1,484 research outputs found

    The Stability and the Security of the Tangle

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    In this paper we study the stability and the security of the distributed data structure at the base of the IOTA protocol, called the Tangle. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we present a simple model to analyze the Tangle and give the first discrete time formal analyzes of the average number of unconfirmed transactions and the average confirmation time of a transaction. Then, we define the notion of assiduous honest majority that captures the fact that the honest nodes have more hashing power than the adversarial nodes and that all this hashing power is constantly used to create transactions. This notion is important because we prove that it is a necessary assumption to protect the Tangle against double-spending attacks, and this is true for any tip selection algorithm (which is a fundamental building block of the protocol) that verifies some reasonable assumptions. In particular, the same is true with the Markov Chain Monte Carlo selection tip algorithm currently used in the IOTA protocol. Our work shows that either all the honest nodes must constantly use all their hashing power to validate the main chain (similarly to the Bitcoin protocol) or some kind of authority must be provided to avoid this kind of attack (like in the current version of the IOTA where a coordinator is used). The work presented here constitute a theoretical analysis and cannot be used to attack the current IOTA implementation. The goal of this paper is to present a formalization of the protocol and, as a starting point, to prove that some assumptions are necessary in order to defend the system again double-spending attacks. We hope that it will be used to improve the current protocol with a more formal approach

    Trustless communication across distributed ledgers: impossibility and practical solutions

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    Since the advent of Bitcoin as the first decentralized digital currency in 2008, a plethora of distributed ledgers has been created, differing in design and purpose. Considering the heterogeneous nature of these systems, it is safe to say there shall not be ``one coin to rule them all". However, despite the growing and thriving ecosystem, blockchains continue to operate almost exclusively in complete isolation from one another: by design, blockchain protocols provide no means by which to communicate or exchange data with external systems. To this date, centralized providers hence remain the preferred route to exchange assets and information across blockchains~-- undermining the very nature of decentralized currencies. The contribution of this thesis is threefold. First, we critically evaluate the (im)possibilty, requirements, and challenges of cross-chain communication by contributing the first systematization of this field. We formalize the problem of Cross-Chain Communication (CCC) and show it is impossible without a trusted third party by relating CCC to the Fair Exchange problem. With this impossibility result in mind, we develop a framework to design new and evaluate existing CCC protocols, focusing on the inherent trust assumptions thereof, and derive a classification covering the field of cross-chain communication to date. We then present XCLAIM, the first generic framework for transferring assets and information across permissionless distributed ledgers without relying on a centralized third party. XCLAIM leverages so-called cryptocurrency-backed assets, blockchain-based assets one-to-one backed by other cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin-backed tokens on Ethereum. Through the secure issuance, transfer, and redemption of these assets, users can perform cross-chain exchanges in a financially trustless and non-interactive manner, overcoming the limitations of existing solutions. To ensure the security of user funds, XCLAIM relies on collateralization of intermediaries and a proof-or-punishment approach, enforced via smart contracts equipped with cross-chain light clients, so-called chain relays. XCLAIM has been adopted in practice, among others by the Polkadot blockchain, as a bridge to Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Finally, we contribute to advancing the state of the art in cross-chain light clients. We develop TxChain, a novel mechanism to significantly reduce storage and bandwidth costs of modern blockchain light clients using contingent transaction aggregation, and apply our scheme to Bitcoin and Ethereum individually, as well as in the cross-chain setting.Open Acces

    LightChain: A DHT-based Blockchain for Resource Constrained Environments

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    As an append-only distributed database, blockchain is utilized in a vast variety of applications including the cryptocurrency and Internet-of-Things (IoT). The existing blockchain solutions have downsides in communication and storage efficiency, convergence to centralization, and consistency problems. In this paper, we propose LightChain, which is the first blockchain architecture that operates over a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) of participating peers. LightChain is a permissionless blockchain that provides addressable blocks and transactions within the network, which makes them efficiently accessible by all the peers. Each block and transaction is replicated within the DHT of peers and is retrieved in an on-demand manner. Hence, peers in LightChain are not required to retrieve or keep the entire blockchain. LightChain is fair as all of the participating peers have a uniform chance of being involved in the consensus regardless of their influence such as hashing power or stake. LightChain provides a deterministic fork-resolving strategy as well as a blacklisting mechanism, and it is secure against colluding adversarial peers attacking the availability and integrity of the system. We provide mathematical analysis and experimental results on scenarios involving 10K nodes to demonstrate the security and fairness of LightChain. As we experimentally show in this paper, compared to the mainstream blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, LightChain requires around 66 times less per node storage, and is around 380 times faster on bootstrapping a new node to the system, while each LightChain node is rewarded equally likely for participating in the protocol

    Hybrid Mining: Exploiting blockchain’s computational power for distributed problem solving

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    In today's cryptocurrencies, Hashcash proof of work is the most commonly-adopted approach to mining. In Hashcash, when a miner decides to add a block to the chain, she has to solve the difficult computational puzzle of inverting a hash function. While Hashcash has been successfully adopted in both Bitcoin and Ethereum, it has attracted significant and harsh criticism due to its massive waste of electricity, its carbon footprint and environmental effects, and the inherent lack of usefulness in inverting a hash function. Various other mining protocols have been suggested, including proof of stake, in which a miner's chance of adding the next block is proportional to her current balance. However, such protocols lead to a higher entry cost for new miners who might not still have any stake in the cryptocurrency, and can in the worst case lead to an oligopoly, where the rich have complete control over mining. In this paper, we propose Hybrid Mining: a new mining protocol that combines solving real-world useful problems with Hashcash. Our protocol allows new miners to join the network by taking part in Hashcash mining without having to own an initial stake. It also allows nodes of the network to submit hard computational problems whose solutions are of interest in the real world, e.g.~protein folding problems. Then, miners can choose to compete in solving these problems, in lieu of Hashcash, for adding a new block. Hence, Hybrid Mining incentivizes miners to solve useful problems, such as hard computational problems arising in biology, in a distributed manner. It also gives researchers in other areas an easy-to-use tool to outsource their hard computations to the blockchain network, which has enormous computational power, by paying a reward to the miner who solves the problem for them. Moreover, our protocol provides strong security guarantees and is at least as resilient to double spending as Bitcoin
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