MarciaTesta: An Automatic Generator of Test Programs for Microprocessors' Data Caches

SBST (Software Based Self-Testing) is an effective solution for in-system testing of SoCs without any additional hardware requirement. SBST is particularly suited for embedded blocks with limited accessibility, such as cache memories. Several methodologies have been proposed to properly adapt existing March algorithms to test cache memories. Unfortunately they all leave the test engineers the task of manually coding them into the specific Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) of the target microprocessor. We propose an EDA tool for the automatic generation of assembly cache test program for a specific architectur

Taming the Static Analysis Beast

While industrial-strength static analysis over large, real-world codebases has become commonplace, so too have difficult-to-analyze language constructs, large libraries, and popular frameworks. These features make constructing and evaluating a novel, sound analysis painful, error-prone, and tedious. We motivate the need for research to address these issues by highlighting some of the many challenges faced by static analysis developers in today\u27s software ecosystem. We then propose our short- and long-term research agenda to make static analysis over modern software less burdensome

CaSE: Cache-Assisted Secure Execution on ARM Processors

Recognizing the pressing demands to secure embedded applications, ARM TrustZone has been adopted in both academic research and commercial products to protect sensitive code and data in a privileged, isolated execution environment. However, the design of TrustZone cannot prevent physical memory disclosure attacks such as cold boot attack from gaining unrestricted read access to the sensitive contents in the dynamic random access memory (DRAM). A number of system-on-chip (SoC) bound execution solutions have been proposed to thaw the cold boot attack by storing sensitive data only in CPU registers, CPU cache or internal RAM. However, when the operating system, which is responsible for creating and maintaining the SoC-bound execution environment, is compromised, all the sensitive data is leaked. In this paper, we present the design and development of a cache-assisted secure execution framework, called CaSE, on ARM processors to defend against sophisticated attackers who can launch multi-vector attacks including software attacks and hardware memory disclosure attacks. CaSE utilizes TrustZone and Cache-as-RAM technique to create a cache-based isolated execution environment, which can protect both code and data of security-sensitive applications against the compromised OS and the cold boot attack. To protect the sensitive code and data against cold boot attack, applications are encrypted in memory and decrypted only within the processor for execution. The memory separation and the cache separation provided by TrustZone are used to protect the cached applications against compromised OS. We implement a prototype of CaSE on the i.MX53 running ARM Cortex-A8 processor. The experimental results show that CaSE incurs small impacts on system performance when executing cryptographic algorithms including AES, RSA, and SHA1