by Lin and Shoham as a general logic for nonmonotonic reasoning. To date, it has been used to embed in it default logic (propositional case), autoepistemic logic, Turner's logic of universal causation, and general logic programming under stable model semantics. Besides showing the generality of GK as a logic for nonmonotonic reasoning, these embeddings shed light on the relationships among these other logics. In this paper, for the first time, we show how the logic of GK can be embedded into disjunctive logic programming in a polynomial but non-modular translation with new variables. The result can then be used to compute the extension/expansion semantics of default logic, autoepistemic logic and Turner's logic of universal causation by disjunctive ASP solvers such as claspD(-2), DLV, GNT and cmodels.Comment: Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR 2014

Strategic Argumentation is NP-Complete

In this paper we study the complexity of strategic argumentation for dialogue games. A dialogue game is a 2-player game where the parties play arguments. We show how to model dialogue games in a skeptical, non-monotonic formalism, and we show that the problem of deciding what move (set of rules) to play at each turn is an NP-complete problem

Sequence Semantics for Modelling Reason-based Preferences

We study how the non-classical n-ary operator circle times, originally intended to capture the concept of reparative obligation, can be used in the context of social choice theory to model preferences. A novel possible-world model-theoretic semantics, called sequence semantics, was proposed for the operator. In this paper, we propose a sound and complete axiomatisation of a minimal modal logic for the operator, and we extend it with axioms suitable to model social choice consistency principles such as extension consistency and contraction consistency. We provide completeness results for such extensions

Logics for strategic reasoning and collective decision-making

Strategic decision-making is ubiquitous in everyday life. The analysis of game strategies has been a research theme in game theory for several decades since von Neumann and Morgenstern. Sophisticated models and analysis tools have been developed with wide applications in Economics, Management Science, Social Science and Computer Science, especially in the field of Artificial Intelligence. However, \much of game theory is about the question whether strategic equilibria exist", as Johan van Benthem, a world-leading logician and game-theorist, points out, \but there are hardly any explicit languages for defining, comparing, or combining strategies". Without such a facility it is challenging for computer scientists to build intelligent agents that are capable of strategic decision-making. In the last twenty years, logical approaches have been proposed to tackle this problem. Pioneering work includes Game Logics, Coalition Logic and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). These logics either provide facilities for expressing and combining games or offer mechanisms for reasoning about strategic abilities of players. But none of them can solve the problem. The intrinsic difficulty in establishing such a logic is that reasoning about strategies requires combinations of temporal reasoning, counterfactual reasoning, reasoning about actions, preferences and knowledge, as well as reasoning about multi-agent interactions and coalitional abilities. More recently, a few new logical formalisms have been proposed by extending ATL with strategy variables in order to express strategies explicitly. However, most of these logics tend to have high computational complexity, because ATL introduces quantifications over strategies (functions), which leaves little hope of building any tractable inference system based on such a logic. This thesis takes up the challenge by using a bottom-up approach in order to create a balance between expressive power and computational efficiency. Instead of starting with a highly complicated logic, we propose a set of logical frameworks based on a simple and practical logical language, called Game Description Language (GDL), which has been used as an official language for General Game Playing (GGP) since 2005. To represent game strategies, we extend GDL with two binary prioritized connectives for combining actions in terms of their priorities specified by these connectives, and provide it with a semantics based on the standard state transition model. To reason about the strategic abilities of players, we further extend the framework with coalition operators from ATL for specifying the strategic abilities of players. More importantly, a unified semantics is provided for both GDL- and ATL- formulas, which allows us to verify and reason about game strategies. Interestingly, the framework can be used to formalize the fundamental game-playing principles and formally derive two well-known results on two-player games: Weak Determinacy and Zermelo's Theorem. We also show that the model-checking problem of the logic is not worse than that of ATL*, an extension of ATL. To deal with imperfect information games, we extend GDL with the standard epistemic operators and provide it with a semantics based on the epistemic state transition model. The language allows us to specify an imperfect information game and formalize its epistemic properties. Meanwhile, the framework allows us to reason about players' own as well as other players' knowledge during game playing. Most importantly, the logic has a moderate computational complexity, which makes it significantly different from similar existing frameworks. To investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of players and its coalitional abilities, we provide a variant of semantics for ATL with imperfect information. The relation between knowledge sharing and coalitional abilities is investigated through the interplay of epistemic and coalition modalities. Moreover, this semantics is able to preserve the desirable properties of coalitional abilities. To deal with collective decision-making, we apply the approach of combining actions via their priorities for collective choice. We extend propositional logic with the prioritized connective for modelling reason-based individual and collective choices. Not only individual preferences but also aggregation rules can be expressed within this logic. A model-checking algorithm for this logic is thus developed to automatically generate individual and collective choices. In many real-world situations, a group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups different priorities to determine the collective judgment. We design an aggregation rule based on the priorities of individuals so as to investigate how the judgment from each individual affects group judgment in a hierarchical environment. We also show that this rule satisfies a set of plausible conditions and has a tractable computational complexity