Pre-Emption: Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxation

This paper examines the implications of Federal statutory restrictions on state government taxing powers. Such pre-emption can prevent states from pursuing policies that are best adapted to their economic circumstances and objectives, inefficiently constraining decentralized state tax policymaking. States policy choices may, however, harm the efficient operation of the US federation as a whole; in such cases, the “visible hand” of Federal pre-emption may lead to improved policy outcomes. Existing and proposed statutes that regulate state taxation of retail sales, retirement savings distributions, and corporation income illustrate the potential advantages and disadvantages of pre-emption.

The Right of Pre-Emption Under the Legislation of North Macedonia

The right of pre-emption represents the authorization that a person has, based on the law or the contract, to request from another person to acquire the right to emption the item in the case of the sale of a certain item. The object of the right of pre-emption can be all movable and immovable possessions. When the right of pre-emption is created by agreement for the real estate, the same must be registered in the public register as a temporary registration. The fact of registration also creates effects on third parties. The legal right of pre-emption comes directly from the law or from any by-law act. The legal right of pre-emption appears in co-ownership, joint ownership, floor ownership, agricultural land, construction land, right of pledge, and other similar possessions. The legal right of pre-emption is provided by the provisions of the Law on ownership and other real rights; by the Law on agricultural land; by the Law on enforcement; and by the Law on the sale of agricultural land owned by the state. The contractual right of pre-emption is established by agreement between the parties which is mainly foreseen in the sales contract or with a special contract that consists of the right of pre-emption as its’ creation object. Unlike the legal right of pre-emption, which is permanent, the contractual right of pre-emption has a deadline depending on the will of the parties. This right can last for a maximum of five years from the moment of concluding the contract. Keywords: the right of pre-emption, co-owners, legal pre-emption, pre-emption contract, pre-emption bearer DOI: 10.7176/JLPG/125-08 Publication date:October 31st 202

An integrative framework of preemption strategies

Pre-print; author's draftThis paper performs a review of the various pre-emption strategies prescribed in the economics literature. These are cost superiority, consumers' switching cost, channel exclusivity, environmental barriers of entry and credible commitment to react aggressively. Through our analysis, we develop an integrative framework of the pre-emption strategies that will result in long-term payoffs to the firm. The framework proposes that there are two key dimensions—strategic advantage and strategic focus—and identify five generic types of pre-emption strategies for market incumbents. These are the switching cost, blockade, credible commitment, tie-up, and cost leadership strategies. The pre-emption strategies and the framework presented can assist managerial decision-making for the successful pre-emption of potential competition to complement their existing efforts

Judicially Modified Democracy: Court and State Pre-Emption of Local GMO Regulation in Hawaii and Beyond

The federal framework for regulating genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has long been criticized as fragmented and inadequate to protect against various health, environmental, and economic concerns. Yet, despite having the legal authority to augment the federal framework, the overwhelming majority of states have failed to enact any substantive legislation governing GMOs at the state-level. In the wake of this regulatory vacuum, a small but growing number of local governments have attempted to regulate GMOs locally. However, local GMO regulations face significant challenges by the GMO industry, which has sought to undo local regulatory authority both through the courts and through industry lobbying of state legislators to expressly pre-empt local regulation. Today, roughly 17 states have now expressly pre-empted local authority to regulate GMOs, largely due to industry influence. Hawaii is a high-stakes battleground for the genetically modified debate, and in 2013-2014, three local counties—Maui County, Hawaii County, and Kauai County—all attempted to regulate GMOs at the local level. Although the counties purportedly had broad statutory authority to regulate to protect local health, life, and property, as well as conservation obligations under the Hawaii Constitution, the local GMO ordinances were quickly challenged in court by the GMO industry and soon invalidated by the federal district court in Hawaii on novel state and federal pre-emption grounds. As the very first local GMO regulations struck down on state and federal pre-emption grounds, the Hawaii pre-emption decisions will likely have a significant adverse impact on local GMO regulation across the country if allowed to stand. This article argues that the recent pre-emption decisions were wrongly decided under traditional pre-emption principles, and further argues that in the absence of state or federal comprehensive regulatory schemes sufficient to address mounting health, environmental, and economic concerns, courts and states should refrain from denying local authority to regulate GMOs. Permitting local regulation of GMOs not only fosters and supports legitimate local democracy, but it may also be what is most needed to find innovative solutions to acknowledged GMO risks and realities

Processes, pre-emption and further problems

In this paper I will argue that what makes our ordinary judgements about token causation true can be explicated in terms of interferences into quasi-inertial processes. These interferences and quasi-inertial processes can in turn be fully explicated in scientific terms. In this sense the account presented here is reductive. I will furthermore argue that this version of a process-theory of causation can deal with the traditional problems that process theories have to face, such as the problem of misconnection and the problem of disconnection as well as with a problem concerning the mis-classification of pre-emption cases

Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.

In an ongoing dispute, the Supreme Court has allowed retail natural gas purchasers to bring state law anti-trust claims against natural gas pipelines for price manipulation. While holding that the Natural Gas Act does not create field pre-emption over these claims, the opinion hinted that there might still be conflict pre-emption. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, argued forcefully that the majority had misapplied and misconstrued the applicable case law, which, he argued, clearly created field pre-emption

Competitive balance in sports leagues and the paradox of power

It is generally thought that competitive equilibrium in sports leagues involves too little competitive balance (the strong dominate the weak too much- a more even contest would be more attractive). However, it is possible to sow in a standard logit contest model that the reverse is true – the strong do not win “enough”- i.e. more wins by the strong team would increase attendance or revenues. This is consistent with Hirshleifer’s paradox of power. However, this is only true so long as the strong do not become too dominant- otherwise the regime switches to one of pre-emption: the strong never lose. This paper identifies the conditions under which the paradox of power and pre-emption will manifest themselves.

Corporate Leniency with Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption

A corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to the first member of a cartel to come forward and cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the incentives to apply for leniency when each cartel member has private information as to the likelihood that the competition authority will be able to convict them without a cooperating firm. A firm may apply for leniency because it fears being convicted ("prosecution effect") or because it fears another firm will apply ("pre-emption effect"). Policies by the competition authority to magnify concerns about pre-emption - and thereby induce greater use of the leniency program - are also explored.

EXERCISE RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS

There are identified problems in regulatory framework, for example, there is a possibility of circumventing the decisions of the municipality to exercise the right of pre-emption. Municipality can’t use the right of pre-emption of proportion real estate. Research contain original solutions of regulatory framework improvement

Community Property After Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo

This Comment will briefly discuss California\u27s community property system, and the standards traditionally required by the Supreme Court for federal pre-emption of state property law. It will also examine the Supreme Court\u27s interpretation of the Railroad Retirement Act which led the Court to conclude that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and demanded federal pre-emption in this case. It will discuss the Hisquierdo test for federal pre-emption, which the Supreme Court has since used to override state community property systems. Finally, it will evaluate whether the case was correctly decided