Guidelines for Process Safety Hazard Assessment Based on Process Information

In any new chemical process development and design, process safety is a critical aspect to be considered besides economic and technical feasibility of the manufacture of the product. A lack of proper hazard assessment during the design phase may later result in accidents with disastrous consequences to workers, the public as well as the environment. Many methods have been introduced to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the safety level of processes. Despite the availability of a large amount of methods, a systematic framework that details guidelines for hazard identification, risk assessment, safety measure design, and safe critical decision-making is still missing. To address this issue, the main objective of this study was to propose a systematic framework that outlines comprehensive guidelines for assessing the safety performance of processes based on information from the piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID). Apart from proposing the framework, appropriate strategies for minimizing safety hazards and risks are also recommended. In addition, the user is assisted in selecting the most appropriate assessment method according to his or her needs and the scope and constraints of the assessment. A case study is presented to illustrate the application of the proposed framework

Organizational Process Safety: Taking Process Safety to the Next Level

PresentationProcess safety management relies on multiple models for the safe manufacture, storage, use and transportation of highly hazardous chemicals. For the most part these models are little more than a checklist of activities that, at best, create a fractured strategy for preventing catastrophic incidents. To manage process safety at a world-class level, organizations need to develop their culture and capabilities around process safety. These two elements help integrate the overall system and move process safety to the next level

Process Safety Fundamentals – Making Process Safety ‘Real’ in the Field

PresentationProcess safety management aims to ensure that all physical assets are well designed, safely operated and properly maintained. Process safety management is central to achieving Shell’s Goal Zero ambition of no harm and no leaks across our operations. Shell’s approach to achieving this combines our asset integrity principles with our risk management approach, which is based on the “bow-tie” model. Continuous improvement in the management of hardware barriers and the robustness of human barriers is important to our overall risk management approach. Within the overall improvement trend, the number of technical integrity related events has significantly reduced. This suggests that operating integrity incidents make up an increasing fraction of process safety incidents, and, deeper process safety leadership and a different approach to behavioural change at the front line may be required to maintain improvement. Analysis of operational integrity events in Shell identified that a small set of human barriers contribute to half of the releases and it is likely that the potential for these occurrences could have been reduced by people adhering to known good operating practices. From this analysis, a set of “Process Safety Fundamentals” were derived. The Process Safety Fundamentals were first rolled out across our Downstream Manufacturing Business. Building on the Manufacturing experience, and further incident analysis, an updated set of ten Process Safety Fundamentals are being rolled out across our businesses. The ten Process Safety Fundamentals and the roll-out uses Hearts and Minds principles to engage the workforce and unlock process safety leadership at all levels. The Fundamentals aim to leverage the knowledge of a capable workforce, supporting them to apply known safe operating techniques

Process safety performance indicators

For over 50 years to measure safety performance the Lost Time Incident Rate, LTIR was used. Fortunately, over the years the learning attitude towards accidents changed from a retrospective to a pro-active one. In the 90-s the safety management system was introduced. No management though, without the Deming cycle of Plan, Do, Check, Act, and checking, means the need of indicators. Existing LTIR-values were used not realizing these refl ect personal rather than process safety. In 2005 after the BP Texas City refi nery vapor cloud explosion, awareness of the difference broke through and Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics were formulated. In January 2012 an international conference was held in Brussels organized by EPSC and CEFIC. Results will be summarized. The paper will explain briefl y, where we are now, and what still is ahead

Lead Process Safety Metrics

PresentationMetrics have existed for many years across the occupational realm. In more recent times, there has been a focus on the use of metrics to monitor process safety. This has traditionally focused on lag metrics, as these are easier to monitor and analyse than their leading relatives. Excellent publications, such as the American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice754, Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries, have emerged to provide guidance on how to develop and monitor metrics. Rightly, as defined in the recommended practice, each facility needs to understand what is important for themselves and implement their own leading metrics. This however, has lead to a divergence in what is measure and how it is done. In an effort to enable effective benchmarking, the members of the IChemE Safety Centre initiated a project to develop a suite of common lead metrics. This work, which occurred over a 12 month period, culminated in the release of a guidance document that details lead metrics that can be commonly applied across varied industries. This paper defines the process used to establish the common metrics and shows some examples of the metrics chosen

Process Safety Competence Assurance

PresentationCompetence is a critical component of an organization’s success—one that is also very relevant for process safety. In fact, process safety competence can help ensure compliance with regulatory requirements and can be an important business improvement driver, particularly when it comes to process safety risk. Competence is often confused with knowledge; therefore, it can be difficult to assess competence levels. However, having a well-defined framework to assess process safety competence across the organization can offer many benefits, including helping the organization to: Identify gaps in organizational understanding and competence, and uncover opportunities to close those gaps; Ensure that personnel have the appropriate process safety competence levels (i.e., knowledge, experience, education and training); Ensure correct decisions and actions are taken to prevent incidents; Facilitate training to help effectively manage process safety in the workplace; and Create a sustainable model to support ongoing staffing and succession planning. This paper introduces a structured and scalable approach to process safety competence assurance, which is modeled using recognized industry guidelines, publications, and experience. This approach is fit-for-purpose and provides a framework designed to encourage intentional learning and development to close identified process safety competence gaps. The ultimate outcome of this approach is a competent staff who help recognize and drive process safety improvement

Reflections on embedding safety throughout the process engineering program

Safety is an important part of being a well-rounded, responsible process engineer. It not only covers fundamental scientific knowledge but also a way of thinking and culture in how engineers approach their work, and is continually developed throughout the working life of a process engineer. However, how this safety learning can start to be imparted to engineering students in an academic environment is a challenge for educators. In this work the systems approach that has been taken as part of UCL's Integrated Engineering Program (IEP) teaching framework is examined. Within this framework, safety is embedded into the curriculum from the start in Year 1 and is continually extended and advanced throughout the process engineering program. As the first cohort of students graduate we reflect on how this has been implemented and received

Process Safety-Equations of State

PresentationBy convention, chemical engineering requires us to develop a set of empirical equations that predict the transformation of one state into another. Process Safety generally lacks that discipline and as a consequence is sometimes suggested as having a lack of academic rigour. (Apologies here to the hard working risk, fires & explosions modellers) In the tradition of empirical chemical engineering, this paper takes a philosophical approach to “equations of state” as a way of demonstrating the transitions that have taken place in the approaches to Process Safety, consider the rise and fall of the importance of key components and present a “hypothesis” for discussion, that there is a “need to move away from the Engineering model and its linear solutions, to an Organizational Model where responsibility lies with the Individual rather than the System which is still the current trend.” [1] In reviewing this text, readers are provided with excerpts from an Events History of Process Failure which is intended to be indicative rather than prescriptive in its nature. It is taken from a wide arrange of sources only to demonstrate the frequency of major events across large parts of the world-wide process industry