Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems

The author is grateful to FNRS for their financial support.Under open list proportional representation, voters vote both for a party and for some candidates within its list (preferential vote). Seats are assigned to parties in proportion to their votes and, within parties, to the candidates obtaining the largest number of preferential votes. The paper examines how the number of candidates voters can vote for affects the representation of minorities in parliaments. I highlight a clear negative relationship between the two. Minorities are proportionally represented in parliament only if voters can cast a limited number of preferential votes. When the number of preferential votes increases, a multiplier effect arises, which disproportionately increases the power of the majority in determining the elected candidates.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Preferential votes and minority representation

I am grateful to FNRS for their financial support.Under open list proportional representation, voters vote both for a party and for some candidates within its list (preferential vote). Seats are assigned to parties in proportion to their votes and, within parties, to the candidates obtaining the largest number of preferential votes. The paper examines how the number of candidates voters can vote for affects the representation of minorities in parliaments. I highlight a clear negative relationship between the two. Minorities are proportionally represented in parliament only if voters can cast a limited number of preferential votes. When the number of preferential votes increases, a multiplier effect arises, which disproportionately increases the power of the majority in determining the elected candidates.Publisher PD

Yes we can? Ethnic minority representation at the local level: the influence of political parties and electoral systems in Belgium and England

Since the end of World War II, most Western countries face a growing number of ethnic minorities within their borders. Over the years, the migrant population diversified and turned into a permanent phenomenon. As a result, we nowadays live in very diverse societies. However, our political institutions are less diverse, as there remains an underrepresentation of specific groups and more specifically of ethnic minorities. The scholarly literature on ethnic minority representation points at the importance of the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and more specifically of citizenship regimes, electoral systems, characteristics of the ethnic group and political parties to explain the political (under)representation of ethnic minorities. In this paper, I focus more specifically on the influence of electoral systems and political parties. I discuss which party characteristics and which elements of the electoral system are beneficial for the political representation of ethnic minorities. This comparative paper is based on a qualitative case study of one Belgian and one English city. In these cities, semi-structured interviews were conducted with ethnic representatives, ethnic candidates, representatives of the ethnic community and party representatives. Interviews were analyzed using the grounded theory approach (Glaser, 1992)

Rational choice meets the new politics: choosing the Scottish Parliament’s electoral system

Although there has been extensive research about electoral system choice at the national level, we know relatively little about the dynamics of deciding the rules of the game for sub-state institutions. This article examines the factors that influenced the choice of a proportional electoral system for the new Scottish Parliament in 1999. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with key participants, we challenge the conventional rational choice explanation for the adoption of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. Although rational considerations on the part of the Labour Party were involved in the choice of MMP, our findings suggest that, as at the national level, theories of electoral system choice need to consider normative values as well

Electoral system reviews in New Zealand, Britain and Canada: a critical comparison

This article compares the use of people outside government to consider electoral reform in three countries using the single-member plurality electoral system. The composition of electoral reform bodies, ranging from commissions of experts (New Zealand) and ex- politicians (Britain) to assemblies of randomly selected citizens (British Columbia), appears to have influenced how well their recommendations were received by the public. Governments should be careful not to assume that they can retain control of the electoral reform process once they let it out of their hands, as the cases of New Zealand and British Columbia show, where majorities of the voters chose reform

Electoral reform in Asia: institutional engineering against "money politics"

This paper argues that the concept of intraparty competition – as opposed to interparty competition – provides the most useful lens through which to understand recent cases of electoral reform in East Asia. Various democracies in the region have over the past two decades replaced ‘extreme’ systems on the intraparty dimension with more moderate types. Pressure for reform built up as these systems were increasingly blamed for a number of social ills, such as "money politics" and economic mismanagement. The paper will conclude by arguing that the effect of electoral reform has been rather limited. In particular, particularistic strategies of voter mobilization – such as clientelism and vote buying – remain an important electoral tool for many politicians