3,463 research outputs found

    Cyber-Vulnerabilities & Public Health Emergency Response

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    A Graphical Adversarial Risk Analysis Model for Oil and Gas Drilling Cybersecurity

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    Oil and gas drilling is based, increasingly, on operational technology, whose cybersecurity is complicated by several challenges. We propose a graphical model for cybersecurity risk assessment based on Adversarial Risk Analysis to face those challenges. We also provide an example of the model in the context of an offshore drilling rig. The proposed model provides a more formal and comprehensive analysis of risks, still using the standard business language based on decisions, risks, and value.Comment: In Proceedings GraMSec 2014, arXiv:1404.163

    Employing a User-Centered Design Process for Cybersecurity Awareness in the Power Grid

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    In this paper, we discuss the process we are using in the design and implementation of a tool to improve the situation awareness of cyberattacks in the power grid. We provide details of the steps we have taken to date and describe the steps that still need to be accomplished. The focus of this work is to provide situation awareness of the power grid to staff from different, non-overlapping roles in an electrical transmission organization in order to facilitate an understanding of a possible occurrence of a cyberattack. Our approach follows a user-centered design process and includes determining the types of information to display, the format of the displays, and the personnel to whom the display should be shown. Additionally, there is the issue of how much help the tool can provide in the way of assessing the probability of a cyberattack given the current status of various portions of the power grid. Regardless, the ability to provide a common operating picture should enable the various groups to collaborate on a response

    Between Hype and Understatement: Reassessing Cyber Risks as a Security Strategy

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    Most of the actions that fall under the trilogy of cyber crime, terrorism,and war exploit pre-existing weaknesses in the underlying technology.Because these vulnerabilities that exist in the network are not themselvesillegal, they tend to be overlooked in the debate on cyber security. A UKreport on the cost of cyber crime illustrates this approach. Its authors chose to exclude from their analysis the costs in anticipation of cyber crime, such as insurance costs and the costs of purchasing anti-virus software on the basis that "these are likely to be factored into normal day-to-day expenditures for the Government, businesses, and individuals. This article contends if these costs had been quantified and integrated into the cost of cyber crime, then the analysis would have revealed that what matters is not so much cyber crime, but the fertile terrain of vulnerabilities that unleash a range of possibilities to whomever wishes to exploit them. By downplaying the vulnerabilities, the threats represented by cyber war, cyber terrorism, and cyber crime are conversely inflated. Therefore, reassessing risk as a strategy for security in cyberspace must include acknowledgment of understated vulnerabilities, as well as a better distributed knowledge about the nature and character of the overhyped threats of cyber crime, cyber terrorism, and cyber war

    Threats on the horizon: Understanding security threats in the era of cyber-physical systems

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    Disruptive innovations of the last few decades, such as smart cities and Industry 4.0, were made possible by higher integration of physical and digital elements. In today's pervasive cyber-physical systems, connecting more devices introduces new vulnerabilities and security threats. With increasing cybersecurity incidents, cybersecurity professionals are becoming incapable of addressing what has become the greatest threat climate than ever before. This research investigates the spectrum of risk of a cybersecurity incident taking place in the cyber-physical-enabled world using the VERIS Community Database. The findings were that the majority of known actors were from the US and Russia, most victims were from western states and geographic origin tended to reflect global affairs. The most commonly targeted asset was information, with the majority of attack modes relying on privilege abuse. The key feature observed was extensive internal security breaches, most often a result of human error. This tends to show that access in any form appears to be the source of vulnerability rather than incident specifics due to a fundamental trade-off between usability and security in the design of computer systems. This provides fundamental evidence of the need for a major reevaluation of the founding principles in cybersecurity
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