A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision

In [G. Bonanno, Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009] a semantics for one-stage AGM belief revision was proposed based on choice frames, borrowed from the rational choice literature. In this paper we extend the semantics of choice frames to deal with iterated belief revision and use the corresponding structures to analyze extensive-form games. Choice frames can be used to represent a player's initial beliefs and disposition to change those beliefs when informed that it is her turn to move. If the frame satisfies AGM-consistency and a natural postulate for iterated belief revision, then it is rationalizable by a total pre-order on the set of histories. We show that three properties of this total pre-order, together with the hypothesis of agreement among players, provide a characterization of the notion of consistent assessment, which is the central component of the notion of sequential equilibrium proposed by Kreps and Wilson [Econometrica, 1982].Choice function, AGM belief revision, extensive-form game, sequential equilibrium, iterated belief revision, backward induction.

Semantic structures for one-stage and iterated belief revision

Semantic structures for belief revision and iterated belief revision are proposed. We start with one-stage revision structures that generalize the notion of choice function from rational choice theory. A correspondence between these one-stage structures and AGM belief revision functions is established. We then add branching time and consider more general structures that accommodate iterated revision. AGM temporal belief revision structures are defined and a syntactic axiomatization is provided

Disagreement and easy bootstrapping

ABSTRACTShould conciliating with disagreeing peers be considered sufficient for reaching rational beliefs? Thomas Kelly argues that when taken this way, Conciliationism lets those who enter into a disagreement with an irrational belief reach a rational belief all too easily. Three kinds of responses defending Conciliationism are found in the literature. One response has it that conciliation is required only of agents who have a rational belief as they enter into a disagreement. This response yields a requirement that no one should follow. If the need to conciliate applies only to already rational agents, then an agent must conciliate only when her peer is the one irrational. A second response views conciliation as merely necessary for having a rational belief. This alone does little to address the central question of what is rational to believe when facing a disagreeing peer. Attempts to develop the response either reduce to the first response, or deem necessary an unnecessary doxastic revision, or imply that rational dilemmas obtain in cases where intuitively there are none. A third response tells us to weigh what our pre-disagreement evidence supports against the evidence from the disagreement itself. This invites epistemic akrasia

Revealed preference, iterated belief revision and dynamic games

In previous work (G. Bonanno, Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009) a semantics for AGM belief revision was proposed based on choice frames, borrowed from the rational choice literature. In this paper we discuss how to use choice frames to analyze extensive-form games. Given an extensive form with perfect recall, a choice frame can be used to represent a player\u27s initial beliefs and her disposition to change those beliefs when she is informed that it is her turn to move. When some players move more than once along some play of the game, the issue of iterated belief revision arises. We provide a semantics for iterated belief revision in terms of choice frames and provide an outline of how to use choice frames to analyze solution concepts for extensive-form games

A Rational and Efficient Algorithm for View Revision in Databases

The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information. In this paper, we argue that to apply rationality result of belief dynamics theory to various practical problems, it should be generalized in two respects: first of all, it should allow a certain part of belief to be declared as immutable; and second, the belief state need not be deductively closed. Such a generalization of belief dynamics, referred to as base dynamics, is presented, along with the concept of a generalized revision algorithm for Horn knowledge bases. We show that Horn knowledge base dynamics has interesting connection with kernel change and abduction. Finally, we also show that both variants are rational in the sense that they satisfy certain rationality postulates stemming from philosophical works on belief dynamics

The Limits of Rational Belief Revision: A Dilemma for the Darwinian Debunker

We are fallible creatures, prone to making all sorts of mistakes. So, we should be open to evidence of error. But what constitutes such evidence? And what is it to rationally accommodate it? I approach these questions by considering an evolutionary debunking argument according to which (a) we have good, scientific, reason to think our moral beliefs are mistaken, and (b) rationally accommodating this requires revising our confidence in, or altogether abandoning the suspect beliefs. I present a dilemma for such debunkers, which shows that either we have no reason to worry about our moral beliefs, or we do but we can self-correct. Either way, moral skepticism doesn’t follow. That the evolutionary debunking argument fails is important; also important, however, is what its failure reveals about rational belief revision. Specifically, it suggests that getting evidence of error is a non-trivial endeavor and that we cannot learn that we are likely to be mistaken about some matter from a neutral stance on that matter

Religious Diversity and Disagreement

Epistemologists have shown increased interest in the epistemic significance of disagreement, and in particular, in whether there is a rational requirement concerning belief revision in the face of peer disagreement. This article examines some of the general issues discussed by epistemologists, and then considers how they may or may not apply to the case of religious disagreement, both within religious traditions and between religious (and non-religious) views