Redundant actuator development program

Two concepts of redundant secondary actuator mechanization, applicable to future advanced flight control systems, were studied to quantitatively assess their design applicability to an AST. The two actuator concepts, a four-channel, force summed system and a three-channel, active/standby system have been developed and evaluated through analysis, analog computer simulation, and piloted motion simulation. The quantitative comparison of the two concepts indicates that the force summed concept better meet performance requirements, although the active/standby is superior in other respects. Both concepts are viable candidates for advanced control application dependent on the specific performance requirements

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) Actuator hardware are documented. The function of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuators (ATVC) is to gimbal the main engines to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent. During first stage flight, the SRB nozzles provide nearly all the steering. After SRB separation, the Orbiter is steered by gimbaling of its main engines. There are six electrohydraulic servoactuators, one pitch and one yaw for each of the three main engines. Each servoactuator is composed of four electrohydraulic servovalve assemblies, one second stage power spool valve assembly, one primary piston assembly and a switching valve. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical failures resulting in loss of ATVC were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contamination and mechanical failures

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the elevon subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Orbiter Elevon system hardware. The elevon actuators are located at the trailing edge of the wing surface. The proper function of the elevons is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. In the ascent phase of flight, the elevons are used for relieving high wing loads. For entry, the elevons are used to pitch and roll the vehicle. Specifically, the elevon system hardware comprises the following components: flow cutoff valve; switching valve; electro-hydraulic (EH) servoactuator; secondary delta pressure transducer; bypass valve; power valve; power valve check valve; primary actuator; primary delta pressure transducer; and primary actuator position transducer. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 25 failure modes analyzed, 18 were determined to be PCIs

Design and development of the quad redundant servoactuator for the space shuttle solid rocket booster thrust vector control

The design and theory of operation of the servoactuator used for thrust vector control of the space shuttle solid rocket booster is described accompanied by highlights from the development and qualification test programs. Specific details are presented concerning major anomalies that occurred during the test programs and the corrective courses of action pursued

Electromechanical Simulation of Actively Controlled Rotordynamic Systems with Piezoelectric Actuators

Theories and tests for incorporating piezoelectric pushers as actuator devices for active vibration control are discussed. It started from a simple model with the assumption of ideal pusher characteristics and progressed to electromechanical models with nonideal pushers. Effects on system stability due to the nonideal characteristics of piezoelectric pushers and other elements in the control loop were investigated

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the rudder/speed brake subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism is documented. The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide directional control and to provide a means of energy control during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make a speedbrake. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism consists of the following elements: (1) Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears to provide PDU torque output; (2) four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels; and (3) ten torque shafts which join the PDU to the rotary actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts

Systems study for an Integrated Digital-Electric Aircraft (IDEA)

The results of the Integrated Digital/Electric Aircraft (IDEA) Study are presented. Airplanes with advanced systems were, defined and evaluated, as a means of identifying potential high payoff research tasks. A baseline airplane was defined for comparison, typical of a 1990's airplane with advanced active controls, propulsion, aerodynamics, and structures technology. Trade studies led to definition of an IDEA airplane, with extensive digital systems and electric secondary power distribution. This airplane showed an improvement of 3% in fuel use and 1.8% in DOC relative to the baseline configuration. An alternate configuration, an advanced technology turboprop, was also evaluated, with greater improvement supported by digital electric systems. Recommended research programs were defined for high risk, high payoff areas appropriate for implementation under NASA leadership