A qualitative logic of decision

An important aspect of intelligent behavior is the ability to reason, make decisions, and act in spite of uncertainty. This paper presents a qualitative logic of decision that supports decision-making under uncertainty. To be specific, the paper presents a knowledge representation language based upon subjective Bayesian decision theory that aims to capture some aspects of common-sense reasoning associated with making decisions about actions. The language addresses the problem of describing justifications of rational choices in situations where the alternatives involve trading off potential losses and gains. The logic and an associated qualitative arithmetic are implemented in an efficient PROLOG program. Examples illustrate their use in several concrete decision-making situations

Framework development for providing accessibility to qualitative spatial calculi

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.Qualitative spatial reasoning deals with knowledge about an infinite spatial domain using a finite set of qualitative relations without using numerical computation. Qualitative knowledge is relative knowledge where we obtain the knowledge on the basis of comparison of features with in the object domain rather then using some external scales. Reasoning is an intellectual facility by which, conclusions are drawn from premises and is present in our everyday interaction with the geographical world. The kind of reasoning that human being relies on is based on commonsense knowledge in everyday situations. During the last decades a multitude of formal calculi over spatial relations have been proposed by focusing on different aspects of space like topology, orientation and distance. Qualitative spatial reasoning engines like SparQ and GQR represents space and reasoning about the space based on qualitative spatial relations and bring qualitative reasoning closer to the geographic applications. Their relations and certain operations defined in qualitative calculi use to infer new knowledge on different aspects of space. Today GIS does not support common-sense reasoning due to limitation for how to formalize spatial inferences. It is important to focus on common sense geographic reasoning, reasoning as it is performed by human. Human perceive and represents geographic information qualitatively, the integration of reasoner with spatial application enables GIS users to represent and extract geographic information qualitatively using human understandable query language. In this thesis, I designed and developed common API framework using platform independent software like XML and JAVA that used to integrate qualitative spatial reasoning engines (SparQ) with GIS application. SparQ is set of modules that structured to provides different reasoning services. SparQ supports command line instructions and it has a specific syntax as set of commands. The developed API provides interface between GIS application and reasoning engine. It establishes connection with reasoner over TCP/IP, takes XML format queries as input from GIS application and converts into SparQ module specific syntax. Similarly it extracts given result, converts it into defined XML format and passes it to GIS application over the same TCP/IP connection. The most challenging part of thesis was SparQ syntax analysis for inputs and their outputs. Each module in Sparq takes module specific query syntax and generates results in multiple syntaxes like; error, simple result and result with comments. Reasoner supports both binary and ternary calculi. The input query syntax for binary-calculi is different for ternary-calculi in the terms of constraint-networks. Based on analysis I, identified commonalities between input query syntaxes for both binary and ternary calculi and designed XML structures for them. Similarly I generalized SparQ results into five major categories and designed XML structures. For ternary-calculi, I considered constraint-reasoning module and their specific operations and designed XML structure for both of their inputs and outputs

Beyond deficit-based models of learners' cognition: Interpreting engineering students' difficulties with sense-making in terms of fine-grained epistemological and conceptual dynamics

Researchers have argued against deficit-based explanations of students' troubles with mathematical sense-making, pointing instead to factors such as epistemology: students' beliefs about knowledge and learning can hinder them from activating and integrating productive knowledge they have. In this case study of an engineering major solving problems (about content from his introductory physics course) during a clinical interview, we show that "Jim" has all the mathematical and conceptual knowledge he would need to solve a hydrostatic pressure problem that we posed to him. But he reaches and sticks with an incorrect answer that violates common sense. We argue that his lack of mathematical sense-making-specifically, translating and reconciling between mathematical and everyday/common-sense reasoning-stems in part from his epistemological views, i.e., his views about the nature of knowledge and learning. He regards mathematical equations as much more trustworthy than everyday reasoning, and he does not view mathematical equations as expressing meaning that tractably connects to common sense. For these reasons, he does not view reconciling between common sense and mathematical formalism as either necessary or plausible to accomplish. We, however, avoid a potential "deficit trap"-substituting an epistemological deficit for a concepts/skills deficit-by incorporating multiple, context-dependent epistemological stances into Jim's cognitive dynamics. We argue that Jim's epistemological stance contains productive seeds that instructors could build upon to support Jim's mathematical sense-making: He does see common-sense as connected to formalism (though not always tractably so) and in some circumstances this connection is both salient and valued.Comment: Submitted to the Journal of Engineering Educatio

The Knowledge Level in Cognitive Architectures: Current Limitations and Possible Developments

In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely: the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build articial agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviours in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of the comparison of the CAs' knowledge representation and processing mechanisms with those executed by humans in their everyday activities. In the final part of the paper further directions of research will be explored, trying to address current limitations and future challenges

Pre-service K-8 Teachers’ Professional Noticing and Strategy Evaluation Skills: An Exploratory Study

This study sheds light on three teaching competencies: Pre-service teachers’ (PSTs’) professional noticing of student mathematical reasoning and strategies, their ability to assess the validity of student reasoning and strategies, and to select student strategy for class discussion. Our results reveal that PSTs with strong awareness of mathematically significant aspects of student reasoning and strategies (focused noticing) were better positioned to assess the validity of student reasoning and strategies. PSTs with higher strategy evaluation skills were more likely to choose the strategy to engage class in justification or to advance students’ conceptual understanding compared to PSTs with low strategy evaluation skills

Space is the machine, part four: theoretical syntheses

Part IV of the book, ‘Theoretical Syntheses’, begins to draw together some of the questions raised in Part I, the regularities shown in Part II and the laws proposed in Part III, to suggest how the two central problems in architectural theory, namely the form-function problem and the form-meaning problem, can be reconceptualised. Chapter 10, ‘Space is the machine’, reviews the form-function theory in architecture and attempts to establish a pathology of its formulation: how it came to be set up in such a way that it could not be solved. It then proposes how the configuration paradigm permits a reformulation, through which we can not only make sense of the relation between form and function in buildings, but also we can make sense of how and why buildings, in a powerful sense are ‘social objects’ and in fact play a powerful role in the realisation and sustaining of human society. Finally, in Chapter 11, ‘The reasoning art’, the notion of configuration is applied to the study of what architects do, that is, design. Previous models of the design process are reviewed, and it is shown that without knowledge of configuration and the concept of the non-discursive, we cannot understand the internalities of the design process. A new knowledge-based model of design is proposed, with configuration at its centre. It is argued from this that because design is a configurational process, and because it is the characteristic of configuration that local changes make global differences, design is necessarily a top down process. This does not mean that it cannot be analysed, or supported by research. It shows however that only configurationally biased knowledge can really support the design Introduction Space is the machine | Bill Hillier Space Syntax Introduction process, and this, essentially, is theoretical knowledge. It follows from this that attempts to support designers by building methods and systems for bottom up construction of designs must eventually fail as explanatory systems. They can serve to create specific architectural identities, but not to advance general architectural understanding. In pursuing an analytic rather than a normative theory of architecture, the book might be thought by some to have pretensions to make the art of architecture into a science. This is not what is intended. One effect of a better scientific understanding of architecture is to show that although architecture as a phenomenon is capable of considerable scientific understanding, this does not mean that as a practice architecture is not an art. On the contrary, it shows quite clearly why it is an art and what the nature and limits of that art are. Architecture is an art because, although in key respects its forms can be analysed and understood by scientific means, its forms can only be prescribed by scientific means in a very restricted sense. Architecture is law governed but it is not determinate. What is governed by the laws is not the form of individual buildings but the field of possibility within which the choice of form is made. This means that the impact of these laws on the passage from problem statement to solution is not direct but indirect. It lies deep in the spatial and physical forms of buildings, in their genotypes, not their phenotypes. Architecture is therefore not part art, and part science, in the sense that it has both technical and aesthetic aspects, but is both art and science in the sense that it requires both the processes of abstraction by which we know science and the processes of concretion by which we know art. The architect as scientist and as theorist seeks to establish the laws of the spatial and formal materials with which the architect as artist then composes. The greater scientific content of architecture over art is simply a function of the far greater complexity of the raw materials of space and form, and their far greater reverberations for other aspects of life, than any materials that an artist uses. It is the fact that the architect designs with the spatial stuff of living that builds the science of architecture into the art of architecture. It may seem curious to argue that the quest for a scientific understanding of architecture does not lead to the conclusion that architecture is a science, but nevertheless it is the case. In the last analysis, architectural theory is a matter of understanding architecture as a system of possibilities, and how these are restricted by laws which link this system of possibilities to the spatial potentialities of human life. At this level, and perhaps only at this level, architecture is analogous to language. Language is often naïvely conceptualised as a set of words and meanings, set out in a dictionary, and syntactic rules by which they may be combined into meaningful sentences, set out in grammars. This is not what language is, and the laws that govern language are not of this kind. This can be seen from the simple fact that if we take the words of the dictionary and combine them in grammatically correct sentences, virtually all are utterly meaningless and do not count as legitimate sentences. The structures of language are the laws which restrict the combinatorial possibilities of words, and through these restrictions construct the sayable and the meaningful. The laws of language do not therefore tell us what to say, but prescribe the structure and limits of the sayable. It is within these limits that we use language as the prime means to our individuality and creativity. In this sense architecture does resemble language. The laws of the field of architecture do not tell designers what to do. By restricting and structuring the field of combinatorial possibility, they prescribe the limits within which architecture is possible. As with language, what is left from this restrictive structuring is rich beyond imagination. Even so, without these laws buildings would not be human products, any more than meaningless but syntactically correct concatenations of words are human sentences. The case for a theoretical understanding of architecture then rests eventually not on aspiration to philosophical or scientific status, but on the nature of architecture itself. The foundational proposition of the book is that architecture is an inherently theoretical subject. The very act of building raises issues about the relations of the form of the material world and the way in which we live in it which (as any archaeologist knows who has tried to puzzle out a culture from material remains) are unavoidably both philosophical and scientific. Architecture is the most everyday, the most enveloping, the largest and the most culturally determined human artefact. The act of building implies the transmission of cultural conventions answering these questions through custom and habit. Architecture is their rendering explicit, and their transmutation into a realm of innovation and, at its best, of art. In a sense, architecture is abstract thought applied to building, even therefore in a sense theory applied to building. This is why, in the end, architecture must have analytic theories

Logic and reasoning in jokes

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The Beginnings of Priestley's Materialism

The mature materialism of Joseph Priestley's Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit of 1777 is based on three main arguments: that Newton's widely-accepted scientific methodology requires the rejection of the 'hypothesis' of the soul; that a dynamic theory of matter breaks down the active/passive dichotomy assumed by many dualists; and that interaction between matter and spirit is impossible. In Matter and Spirit it is the first two arguments which are given greatest prominence; but it is the third argument which first brought Priestley to take materialism seriously. It was an argument which had persistently troubled him in his dualist years, but it was not until 1774 in the Examination that he 'first entertained a serious doubt of the truth of the vulgar hypothesis'. Underlying this fact is an episode of some complexity which this article examines