Road-side units operators in competition: A game-theoretical approach

International audienceWe study the interactions among Internet providers in vehicular networks which offer access to commuters via road side units (RSUs). Namely, we propose a game-theoretical framework to model the competition on prices between vehicular Internet providers to capture the largest amount of users, thus selfishly maximizing the revenues. The equilibria of the aforementioned game are characterized under different mobile traffic conditions, RSU capabilities and users requirements and expectations. In particular, we also consider in the analysis the case where mobile users modify the price they accept to pay for the access as the likeliness of finding an access solution decreases. Our game-theoretical analysis gives insights on the outcomes of the competition between vehicular Internet providers, further highlighting some counter-intuitive behaviors; as an example, comparing with the case when users have constant price valuation over time, having users inclined to increasing their "acceptable" price may force vehicle Internet providers to charge lower prices due to competition

Competitive Charging Station Pricing for Plug-in Electric Vehicles

This paper considers the problem of charging station pricing and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) station selection. When a PEV needs to be charged, it selects a charging station by considering the charging prices, waiting times, and travel distances. Each charging station optimizes its charging price based on the prediction of the PEVs' charging station selection decisions and the other station's pricing decision, in order to maximize its profit. To obtain insights of such a highly coupled system, we consider a one-dimensional system with two competing charging stations and Poisson arriving PEVs. We propose a multi-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game model, in which the charging stations (leaders) announce their charging prices in Stage I, and the PEVs (followers) make their charging station selections in Stage II. We show that there always exists a unique charging station selection equilibrium in Stage II, and such equilibrium depends on the charging stations' service capacities and the price difference between them. We then characterize the sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the pricing equilibrium in Stage I. We also develop a low complexity algorithm that efficiently computes the pricing equilibrium and the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage Stackelberg game.Comment: 15 pages, 21 figure

Smart Procurement of Naturally Generated Energy (SPONGE) for Plug-in Hybrid Electric Buses

We discuss a recently introduced ECO-driving concept known as SPONGE in the context of Plug-in Hybrid Electric Buses (PHEB)'s.Examples are given to illustrate the benefits of this approach to ECO-driving. Finally, distributed algorithms to realise SPONGE are discussed, paying attention to the privacy implications of the underlying optimisation problems.Comment: This paper is recently submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineerin

Government transport land-use planning and development by implicit contract for franchised buses and ferries in Hong Kong, 1933-1972

As a contribution to policy research on monopolies in planning for public utilities and the role of the state in ordering the coordination of land use and transport in a market economy, this paper evaluates a couple of hypotheses informed by the Coasian economic concept of an implicit contract. There have been public subsidies to franchised bus and ferry companies in Colonial Hong Kong in the form of concessions in kind with spatial land-use transport implications. The hypotheses were evaluated by a comprehensive archive survey and documentary analysis of the clauses in relevant franchise documents, Crown Leases, government memoranda, and expert writings on buses and ferries. The findings revealed that there was no real land price subsidy provided for within or outside the franchise or lease documents, but there were substantial indirect subsidies during the study period. These were provided not only in terms of the free provision of bus terminals and piers, but also their planned combination on government land, as well as the strategic positioning of bus terminals in newly-developed government housing estates and new towns. The land-use public transport planning strategy shaped the urban structure of Hong Kong prior to the takeover of the companies by developers. The critical role of the government vis-á-vis developers as a super landlord is discussed. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.postprin

Sharing with Caution: Managing Parking Spaces in Vehicular Networks

By exchanging events in a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), drivers can receive interesting information while driving. For example, they can be informed of available parking spaces in their vicinity. A suitable protocol is needed to disseminate the events efficiently within the area where they are relevant. Moreover, in such a competitive context where each vehicle may be interested in a resource, it is crucial not to communicate that resource to each driver in the vicinity. Otherwise, those drivers would waste time trying to reach a parking space and only one of them would be fulfilled, which would lead to a poor satisfaction in the system. To solve this problem, we detail in this paper a reservation protocol that efficiently allocates parking spaces in vehicular ad hoc networks and avoids the competition among the vehicles. We have integrated our protocol within VESPA, a system that we have designed for vehicles to share information in VANETs. An experimental evaluation is provided, which proves the usefulness and benefits of our reservation protocol in both parking lots and urban scenarios. Besides, we present an in-depth study of the state of the art on this topic, that shows the interest and the originality of our approach