Sharp de Rham realization

We introduce the "sharp" (universal) extension of a 1-motive (with additive factors and torsion) over a field of characteristic zero. We define the "sharp de Rham realization" by passing to the Lie-algebra. Over the complex numbers we then show a (sharp de Rham) comparison theorem in the category of formal Hodge structures. For a free 1-motive along with its Cartier dual we get a canonical connection on their sharp extensions yielding a perfect pairing on sharp realizations. We thus provide "one-dimensional sharp de Rham cohomology" of algebraic varieties.Comment: 30 page

Realization of Minimal Supergravity

Minimal supergravity mediation of supersymmetry breaking has attracted much attention due to its simplicity, which leads to its predictive power. We consider how Nature possibly realizes minimal supergravity through inflationary selection of the theory. Minimality is impressively consistent with the present observational bounds and it might be tested with the aid of low-energy soft parameters obtained in future experiments.Comment: 18 pages, 5 figure

The Unreality of Realization

This paper argues against the realization principle, which reifies the realization relation between lower-level and higher-level properties. It begins with a review of some principles of naturalistic metaphysics. Then it criticizes some likely reasons for embracing the realization principle, and finally it argues against the principle directly. The most likely reasons for embracing the principle depend on the dubious assumption that special science theories cannot be true unless special science predicates designate properties. The principle itself turns out to be false because the realization relation fails the naturalistic test for reality: it makes no causal difference to the world.1 1This paper resulted from work done at John Heil's 2006 Mind and Metaphysics NEH Summer Seminar at Washington University in St. Louis. An early version of it was presented in a special symposium on realization at the 2007 meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. I owe thanks to all the participants in both events for helpful discussions, and I owe particular thanks to Ken Aizawa, Torin Alter, Jason Ford, Carl Gillett, John Heil, Nicholas Helms, Pete Mandik, John Post, Gene Witmer, Michelle Wrenn, Tad Zawidzki, and two anonymous referees for the AJP

Emergence, Function and Realization

“Realization” and “emergence” are two concepts that are sometimes used to describe same or similar phenomena in philosophy of mind and the special sciences, where such phenomena involve the synchronic dependence of some higher-level states of affairs on the lower-level ones. According to a popular line of thought, higher-level properties that are invoked in the special sciences are realized by, and/or emergent from, lower-level, broadly physical, properties. So, these two concepts are taken to refer to relations between properties from different levels where the lower-level ones somehow “bring about” the higher-level ones. However, for those who specialise in inter-level relations, there are important differences between these two concepts – especially if emergence is understood as strong emergence. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight these differences