Price Rigidity and Strategic Uncertainty An Agent-based Approach

The phenomenon of infrequent price changes has troubled economists for decades. Intuitively one feels that for most price-setters there exists a range of inaction, i.e. a substantial measure of the states of the world, within which they do not wish to modify prevailing prices. However, basic economics tells us that when marginal costs change it is rational to change prices, too. Economists wishing to maintain rationality of price-setters resorted to fixed price adjustment costs as an explanation for price rigidity. In this paper we propose an alternative explanation, without recourse to any sort of physical adjustment cost, by putting strategic interaction into the center-stage of our analysis. Price-making is treated as a repeated oligopoly game. The traditional analysis of these games cannot pinpoint any equilibrium as a reasonable "solution" of the strategic situation. Thus there is genuine strategic uncertainty, a situation where decision-makers are uncertain of the strategies of other decision-makers. Hesitation may lead to inaction. To model this situation we follow the style of agent-based models, by modelling firms that change their pricing strategies following an evolutionary algorithm. Our results are promising. In addition to reproducing the known negative relationship between price rigidity and the level of general inflation, our model exhibits several features observed in real data. Moreover, most prices fall into the theoretical "range" without explicitly building this property into strategies.Agent-based modeling, Evolutionary algorithm, Price rigidity, Social learning, Strategic Uncertainty

Price Rigidity and Strategic Uncertainty An Agent-based Approach

Abstract. The phenomenon of infrequent price changes has troubled economists for decades. Intuitively one feels that for most price-setters there exists a range of inaction, i.e. a substantial measure of the states of the world, within which they do not wish to modify prevailing prices. However, basic economics tells us that when marginal costs change it is rational to change prices, too. Economists wishing to maintain rationality of price-setters resorted to fixed price adjustment costs as an explanation for price rigidity. In this paper we propose an alternative explanation, without recourse to any sort of physical adjustment cost, by putting strategic interaction into the center-stage of our analysis. Pricemaking is treated as a repeated oligopoly game. The traditional analysis of these games cannot pinpoint any equilibrium as a reasonable "solution" of the strategic situation. Thus there is genuine strategic uncertainty, a situation where decision-makers are uncertain of the strategies of other decision-makers. Hesitation may lead to inaction. To model this situation we follow the style of agent-based models, by modelling firms that change their pricing strategies following an evolutionary algorithm. Our results are promising. In addition to reproducing the known negative relationship between price rigidity and the level of general inflation, our model exhibits several features observed in real data. Moreover, most prices fall into the theoretical "range" without explicitly building this property into strategies

Higher tax morale implies a higher optimal income tax rate

We analyze the impact of (exogenous) tax morale on the optimal design of progressive income taxation. In our model, only universal basic income (transfer) is financed from a linear income tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning, depending on his labor disutility and tax morale, respectively. Limiting the utilitarianism to the poorer parts of the population (defined by the welfare share), the optimal tax rate is an increasing function of the tax morale and a decreasing function of the welfare share.tax morale, progressive income tax, undeclared earning, labor supply, income redistribution

Importance of Animation Actions in the Operation of Hungarian Local Action Groups

The EU LEADER initiative has been running for 20 years and plays an important role in the development of European rural areas, however, in countries joining to the EU after 2004 it is still a relatively new phenomenon. In Hungary, for example, the LEADER+ programme was launched in 2005 with an experimental phase (called a "LEADER type initiative") and has developed to be a fully applied EU programme only in the current programming period. This paper explores the implementation of the LEADER programme in eastern Hungary. The examined Local Action Groups face diverse challenges concerning human, social, physical and financial capital, networks and social learning. The study investigates the opportunities and threats faced by the LAGs, with special regard to institutions, governance and applied initiatives. The roles of the LAGs within the social, economic and cultural context of given areas are examined through Lukesch's (2007) model FOG - forms of governance. The model is a tool to explore the interrelationships local partnership, local needs and local socio-cultural environment. The results of the FOG test show that the prevailing mode of governance in the examined LAGs emphasises animation actions as important elements of operation. Although the importance of animation actions is underlined by the result of the test, their presence between the initiatives is less than it should be. Good examples of animation actions are given: participatory video and a case study of its Hungarian application are introduced. Finally the role of Universities in animation actions is emphasised and closer relation of them with RD networks is called for.LEADER, Hungary, rural development, social learning, animation actions, policy analysis

Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey

This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with couples. We discuss contributions from computer scientists, economists, and game theorists.matching; couples; stability; computational complexity; incentive compatibility; restricted domains; large markets