Building on MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines

This Note explores the possibility of applying Title VII\u27s disparate impact liability theory against foreign companies operating under Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN Treaties). The author questions the reasoning of MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, which applied disparate treatment, but not disparate impact, against a Korean company operating under an FCN Treaty. According to MacNamara, if courts permit plaintiffs in Title VII-FCN Treaty cases to utilize the disparate impact theory and cite statistical disparities in the racial composition of the work force as evidence of discrimination, employers could be held liable merely for exercising their FCN Treaty rights. This Note concludes that the MacNamara court ignored the complexity and costliness of presenting statistical data. More importantly, recovery under the disparate impact theory has become extremely difficult as a result of the Supreme Court\u27s subsequent decision Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio. Furthermore, the author concludes that any increase in Title VII liability--because of either narrowed FCN Treaty rights or the application of disparate impact analysis--likely will not affect foreign investment in the United States. Fear of widespread divestment in the United States should not be the controlling factor in the resolution of tension between Title VII and FCN Treaties. The author advocates that victims of employment discrimination should be entitled to bring disparate impact, as well as disparate treatment, claims in cases involving foreign corporations operating under FCN Treaties

The Implementation, Interpretation, and Justification of Likelihoods in Cosmology

I discuss the formal implementation, interpretation, and justification of likelihood attributions in cosmology. I show that likelihood arguments in cosmology suffer from significant conceptual and formal problems that undermine their applicability in this context

Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference

After some general remarks about the interrelation between philosophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance tests. These are defined as the calculation of $p$-values rather than as formal procedures for ``acceptance'' and ``rejection.'' A number of types of null hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out governing the implications of $p$-values in the specific circumstances of each application, as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A variety of more complicated situations are discussed in which modification of the simple $p$-value may be essential.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/074921706000000400 in the IMS Lecture Notes--Monograph Series (http://www.imstat.org/publications/lecnotes.htm) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox

The lottery paradox involves a set of judgments that are individually easy, when we think intuitively, but ultimately hard to reconcile with each other, when we think reflectively. Empirical work on the natural representation of probability shows that a range of interestingly different intuitive and reflective processes are deployed when we think about possible outcomes in different contexts. Understanding the shifts in our natural ways of thinking can reduce the sense that the lottery paradox reveals something problematic about our concept of knowledge. However, examining these shifts also raises interesting questions about how we ought to be thinking about possible outcomes in the first place

Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?

My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe “exotic” possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for dissolving philosophical paradox

Counterfactual Reasoning, Realism and Quantum Mechanics: Much Ado About Nothing?

I purport to show why old and new claims on the role of counterfactual reasoning for the EPR argument and the Bell theorem are unjustified: once the logical relation between locality and counterfactual reasoning is clarified, the use of the latter does no harm and the nonlocality result can well follow from the EPR premises. To show why, I critically review (i) incompleteness arguments that Einstein developed before the EPR paper, and (ii) more recent claims that equate the use of counterfactual reasoning with the assumption of a strong form of realism.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1501.04618 by other author

Ideal Reasoners don’t Believe in Zombies

The negative zombie argument concludes that physicalism is false from the premises that p ∧¬q is ideally negatively conceivable and that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, where p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is a phenomenal truth (Chalmers 2002; 2010). A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable iff φ is not ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that the negative zombie argument is neither a priori nor conclusive. First, I argue that the premises of the argument are true only if there exists an adequate finite ideal reasoner R that believes ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis. Roughly, a finite reasoner is a reasoner with cognitive limitations (e.g. finite memory). I argue that R is finite only if R reasons nonmonotonically and only approach ideal reflection at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis (e.g. for q =‘something is conscious’). This would render the choice of an adequate q dependent on empirical information (and the argument a posteriori). I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither a priori nor conclusive