Attitude toward imprecise information

This paper presents an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty which incorporates objective but imprecise information. Information is assumed to take the form of a probability-possibility set, that is, a set $P$ of probability measures on the state space. The decision maker is told that the true probability law lies in $P$ and is assumed to rank pairs of the form $(P,f)$ where $f$ is an act mapping states into outcomes. The key representation result delivers maxmin expected utility where the min operator ranges over a set of probability priors --just as in the maxmin expected utility (MEU) representation result of \cite{GILB/SCHM/89}. However, unlike the MEU representation, the representation here also delivers a mapping, $\varphi$, which links the probability-possibility set, describing the available information, to the set of revealed priors. The mapping $\varphi$ is shown to represent the decision maker's attitude to imprecise information: under our axioms, the set of representation priors is constituted as a selection from the probability-possibility set. This allows both expected utility when the selected set is a singleton and extreme pessimism when the selected set is the same as the probability-possibility set, i.e. , $\varphi$ is the identity mapping. We define a notion of comparative imprecision aversion and show it is characterized by inclusion of the sets of revealed probability distributions, irrespective of the utility functions that capture risk attitude. We also identify an explicit attitude toward imprecision that underlies usual hedging axioms. Finally, we characterize, under extra axioms, a more specific functional form, in which the set of selected probability distributions is obtained by (i) solving for the ``mean value'' of the probability-possibility set, and (ii) shrinking the probability-possibility set toward the mean value to a degree determined by preferences.Imprecise information; imprecision aversion; multiple priors; Steiner point

Scenarios, probability and possible futures

This paper provides an introduction to the mathematical theory of possibility, and examines how this tool can contribute to the analysis of far distant futures. The degree of mathematical possibility of a future is a number between O and 1. It quantifies the extend to which a future event is implausible or surprising, without implying that it has to happen somehow. Intuitively, a degree of possibility can be seen as the upper bound of a range of admissible probability levels which goes all the way down to zero. Thus, the proposition `The possibility of X is Pi(X) can be read as `The probability of X is not greater than Pi(X).Possibility levels offers a measure to quantify the degree of unlikelihood of far distant futures. It offers an alternative between forecasts and scenarios, which are both problematic. Long range planning using forecasts with precise probabilities is problematic because it tends to suggests a false degree of precision. Using scenarios without any quantified uncertainty levels is problematic because it may lead to unjustified attention to the extreme scenarios.This paper further deals with the question of extreme cases. It examines how experts should build a set of two to four well contrasted and precisely described futures that summarizes in a simple way their knowledge. Like scenario makers, these experts face multiple objectives: they have to anchor their analysis in credible expertise; depict though-provoking possible futures; but not so provocative as to be dismissed out-of-hand. The first objective can be achieved by describing a future of possibility level 1. The second and third objective, however, balance each other. We find that a satisfying balance can be achieved by selecting extreme cases that do not rule out equiprobability. For example, if there are three cases, the possibility level of extremes should be about 1/3.Futures, futurible, scenarios, possibility, imprecise probabilities, uncertainty, fuzzy logic

Assessment of the effects of space debris and meteoroids environment on the space station solar array assembly

The methodology used to assess the probability of no impact of space debris and meteoroids on a spacecraft structure is applied to the Space Station solar array assembly. Starting with the space debris and meteoroids flux models, the projected surface area of the solar cell string circuit of the solar array panel and the mast longeron, and the design lifetime, the possibility of no impact on the solar array mast and solar cell string circuits was determined as a function of particle size. The probability of no impact on the cell string circuits was used to derive the probability of no open circuit panel. The probability of meeting a certain power requirement at the end of the design lifetime was then calculated as a function of impacting particle size. Coupled with a penetration and damage models/correlations which relate the particle size to the penetration depth and damage, the results of this analysis can be used to determine the probability of meeting the lower power requirement given a degree of redundancy, and the probability of no impact on the solar array mast

Scenarios, probability and possible futures

This paper provides an introduction to the mathematical theory of possibility, and examines how this tool can contribute to the analysis of far distant futures. The degree of mathematical possibility of a future is a number between O and 1. It quantifies the extend to which a future event is implausible or surprising, without implying that it has to happen somehow. Intuitively, a degree of possibility can be seen as the upper bound of a range of admissible probability levels which goes all the way down to zero. Thus, the proposition `The possibility of X is Pi(X) can be read as `The probability of X is not greater than Pi(X).Possibility levels offers a measure to quantify the degree of unlikelihood of far distant futures. It offers an alternative between forecasts and scenarios, which are both problematic. Long range planning using forecasts with precise probabilities is problematic because it tends to suggests a false degree of precision. Using scenarios without any quantified uncertainty levels is problematic because it may lead to unjustified attention to the extreme scenarios.This paper further deals with the question of extreme cases. It examines how experts should build a set of two to four well contrasted and precisely described futures that summarizes in a simple way their knowledge. Like scenario makers, these experts face multiple objectives: they have to anchor their analysis in credible expertise; depict though-provoking possible futures; but not so provocative as to be dismissed out-of-hand. The first objective can be achieved by describing a future of possibility level 1. The second and third objective, however, balance each other. We find that a satisfying balance can be achieved by selecting extreme cases that do not rule out equiprobability. For example, if there are three cases, the possibility level of extremes should be about 1/3

Network growth models and genetic regulatory networks

We study a class of growth algorithms for directed graphs that are candidate models for the evolution of genetic regulatory networks. The algorithms involve partial duplication of nodes and their links, together with innovation of new links, allowing for the possibility that input and output links from a newly created node may have different probabilities of survival. We find some counterintuitive trends as parameters are varied, including the broadening of indegree distribution when the probability for retaining input links is decreased. We also find that both the scaling of transcription factors with genome size and the measured degree distributions for genes in yeast can be reproduced by the growth algorithm if and only if a special seed is used to initiate the process.Comment: 8 pages with 7 eps figures; uses revtex4. Added references, cleaner figure