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The inverse conjunction fallacy
If people believe that some property is true of all members of a class such as sofas, then they should also believe that the same property is true of all members of a conjunctively defined subset of that class such as uncomfortable handmade sofas. A series of experiments demonstrated a failure to observe this constraint, leading to what is termed the inverse conjunction fallacy. Not only did people often express a belief in the more general statement but not in the more specific, but also when they accepted both beliefs, they were inclined to give greater confidence to the more general. It is argued that this effect underlies a number of other demonstrations of fallacious reasoning, particularly in category-based induction. Alternative accounts of the phenomenon are evaluated, and it is concluded that the effect is best interpreted in terms of intensional reasoning [Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293–315.]
Semantic Ambiguity and Perceived Ambiguity
I explore some of the issues that arise when trying to establish a connection
between the underspecification hypothesis pursued in the NLP literature and
work on ambiguity in semantics and in the psychological literature. A theory of
underspecification is developed `from the first principles', i.e., starting
from a definition of what it means for a sentence to be semantically ambiguous
and from what we know about the way humans deal with ambiguity. An
underspecified language is specified as the translation language of a grammar
covering sentences that display three classes of semantic ambiguity: lexical
ambiguity, scopal ambiguity, and referential ambiguity. The expressions of this
language denote sets of senses. A formalization of defeasible reasoning with
underspecified representations is presented, based on Default Logic. Some
issues to be confronted by such a formalization are discussed.Comment: Latex, 47 pages. Uses tree-dvips.sty, lingmacros.sty, fullname.st
Non-Relational Intentionality
This dissertation lays the foundation for a new theory of non-relational intentionality.
The thesis is divided into an introduction and three main chapters, each of which serves
as an essential part of an overarching argument. The argument yields, as its conclusion, a
new account of how language and thought can exhibit intentionality intrinsically, so that
representation can occur in the absence of some thing that is represented. The overarching
argument has two components: first, that intentionality can be profitably studied through
examination of the semantics of intensional transitive verbs (ITVs), and second, that providing
intensional transitive verbs with a nonrelational semantics will serve to provide us
with (at least the beginnings of) a non-relational theory of intentionality. This approach is
a generalization of Anscombe's views on perception. Anscombe held that perceptual verbs
such as "see" and "perceive" were ITVs, and that understanding the semantics of their object positions could help us to solve the problems of hallucination and illusion, and provide
a theory of perception more generally. I propose to apply this strategy to intentional states
and the puzzles of intentionality more generally, and so Anscombe's influence will be felt
all through the dissertation.
In the first chapter, titled "Semantic Verbs are Intensional Transitives", I argue that
semantic verbs such as "refers to", "applies to", and "is true of" have all of the features of intensional transitive verbs, and discuss the consequences of this claim for semantic theory and the philosophy of language. One theoretically enriching consequence of this view is
that it allows us to perspicuously express, and partially reconcile two opposing views on
the nature and subject-matter of semantics: the Chomskian view, on which semantics is an
internalistic enterprise concerning speakers' psychologies, and the Lewisian view, on which
semantics is a fully externalistic enterprise issuing in theorems about how the world must
look for our natural language sentences to be true. Intensional Transitive Verbs have two
readings: a de dicto reading and a de re reading; the de dicto reading of ITVs is plausibly a
nonrelational reading, and the intensional features peculiar to this reading make it suitable
for expressing a Chomskian, internalist semantic program. On the other hand, the de
re reading is fully relational, and make it suitable for expressing the kinds of word-world
relations essential to the Lewisian conception of semantics. And since the de dicto and de
re readings are plausibly related as two distinct scopal readings of the very same semantic
postulates, we can see these two conceptions of semantics as related by two scopal readings
of the very same semantic postulates.
In chapter two, titled "Hallucination and the New Problem of Empty Names", I argue
that the problem of hallucination and the problem of empty names are, at bottom, the
same problem. I argue for this by reconstructing the problem of empty names in way that
is novel, but implicit in much of the discussion on empty names. I then show how, once
recast in this light, the two problems are structurally identical down to an extremely fine
level of granularity, and also substantially overlap in terms of their content. If the problems
are identical in the way I propose, then we should expect that their spaces of solutions are
also identical, and there is signicant support for this conclusion. However, there are some
proposed solutions to the problem of hallucination that have been overlooked as potential
solutions to the problem of empty names, and this realization opens new non-relational
approaches to the problem of empty names, and to the nature of meaning more generally.
In chapter three, titled "Intensionality is Additional Phrasal Unity", I argue for a novel
approach to the semantics of intensional contexts. At the heart of my proposal is the
Quinean view that intensional contexts should, from the perspective of the semantics, be
treated as units, with the material in them contributing to the formation of a single predicate.
However, this proposal is subject to a number of objections, including the criticism
that taken at face value, this would render intensional contexts, which seem to be fully
productive, non-compositional. I begin by discussing the concept of the unity of the phrase,
and pointing to various ways that phrases can gain additional unity. I then proposes that
the intensionality of intensional transitive verbs is best construed as a form of semantic
incorporation; ITVs, on their intensional readings, meet all of the criteria for qualifying
as incorporating the nominals in their object positions. I then give a semantics for ITVs
that builds on existing views of the semantics of incorporation structures, and gesture at
how this can be extended to intensional clausal verbs, including the so-called propositional
attitude verbs
Carnap's Pragmatism
Carnap is widely seen as a founding father of the view that metaphysical debates do not concern any substantive issue. My dissertation argues against this line of interpretation. I propose a reading on which Carnap’s views on metaphysics and language, and in particular, his Principle of Tolerance and verificationism, derive from his pragmatism, i.e., from the thesis that scientific language is an instrument whose function is to aid in the derivation of observational knowledge. I argue that, so understood, various controversial aspects of Carnap’s philosophy are plausible
Class and conditional reasoning in children and adolescents
The development of the ability to comprehend and reason with class and conditional logic statements was examined in the light of Piaget's claim that prior to the age of 11-12 years children are limited to reasoning in terms of classes and relations but from the age of 11-12 years reasoning in terms of propositions becomes possible. Subjects from 5 years to 17.5 years were presented with several different comprehension and inference tasks with class and conditional logic statements. Evidence of differences in the ability of subjects under 12 years to verify class and conditional logic statements was consistent with Piaget's claim that the logical classification operations of the concrete subject enable him to interpret class inclusion statements but that the conditional interpretation of empirical information requires formal operational thinking. No distinction in performance between class and conditional statements was found on tasks which required an understanding of the logical consequences of the inclusion relation with subjects younger than first year secondary performing poorly on both class and conditional versions of an evaluation task and a syllogistic reasoning task. Significant changes in patterns of response at adolescence on the conditional verification task, the evaluation task and the syllogistic reasoning task supported Piaget's contention that there are qualitative changes in reasoning at adolescence although, as in other studies, errors in reasoning by adolescents indicated that Piaget overestimated the logical abilities of the formal subject and suggested that Piaget's logical model of cognition should be regarded as a model of logical competence
Willard Van Orman Quine's Philosophical Development in the 1930s and 1940s
As analytic philosophy is becoming increasingly aware of and interested in its own history, the study of that field is broadening to include, not just its earliest beginnings, but also the mid-twentieth century. One of the towering figures of this epoch is W.V. Quine (1908-2000), champion of naturalism in philosophy of science, pioneer of mathematical logic, trying to unite an austerely physicalist theory of the world with the truths of mathematics, psychology, and linguistics. Quine's posthumous papers, notes, and drafts revealing the development of his views in the forties have recently begun to be published, as well as careful philosophical studies of, for instance, the evolution of his key doctrine that mathematical and logical truth are continuous with, not divorced from, the truths of natural science. But one central text has remained unexplored: Quine's Portuguese-language book on logic, his 'farewell for now' to the discipline as he embarked on an assignment in the Navy in WWII. Anglophone philosophers have neglected this book because they could not read it. Jointly with colleagues, I have completed the first full English translation of this book. In this accompanying paper I draw out the main philosophical contributions Quine made in the book, placing them in their historical context and relating them to Quine's overall philosophical development during the period. Besides significant developments in the evolution of Quine's views on meaning and analyticity, I argue, this book is also driven by Quine's indebtedness to Russell and Whitehead, Tarski, and Frege, and contains crucial developments in his thinking on philosophy of logic and ontology. This includes early versions of some arguments from 'On What There Is', four-dimensionalism, and virtual set theory
The Use of Trustworthy Principles in a Revised Hilbert’s Program
After the failure of Hilbert’s original program due to Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, relativized Hilbert’s programs have been sug-gested. While most metamathematical investigations are focused on car-rying out mathematical reductions, we claim that in order to give a full substitute for Hilbert’s program, one should not stop with purely mathe-matical investigations, but give an answer to the question why one should believe that all theorems proved in certain mathematical theories are valid. We suggest that, while it is not possible to obtain absolute certainty, it is possible to develop trustworthy core principles using which one can prove the correctness of mathematical theories. Trust can be established by both providing a direct validation of such principles, which is nec-essarily non-mathematical and philosophical in nature, and at the same time testing those principles using metamathematical investigations. We investigate three approaches for trustworthy principles, namely ordinal no-tation systems built from below, Martin-Löf type theory, and Feferman’s system of explicit mathematics. We will review what is known about the strength up to which direct validation can be provided. 1 Reducing Theories to Trustworthy Principles In the early 1920’s Hilbert suggested a program for the foundation of mathemat-ics, which is now called Hilbert’s program. As formulated in [40], “it calls for a formalization of all of mathematics in axiomatic form, together with a proof that this axiomatization of mathematics is consistent. The consistency proof it-self was to be carried out using only what Hilbert called ’finitary ’ methods. The special epistemological character of finitary reasoning then yields the required justification of classical mathematics. ” Because of Gödel’s second incomplete-ness theorem, Hilbert’s program can be carried out only for very weak theories
On the incrementality of pragmatic processing: An ERP investigation of informativeness and pragmatic abilities
In two event-related potential (ERP) experiments, we determined to what extent Grice’s maxim of informativeness as well as pragmatic ability contributes to the incremental build-up of sentence meaning, by examining the impact of underinformative versus informative scalar statements (e.g. “Some people have lungs/pets, and…”) on the N400 event-related potential (ERP), an electrophysiological index of semantic processing. In Experiment 1, only pragmatically skilled participants (as indexed by the Autism Quotient Communication subscale) showed a larger N400 to underinformative statements. In Experiment 2, this effect disappeared when the critical words were unfocused so that the local underinformativeness went unnoticed (e.g., “Some people have lungs that…”). Our results suggest that, while pragmatic scalar meaning can incrementally contribute to sentence comprehension, this contribution is dependent on contextual factors, whether these are derived from individual pragmatic abilities or the overall experimental context
Heavy Hands, Magic, and Scene-Reading Traps
This is one of a series of articles in which I examine errors that philosophers of language may be led to make if already prone to exaggerating the rôle compositional semantics can play in explaining how we communicate, whether by expressing propositions with our words or by
merely implying them. In the present article, I am concerned less with “pragmatic contributions” to the propositions we express—contributions
some philosophers seem rather desperate to deny the existence or ubiquity of—than I am with certain types of traps that those who exaggerate
the rôle of semantic convention and underestimate the rôle of pragmatic inference are apt to fall into
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