A Common Law for the Statutory Era: The Right of Publicity and New York\u27s Right of Privacy Statute

This note compares New York\u27s privacy statute with the common law right of publicity. The article first traces the history of each law, then goes on to compare their effects. The author argues that exploitation of persona warrants judicial recognition of a common law right of publicity in New York, despite the argument that the creation of such a right should be left to the discretion of the legislature

Mean Muggin’ No More: \u3cem\u3eDetroit Free Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice\u3c/em\u3e and a Non-Trivial Privacy Interest in Booking Photographs

On July 14, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that criminal defendants have a legitimate privacy interest in their booking photographs, thereby reversing and remanding a grant of summary judgment in favor of the Detroit Free Press’s request for the booking photographs of four police officers who had recently been indicted for bribery and drug conspiracy. In holding that the public disclosure of booking photographs may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, the majority overturned twenty years’ worth of Sixth Circuit precedent. The court properly acknowledged that booking photographs convey a portrait of guilt to the viewer, and that the Freedom of Information Act’s exemptions are meant to protect individuals who have not yet been convicted from having humiliating personal information freely disclosed to the public. This Comment argues in favor of the majority’s holding, which acknowledged that defendants have a privacy interest in their booking photographs and adopted a case-by-case approach to balancing that privacy interest against the public interest in releasing the photographs. The Sixth Circuit’s decision protects the personal identity of the accused in the age of the Internet, and allows defendants to truly maintain their presumption of innocence until proven guilty

The New Privacy

This article reviews Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance and the Limits of Privacy John Gilliom (2001). In 1964, as the welfare state emerged in full force in the United States, Charles Reich published The New Property, one of the most influential articles ever to appear in a law review. Reich argued that in order to protect individual autonomy in an age of governmental largess, a new property right in governmental benefits had to be recognized. He called this form of property the new property. In retrospect, Reich, rather than anticipating trends, was swimming against the tide of history. In the past forty years, formal claims to government benefits have become more tenuous rather than more secure. Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance and the Limits of Privacy, by John Gilliom, an associate professor of political science at Ohio State University, demonstrates both the tenuousness of welfare rights today and the costs that this system imposes on individual autonomy. In Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom uses his case study of welfare recipients as the occasion for an attack on classic notions of privacy rights. Gilliom finds that welfare clients do not engage in privacy talk - indeed, he finds the concept to be devoid of value for the welfare recipients. Here, another comparison can be made with Reich\u27s new property. Reich explicitly tied his idea of a property right in government entitlements to privacy. He felt that the new property was needed to protect privacy and, in particular, individual autonomy. Reich\u27s notion of privacy reaches back to a classic concept of privacy, one that we term the old privacy. It is precisely this classic idea that Gilliom finds welfare recipients to have rejected. Theoretical work inside and outside of the legal academy has pointed, however, to a new privacy. The new privacy is centered around Fair Information Practices ( FIPs ) and is intended to prevent threats to autonomy. The idea of privacy centered on FIPs is based not on a property interest in one\u27s information, but the idea that processors of personal data should be obliged to follow certain standards. If, as we will see, classic notions of privacy are not of much use in the welfare state, the new privacy may be. This review begins by examining Gilliam\u27s methodology and findings. It credits the insights of his look at the inner world of welfare recipients, but finds that he appears to ignore the need for income limits on aid recipients and the concomitant need for at least some personal information to enforce these limits. It also criticizes his failure to explore an interaction of an ethics of care among welfare recipients with possible use of retooled privacy rights or interests. In the second part of this review, The authors consider the extent to which theoretical work inside and outside of the legal academy points to a new privacy and discuss how Gilliam\u27s empirical research provides support for that scholarship. They also evaluate the extent to which the new privacy, centered on PIPs, can prevent the threats to personal autonomy so poignantly identified by Gilliom

Interference With Privacy - In What Forms Might It Be Actionable in Virginia?

Much has been written about the right of privacy since the 1890 law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis which first proposed that such a right be recognized. In the ensuing years the tort of invasion of privacy, which is, in reality, an amalgam of four separate torts, has been widely accepted. In spite of the burgeoning recognition of various rights assembled under the rubric of right to privacy, the Supreme Court of Virginia has never decided whether private citizens are entitled to protection of their personal privacy against invasions by other private citizens. It is the intent of this article to discuss the status of the common law tort of invasion of privacy in Virginia and to consider whether the tort, if it exists in any embryonic stage, would or should be legitimatized. Because of the proliferation of articles and cases discussing various facets of the right of privacy, this article is of limited scope. It makes no attempt to discuss in detail whether particular factual situations should or should not fall within the purview of such a right, to catalogue, review or discuss the right of privacy as developed in other jurisdictions, or to deal with constitutional limitations on governments which grant or ensure a limited right of privacy. Neither does the article discuss the first amendment ramifications necessarily raised by certain branches of the tort of invasion of privacy involving publication of private facts, unauthorized appropriation of one\u27s name or likeness or portrayal of an individual in a false light

Bruce C. Jeppson and Jean W. Jeppson, His Wife v. United Television, Inc., aka KTVX T.V. Channel 4 : Respondent\u27s Brief

Appeal from the Order of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County State of Utah The Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judg