Utility Design for Distributed Resource Allocation -- Part I: Characterizing and Optimizing the Exact Price of Anarchy

Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a desirable collective behavior. In this work we focus on a well-studied class of distributed resource allocation problems where each agent is requested to select a subset of resources with the goal of optimizing a given system-level objective. Our core contribution is the development of a novel framework to tightly characterize the worst case performance of any resulting Nash equilibrium (price of anarchy) as a function of the chosen agents' utility functions. Leveraging this result, we identify how to design such utilities so as to optimize the price of anarchy through a tractable linear program. This provides us with a priori performance certificates applicable to any existing learning algorithm capable of driving the system to an equilibrium. Part II of this work specializes these results to submodular and supermodular objectives, discusses the complexity of computing Nash equilibria, and provides multiple illustrations of the theoretical findings.Comment: 15 pages, 5 figure

Approximately Truthful Multi-Agent Optimization Using Cloud-Enforced Joint Differential Privacy

Multi-agent coordination problems often require agents to exchange state information in order to reach some collective goal, such as agreement on a final state value. In some cases, it is feasible that opportunistic agents may deceptively report false state values for their own benefit, e.g., to claim a larger portion of shared resources. Motivated by such cases, this paper presents a multi-agent coordination framework which disincentivizes opportunistic misreporting of state information. This paper focuses on multi-agent coordination problems that can be stated as nonlinear programs, with non-separable constraints coupling the agents. In this setting, an opportunistic agent may be tempted to skew the problem's constraints in its favor to reduce its local cost, and this is exactly the behavior we seek to disincentivize. The framework presented uses a primal-dual approach wherein the agents compute primal updates and a centralized cloud computer computes dual updates. All computations performed by the cloud are carried out in a way that enforces joint differential privacy, which adds noise in order to dilute any agent's influence upon the value of its cost function in the problem. We show that this dilution deters agents from intentionally misreporting their states to the cloud, and present bounds on the possible cost reduction an agent can attain through misreporting its state. This work extends our earlier work on incorporating ordinary differential privacy into multi-agent optimization, and we show that this work can be modified to provide a disincentivize for misreporting states to the cloud. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate convergence of the optimization algorithm under joint differential privacy.Comment: 17 pages, 3 figure

Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria

This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in strategic environments.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure

Development and Analysis of Deterministic Privacy-Preserving Policies Using Non-Stochastic Information Theory

A deterministic privacy metric using non-stochastic information theory is developed. Particularly, minimax information is used to construct a measure of information leakage, which is inversely proportional to the measure of privacy. Anyone can submit a query to a trusted agent with access to a non-stochastic uncertain private dataset. Optimal deterministic privacy-preserving policies for responding to the submitted query are computed by maximizing the measure of privacy subject to a constraint on the worst-case quality of the response (i.e., the worst-case difference between the response by the agent and the output of the query computed on the private dataset). The optimal privacy-preserving policy is proved to be a piecewise constant function in the form of a quantization operator applied on the output of the submitted query. The measure of privacy is also used to analyze the performance of $k$-anonymity methodology (a popular deterministic mechanism for privacy-preserving release of datasets using suppression and generalization techniques), proving that it is in fact not privacy-preserving.Comment: improved introduction and numerical exampl

Dagstuhl Reports : Volume 1, Issue 2, February 2011

Online Privacy: Towards Informational Self-Determination on the Internet (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 11061) : Simone Fischer-Hübner, Chris Hoofnagle, Kai Rannenberg, Michael Waidner, Ioannis Krontiris and Michael Marhöfer Self-Repairing Programs (Dagstuhl Seminar 11062) : Mauro Pezzé, Martin C. Rinard, Westley Weimer and Andreas Zeller Theory and Applications of Graph Searching Problems (Dagstuhl Seminar 11071) : Fedor V. Fomin, Pierre Fraigniaud, Stephan Kreutzer and Dimitrios M. Thilikos Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Sequence Processing (Dagstuhl Seminar 11081) : Maxime Crochemore, Lila Kari, Mehryar Mohri and Dirk Nowotka Packing and Scheduling Algorithms for Information and Communication Services (Dagstuhl Seminar 11091) Klaus Jansen, Claire Mathieu, Hadas Shachnai and Neal E. Youn

Differentially-private Distributed Algorithms for Aggregative Games with Guaranteed Convergence

The distributed computation of a Nash equilibrium in aggregative games is gaining increased traction in recent years. Of particular interest is the mediator-free scenario where individual players only access or observe the decisions of their neighbors due to practical constraints. Given the competitive rivalry among participating players, protecting the privacy of individual players becomes imperative when sensitive information is involved. We propose a fully distributed equilibrium-computation approach for aggregative games that can achieve both rigorous differential privacy and guaranteed computation accuracy of the Nash equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast to existing differential-privacy solutions for aggregative games that have to either sacrifice the accuracy of equilibrium computation to gain rigorous privacy guarantees, or allow the cumulative privacy budget to grow unbounded, hence losing privacy guarantees, as iteration proceeds. Our approach uses independent noises across players, thus making it effective even when adversaries have access to all shared messages as well as the underlying algorithm structure. The encryption-free nature of the proposed approach, also ensures efficiency in computation and communication. The approach is also applicable in stochastic aggregative games, able to ensure both rigorous differential privacy and guaranteed computation accuracy of the Nash equilibrium when individual players only have stochastic estimates of their pseudo-gradient mappings. Numerical comparisons with existing counterparts confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2202.0111