9 research outputs found
Cryptographically Sound Security Proof for On-Demand Source Routing Protocol EndairA
We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of a routing protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks. More precisely, we show that the route discovery protocol does not output a non-existing path under arbitrary active attacks, where on a non-existing path there exists at least one pair of neighboring nodes without communication connection during the run of the route discovery protocol. The proof relies on the Dolev-Yao-style model of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner, which allows for mapping results obtained symbolically within this model to cryptographically sound proofs if certain assumptions are met
Universally Composable Signatures, Certification and Authentication
Recently some efforts were made towards capturing the security requirements from digital signature schemes as an ideal functionality within a
composable security framework. This modeling of digital signatures
potentially has some significant analytical advantages (such as enabling component-wise analysis of complex systems that use signature schemes, as well as symbolic and automatable analysis of such systems). However, it turns out that
formulating ideal functionalities that capture the properties
expected from signature schemes in a way that is both sound and
enjoys the above advantages is not a trivial task.
This work has several contributions. We first correct some flaws in the definition of the ideal signature functionality of Canetti, 2001, andsubsequent formulations. Next we provide a minimal
formalization of ``ideal certification authorities\u27\u27 and
show how authenticated communication can be obtained using ideal signatures and an ideal certification authority. This is done while guaranteeing full modularity (i.e., each component is analyzed as stand-alone), and in an unconditional and errorless way.
This opens the door to symbolic and
automated analysis of protocols for these tasks, in a way that is
both modular and cryptographically sound
A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
AbstractWe prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocols. Our long-term goal is to develop a form of protocol analysis, consistent with standard cryptographic assumptions, that provides a language for expressing probabilistic polynomial-time protocol steps, a specification method based on a compositional form of equivalence, and a logical basis for reasoning about equivalence.The process calculus is a variant of CCS, with bounded replication and probabilistic polynomial-time expressions allowed in messages and boolean tests. To avoid inconsistency between security and nondeterminism, messages are scheduled probabilistically instead of nondeterministically. We prove that evaluation of any process expression halts in probabilistic polynomial time and define a form of asymptotic protocol equivalence that allows security properties to be expressed using observational equivalence, a standard relation from programming language theory that involves quantifying over all possible environments that might interact with the protocol.We develop a form of probabilistic bisimulation and use it to establish the soundness of an equational proof system based on observational equivalences. The proof system is illustrated by a formation derivation of the assertion, well-known in cryptography, that El Gamal encryption's semantic security is equivalent to the (computational) Decision Diffie–Hellman assumption. This example demonstrates the power of probabilistic bisimulation and equational reasoning for protocol security
On symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols
Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-94).The universally composable symbolic analysis (UCSA) framework layers Dolev-Yao style symbolic analysis on top of the universally composable (UC) secure framework to construct computationally sound proofs of cryptographic protocol security. The original proposal of the UCSA framework by Canetti and Herzog (2004) focused on protocols that only use public key encryption to achieve 2-party mutual authentication or key exchange. This thesis expands the framework to include protocols that use digital signatures as well. In the process of expanding the framework, we identify a flaw in the framework's use of UC ideal functionality FKE. We also identify issues that arise when combining FKE with the current formulation of ideal signature functionality FSI,. Motivated by these discoveries, we redefine the FPKE and FsIG functionalities appropriately.by Akshay Patil.M.Eng
Reactively Secure Signature Schemes
Protocols for problems like Byzantine agreement, clock synchronization or contract signing often use digital signatures as the only cryptographic operation. Proofs of such protocols are frequently based on an idealizing "blackbox " model of signatures. We show that the standard cryptographic security definition for digital signatures is not sufficient to ensure that such proofs are still valid if the idealized signatures are implemented with real, provably secure signatures
International Journal on Information Security manuscript No. (will be inserted by the editor) Reactively Secure Signature Schemes ⋆
The date of receipt and acceptance will be inserted by the editor Abstract Protocols for problems like Byzantine agreement, clock synchronization or contract signing often use digital signatures as the only cryptographic operation. Proofs of such protocols are frequently based on an idealizing “black-box” model of signatures. We show that the standard cryptographic security definition for digital signatures is not sufficient to ensure that such proofs are still valid if the idealized signatures are implemented with real, provably secure signatures. We propose a definition of signature security suitable for general reactive, asynchronous environments, called reactively secure signature schemes, and prove that for signature schemes where signing just depends on a counter as state the standard security definition implies our definition. We further propose an idealization of digital signatures which can be used in a reactive and composable fashion, and we show that reactively secure signature schemes constitute a secure implementation of our idealization.