Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values

We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many types of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present a reasonable counterexample for interdependent values auctions that shows that sometimes all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. Nevertheless, we give sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence

PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA OF SINGLE AND DOUBLE AUCTIONS WITH INTERDEPENDENT VALUES

We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many types of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present a reasonable counterexample for interdependent values auctions that shows that sometimes all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. Nevertheless, we give sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence.

Equilibria Existence in Regular Discontinuous Games

Many conditions have been introduced to weaken the continuity re- quirements for equilibrium existence in games. We introduce a new con- dition, called regularity, that is simple and easy to verify. It is implied both by Reny's better-reply security and Simon and Zame's endogenous sharing rule method. Regularity implies that the limits of epsilon-equilibria are equilibria. Since this condition is weak, it is yet not enough to ensure pure strategy equilibrium existence, but we are able to identify extra conditions that, together with regularity, are sufficient for equilibrium existence. One is the marginal continuity property introduced by Prokopovych (2008), while the second is the well behavior of a sequence of approximating con- tinuous functions. In this way, we provide new equilibrium existence re- sults for discontinuous games under conditions that are simpler and easier to check than most of the available alternatives.

Characterization of Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit

This paper provides first order conditions for a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions. Under mild conditions we characterize bidding-behavior and generalize previous standard results in the literature. As an application we obtain sufficient conditions for truth-telling, monotonic best reply strategies and identification results for multi-unit auctions.Multi-unit auctions, first order conditions, truth-telling, identification, monotonic bestreply.

Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values

We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present an example of a double auction with interdependent values where all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. This is related to Akerlof's "market for lemmons" example and to the "winner's curse," establishing a connection between them. However, we are able to provide sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence.Equilibrium existence in auctions Pure strategy Nash equilibrium Monotonic equilibrium Tie-breaking rule Positive probability of trade Market for lemmons Winners' curse

Factors affecting the adoption of online auctions by internet users in Hong Kong

This is an exploratory empirical study with the aim to identify the factors that affect the adoption of online auctions by Internet users in Hong Kong. The frameworks used were the TAM (Technology Acceptance Model), TCE (Transaction Cost Economics) and SERVQUAL (Service Quality). It was found that the dimensions that affected the customer’s perceived value of the online auction are benefits, costs, risks and service quality. Data was collected from four pilot focus groups, one online survey and a final focus group. The subjects in the focus groups were 21 undergraduates, whereas the subjects in the online survey were 152 internet users. The results of the pilot focus groups guided the design of the online survey. The results of the survey was analysed using the Kruskal-Wallis test. The final focus group was used to seek explanations to some issues arose from the online survey. It was found that the factors in the benefit dimension were liquidity, enjoyment, and price transparency. The factors in the cost dimension were time, effort, service charge and reputation of the user. The factor in the risk dimension was financial risk. The factors in the service quality dimension were efficiency and system availability. The final focus group revealed that the auctioneer’s role in policing the auction web site was important. For differences among the subjects, it was also found that the adult users consider their reputation in auction website, young adults are worried about financial risks, and female users are more concerned about financial risks than male users. The implications of these differences are discussed. The main academic contribution was the development of a questionnaire and a model which can be used in further research about other forms of auction