67,645 research outputs found
First-order modal logic in the necessary framework of objects
I consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes that only the cardinalities of these sets matters, and that not all pairs of infinite sets determine the same logic. I use so-called two-cardinal theorems from model theory to investigate the space of logics and consequence relations determined by pairs of infinite sets, and show how to eliminate the assumption that worlds are individuals from Williamsonâs argument
The Hyperintensional Variant of Kaplanâs Paradox
David Kaplan famously argued that mainstream semantics for modal logic, which identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds, is affected by a cardinality paradox. Takashi Yagisawa showed that a variant of the same paradox arises when standard possible worlds semantics is extended with impossible worlds to deliver a hyperintensional account of propositions. After introducing the problem, we discuss two general approaches to a possible solution: giving up on sets and giving up on worlds, either in the background semantic framework or in the corresponding conception of propositions. As a result, we conclude that abandoning worlds by embracing a truthmaker-based approach offers a promising way to account for hyperintensional propositions without facing the paradoxical outcome
Hybrid modal realism debugged
This paper is part of a PhD project conducted thanks to a scholarship of the âSchool of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studiesâ at the University of St Andrews and a doctoral contract at Sorbonne UniversitĂ©.In this paper, I support a hybrid view regarding the metaphysics of worlds. I endorse Lewisian Modal Realism for possible worlds (LMR). My aim is to come up with a hybrid account of impossible worlds that provides all the plenitude of impossibilities for all fine-grained intentional contents. I raise several challenges for such a plenitudinous hybrid theory. My version of hybrid modal realism builds impossible worlds as set-theoretic constructions out of genuine individuals and sets of them, that is, as set-theoretic constructions from parts and sets of parts of genuine Lewisian worlds. Structured worlds are defined as sets of tuples: structured entities built out of Lewisian âraw materialâ. These structured worlds are ersatz worlds, some of which are impossible. I claim that propositions must be sets of worlds rather than members of sets. Once the construction is in place, I evaluate the proposal and show that my hybrid account is able to supply a plenitude of impossibilities and thus giving the resources to make all the hyperintensional distinctions we are looking for, whilst remaining Lewisian-conservative.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
Hyperintensionality and overfitting
Funding: This research is published within the project âThe Logic of Conceivabilityâ, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant No. 681404.A hyperintensional epistemic logic would take the contents which can be known or believed as more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. I consider one objection to the idea: Williamsonâs Objection from Overfitting. I propose a hyperintensional account of propositions as sets of worlds enriched with topics: what those propositions, and so the attitudes having them as contents, are about. I show that the account captures the conditions under which sentences express the same content; that it can be pervasively applied in formal and mainstream epistemology; and that it is left unscathed by the objection.Peer reviewe
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Epistemic Semantics in Guarded String Models
Constructive and computable multi-agent epistemic possible worlds models are interpreted as sets of guarded string models in an epistemic extension of Kleene Algebra with Tests (KAT}). The account is framed as a formal language EpiKAT (Epistemic KAT) for defining such models. The language is implemented by translation into the finite state calculus, and alternatively by modeling propositions as lazy lists in Haskell. The syntax-semantics interface for a fragment of English is defined by a categorial grammar
Variations on a Montagovian theme
What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (âsets of worldsâ) propositions, and that all this has little to do with the choice between operators and predicates
Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions
Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness
Counterfactual Attitudes and the Relational Analysis
In this paper, I raise a problem for standard precisifications of the Relational Analysis of attitude reports. The problem I raise involves counterfactual attitude verbs. such as âwishâ. In short, the trouble is this: there are true attitude reports â S wishes that P â but there is no suitable referent for the term âthat P â. The problematic reports illustrate that the content of a subjectâs wish is intimately related to the content of their beliefs. I capture this fact by moving to a framework in which âwishâ relates subjects to sets of pairs of worlds, or paired propositions, rather thanâas is standardly assumedâsets of worlds. Although other types of counterfactual attitude reports, for example those involving âimagineâ, may be similarly problematic, at this stage it is unclear whether they can be handled the same way
Accuracy and Credal Imprecision
Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology
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