14 research outputs found
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Reducing Third Parties in the Network through Client-Side Intelligence
The end-to-end argument describes the communication between a client and server using functionality that is located at the end points of a distributed system. From a security and privacy perspective, clients only need to trust the server they are trying to reach instead of intermediate system nodes and other third-party entities. Clients accessing the Internet today and more specifically the World Wide Web have to interact with a plethora of network entities for name resolution, traffic routing and content delivery. While individual communications with those entities may some times be end to end, from the user's perspective they are intermediaries the user has to trust in order to access the website behind a domain name. This complex interaction lacks transparency and control and expands the attack surface beyond the server clients are trying to reach directly. In this dissertation, we develop a set of novel design principles and architectures to reduce the number of third-party services and networks a client's traffic is exposed to when browsing the web. Our proposals bring additional intelligence to the client and can be adopted without changes to the third parties.
Websites can include content, such as images and iframes, located on third-party servers. Browsers loading an HTML page will contact these additional servers to satisfy external content dependencies. Such interaction has privacy implications because it includes context related to the user's browsing history. For example, the widespread adoption of "social plugins" enables the respective social networking services to track a growing part of its members' online activity. These plugins are commonly implemented as HTML iframes originating from the domain of the respective social network. They are embedded in sites users might visit, for instance to read the news or do shopping. Facebook's Like button is an example of a social plugin. While one could prevent the browser from connecting to third-party servers, it would break existing functionality and thus be unlikely to be widely adopted. We propose a novel design for privacy-preserving social plugins that decouples the retrieval of user-specific content from the loading of third-party content. Our approach can be adopted by web browsers without the need for server-side changes. Our design has the benefit of avoiding the transmission of user-identifying information to the third-party server while preserving the original functionality of the plugins.
In addition, we propose an architecture which reduces the networks involved when routing traffic to a website. Users then have to trust fewer organizations with their traffic. Such trust is necessary today because for example we observe that only 30% of popular web servers offer HTTPS. At the same time there is evidence that network adversaries carry out active and passive attacks against users. We argue that if end-to-end security with a server is not available the next best thing is a secure link to a network that is close to the server and will act as a gateway. Our approach identifies network vantage points in the cloud, enables a client to establish secure tunnels to them and intelligently routes traffic based on its destination. The proliferation of infrastructure-as-a-service platforms makes it practical for users to benefit from the cloud. We determine that our architecture is practical because our proposed use of the cloud aligns with existing ways end-user devices leverage it today. Users control both endpoints of the tunnel and do not depend on the cooperation of individual websites. We are thus able to eliminate third-party networks for 20% of popular web servers, reduce network paths to 1 hop for an additional 20% and shorten the rest.
We hypothesize that user privacy on the web can be improved in terms of transparency and control by reducing the systems and services that are indirectly and automatically involved. We also hypothesize that such reduction can be achieved unilaterally through client-side initiatives and without affecting the operation of individual websites
Facebook et les dispositifs de traçabilitĂ© vus sous lâangle du droit canadien
Aujourdâhui, on parle du Web social. Facebook par exemple, porte bien la marque de son Ă©poque ; il est devenu le rĂ©seau social le plus convoitĂ© dans le monde. Toutefois, lâentreprise a Ă©tĂ© souvent critiquĂ©e en raison de sa politique qui porte atteinte Ă la vie privĂ©e des personnes. Par le truchement de ses modules sociaux, Facebook a le potentiel de collecter et dâutiliser des informations considĂ©rables sur les internautes Ă leur insu et sans leur consentement. Ce fait est malheureusement mĂ©connu de la majoritĂ© dâentre eux.
Certes, lâentreprise doit vivre Ă©conomiquement et lâexploitation des renseignements personnels constitue pour elle une source de revenu. Toutefois, cette quĂȘte de subsistance ne doit pas se faire au dĂ©triment de la vie privĂ©e des gens. En dĂ©pit des outils juridiques dont le Canada dispose en matiĂšre de protection de la vie privĂ©e, des entreprises du Web Ă lâimage de Facebook rĂ©ussissent Ă les contourner.Today we talk about the social Web. Facebook for example bears the mark of its time, as it becomes the most coveted social networking Web site in the world. However, the company has been criticized due to its policy that violates people's privacy. Through its social plugins, Facebook has the potential to collect considerable amounts of information about users without their knowledge and without their consent, a fact which is unknown to most of them.
Certainly, the company must ensure its economic stability through these activities. However, this quest for subsistence should not be to the detriment of people's privacy. Canada has legal tools for the protection of privacy that allow users to deal with this kind of threat. However, Web companies such Facebook succeed to circumvent the law
Beyond Cookie Monster Amnesia:Real World Persistent Online Tracking
Browser fingerprinting is a relatively new method of uniquely identifying
browsers that can be used to track web users. In some ways it is more
privacy-threatening than tracking via cookies, as users have no direct control
over it. A number of authors have considered the wide variety of techniques
that can be used to fingerprint browsers; however, relatively little
information is available on how widespread browser fingerprinting is, and what
information is collected to create these fingerprints in the real world. To
help address this gap, we crawled the 10,000 most popular websites; this gave
insights into the number of websites that are using the technique, which
websites are collecting fingerprinting information, and exactly what
information is being retrieved. We found that approximately 69\% of websites
are, potentially, involved in first-party or third-party browser
fingerprinting. We further found that third-party browser fingerprinting, which
is potentially more privacy-damaging, appears to be predominant in practice. We
also describe \textit{FingerprintAlert}, a freely available browser extension
we developed that detects and, optionally, blocks fingerprinting attempts by
visited websites
AdGraph: a graph-based approach to ad and tracker blocking
User demand for blocking advertising and tracking online is large and growing. Existing tools, both deployed and described in research, have proven useful, but lack either the completeness or robustness needed for a general solution. Existing detection approaches generally focus on only one aspect of advertising or tracking (e.g. URL patterns, code structure), making existing approaches susceptible to evasion. In this work we present AdGraph, a novel graph-based machine learning approach for detecting advertising and tracking resources on the web. AdGraph differs from existing approaches by building a graph representation of the HTML structure, network requests, and JavaScript behavior of a webpage, and using this unique representation to train a classifier for identifying advertising and tracking resources. Because AdGraph considers many aspects of the context a network request takes place in, it is less susceptible to the single-factor evasion techniques that flummox existing approaches. We evaluate AdGraph on the Alexa top-10K websites, and find that it is highly accurate, able to replicate the labels of human-generated filter lists with 95.33% accuracy, and can even identify many mistakes in filter lists. We implement AdGraph as a modification to Chromium. AdGraph adds only minor overhead to page loading and execution, and is actually faster than stock Chromium on 42% of websites and AdBlock Plus on 78% of websites. Overall, we conclude that AdGraph is both accurate enough and performant enough for online use, breaking comparable or fewer websites than popular filter list based approaches
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Information Flow Auditing in the Cloud
As cloud technology matures and trendsetters like Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, and VMware have become the top-tier cloud services players, public cloud services have turned mainstream for individual users. In this work, I propose a set of techniques that can be used as the basis for alleviating cloud customers' privacy concerns and elevating their condence in using the cloud for security-sensitive operations as well as trusting it with their sensitive data. The main goal is to provide cloud customers' with a reliable mechanism that will cover the entire path of tracking their sensitive data, while they are collected and used by cloud-hosted services, to the presentation of the tracking results to the respective data owners. In particular, my design accomplishes this goal by retrofitting legacy applications with data flow tracking techniques and providing the cloud customers with comprehensive information flow auditing capabilities. For this purpose, we created CloudFence, a cloud-wide fine-grained data flow tracking (DFT) framework, that sensitive data in well-defined domains, offering additional protection against inadvertent leaks and unauthorized access