Reactive Synthesis Without Regret

Two-player zero-sum games of infinite duration and their quantitative versions are used in verification to model the interaction between a controller (Eve) and its environment (Adam). The question usually addressed is that of the existence (and computability) of a strategy for Eve that can maximize her payoff against any strategy of Adam. In this work, we are interested in strategies of Eve that minimize her regret, i.e. strategies that minimize the difference between her actual payoff and the payoff she could have achieved if she had known the strategy of Adam in advance. We give algorithms to compute the strategies of Eve that ensure minimal regret against an adversary whose choice of strategy is (i) unrestricted, (ii) limited to positional strategies, or (iii) limited to word strategies, and show that the two last cases have natural modelling applications. We also show that our notion of regret minimization in which Adam is limited to word strategies generalizes the notion of good for games introduced by Henzinger and Piterman, and is related to the notion of determinization by pruning due to Aminof, Kupferman and Lampert

Non-Zero Sum Games for Reactive Synthesis

In this invited contribution, we summarize new solution concepts useful for the synthesis of reactive systems that we have introduced in several recent publications. These solution concepts are developed in the context of non-zero sum games played on graphs. They are part of the contributions obtained in the inVEST project funded by the European Research Council.Comment: LATA'16 invited pape

The Impatient May Use Limited Optimism to Minimize Regret

Discounted-sum games provide a formal model for the study of reinforcement learning, where the agent is enticed to get rewards early since later rewards are discounted. When the agent interacts with the environment, she may regret her actions, realizing that a previous choice was suboptimal given the behavior of the environment. The main contribution of this paper is a PSPACE algorithm for computing the minimum possible regret of a given game. To this end, several results of independent interest are shown. (1) We identify a class of regret-minimizing and admissible strategies that first assume that the environment is collaborating, then assume it is adversarial---the precise timing of the switch is key here. (2) Disregarding the computational cost of numerical analysis, we provide an NP algorithm that checks that the regret entailed by a given time-switching strategy exceeds a given value. (3) We show that determining whether a strategy minimizes regret is decidable in PSPACE

Efficient Symbolic Approaches for Quantitative Reactive Synthesis with Finite Tasks

This work introduces efficient symbolic algorithms for quantitative reactive synthesis. We consider resource-constrained robotic manipulators that need to interact with a human to achieve a complex task expressed in linear temporal logic. Our framework generates reactive strategies that not only guarantee task completion but also seek cooperation with the human when possible. We model the interaction as a two-player game and consider regret-minimizing strategies to encourage cooperation. We use symbolic representation of the game to enable scalability. For synthesis, we first introduce value iteration algorithms for such games with min-max objectives. Then, we extend our method to the regret-minimizing objectives. Our benchmarks reveal that our symbolic framework not only significantly improves computation time (up to an order of magnitude) but also can scale up to much larger instances of manipulation problems with up to 2x number of objects and locations than the state of the art.Comment: Submitted to IROS 202

The decision-making entrepreneur; Literature review

This study provides a literature overview of the entrepreneurial decision-making process. The literature review is used as background information for a qualitative study, which investigates, by means of case studies, the decision-making process of small business enterpreneurs in The Netherlands (Gibcus and Van Hoesel, 2003). The literature overview is the starting point of a confrontation between the literature on decision-making and the empirical findings of the latter qualitive study. Firstly, this literature review gives an introduction to general decision theory. It discusses the classical rationality, the bounded rationality and the neoclassical rationality. The place of the entrepreneur in the general decision theory is also discussed. Next, an analytic framework of the strategic decision-making in SMEs is presented. The analytic framework consists of three elements: the entrepreneur, the environment and the strategic decision process. Each of these elements is critical. Finally, some earlier empirical findings on entrepreneurial strategic decision-making are discussed.