Multiagent Maximum Coverage Problems: The Trade-off Between Anarchy and Stability

The price of anarchy and price of stability are three well-studied performance metrics that seek to characterize the inefficiency of equilibria in distributed systems. The distinction between these two performance metrics centers on the equilibria that they focus on: the price of anarchy characterizes the quality of the worst-performing equilibria, while the price of stability characterizes the quality of the best-performing equilibria. While much of the literature focuses on these metrics from an analysis perspective, in this work we consider these performance metrics from a design perspective. Specifically, we focus on the setting where a system operator is tasked with designing local utility functions to optimize these performance metrics in a class of games termed covering games. Our main result characterizes a fundamental trade-off between the price of anarchy and price of stability in the form of a fully explicit Pareto frontier. Within this setup, optimizing the price of anarchy comes directly at the expense of the price of stability (and vice versa). Our second results demonstrates how a system-operator could incorporate an additional piece of system-level information into the design of the agents' utility functions to breach these limitations and improve the system's performance. This valuable piece of system-level information pertains to the performance of worst performing agent in the system.Comment: 14 pages, 4 figure

Economic Games as Estimators

Discrete event games are discrete time dynamical systems whose state transitions are discrete events caused by actions taken by agents within the game. The agents’ objectives and associated decision rules need not be known to the game designer in order to impose struc- ture on a game’s reachable states. Mechanism design for discrete event games is accomplished by declaring desirable invariant properties and restricting the state transition functions to conserve these properties at every point in time for all admissible actions and for all agents, using techniques familiar from state-feedback control theory. Building upon these connections to control theory, a framework is developed to equip these games with estimation properties of signals which are private to the agents playing the game. Token bonding curves are presented as discrete event games and numerical experiments are used to investigate their signal processing properties with a focus on input-output response dynamics.Series: Working Paper Series / Institute for Cryptoeconomics / Interdisciplinary Researc

Distributed formation control of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles over time-varying graphs using population games

© 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.This paper presents a control technique based on distributed population dynamics under time-varying communication graphs for a multi-agent system structured in a leader-follower fashion. Here, the leader agent follows a particular trajectory and the follower agents should track it in a certain organized formation manner. The tracking of the leader can be performed in the position coordinates x; y; and z, and in the yaw angle phi. Additional features are performed with this method: each agent has only partial knowledge of the position of other agents and not necessarily all agents should communicate to the leader. Moreover, it is possible to integrate a new agent into the formation (or for an agent to leave the formation task) in a dynamical manner. In addition, the formation configuration can be changed along the time, and the distributed population-games-based controller achieves the new organization goal accommodating conveniently the information-sharing graph in function of the communication range capabilities of each UAV. Finally, several simulations are presented to illustrate different scenarios, e.g., formation with time-varying communication network, and time-varying formationPeer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Games for a new climate: experiencing the complexity of future risks

This repository item contains a single issue of the Pardee Center Task Force Reports, a publication series that began publishing in 2009 by the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future.This report is a product of the Pardee Center Task Force on Games for a New Climate, which met at Pardee House at Boston University in March 2012. The 12-member Task Force was convened on behalf of the Pardee Center by Visiting Research Fellow Pablo Suarez in collaboration with the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre to “explore the potential of participatory, game-based processes for accelerating learning, fostering dialogue, and promoting action through real-world decisions affecting the longer-range future, with an emphasis on humanitarian and development work, particularly involving climate risk management.” Compiled and edited by Janot Mendler de Suarez, Pablo Suarez and Carina Bachofen, the report includes contributions from all of the Task Force members and provides a detailed exploration of the current and potential ways in which games can be used to help a variety of stakeholders – including subsistence farmers, humanitarian workers, scientists, policymakers, and donors – to both understand and experience the difficulty and risks involved related to decision-making in a complex and uncertain future. The dozen Task Force experts who contributed to the report represent academic institutions, humanitarian organization, other non-governmental organizations, and game design firms with backgrounds ranging from climate modeling and anthropology to community-level disaster management and national and global policymaking as well as game design.Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centr

Designing Sugaropolis:digital games as a medium for conveying transnational narratives

In this paper, the authors present a case study of ‘Sugaropolis’: a two-year practice-based project that involved interdisciplinary co-design and stakeholder evaluation of two digital game prototypes. Drawing on the diverse expertise of the research team (game design and development, human geography, and transnational narratives), the paper aims to contribute to debates about the use of digital games as a medium for representing the past. With an emphasis on design-as-research, we consider how digital games can be (co-)designed to communicate complex histories and geographies in which people, objects, and resources are connected through space and time