Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful for Preventing Sudden Stops?: A Quantitative Investigation of the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff

The globalization hazard hypothesis maintains that the current account reversals and asset price collapses observed during 'Sudden Stops' are caused by global capital market frictions. A policy implication of this view is that Sudden Stops can be prevented by offering global investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees, however, introduce a moral hazard incentive for global investors, thus creating a tradeoff by which price guarantees weaken globalization hazard but strengthen international moral hazard. This paper studies the quantitative implications of this tradeoff using a dynamic stochastic equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without guarantees, distortions induced by margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by introducing a distortion that props up foreign demand for assets. Non-state-contingent guarantees contain Sudden Stops but they are executed often and induce persistent asset overvaluation. Guarantees offered only in high-debt states are executed rarely and prevent Sudden Stops without persistent asset overvaluation. If the elasticity of foreign asset demand is low, price guarantees can still contain Sudden Stops but domestic agents obtain smaller welfare gains at Sudden Stop states and suffer welfare losses on average in the stochastic steady state.

Dynamic Management of Portfolios with Transaction Costs under Tychastic Uncertainty.

We use in this chapter the viability/capturability approach for studying the problem of dynamic valuation and management of a portfolio with transaction costs in the framework of tychastic control systems (or dynamical games against nature) instead of stochastic control systems. Indeed, the very definition of the guaranteed valuation set can be formulated directly in terms of guaranteed viable-capture basin of a dynamical game. Hence, we shall “compute” the guaranteed viable-capture basin and find a formula for the valuation function involving an underlying criterion, use the tangential properties of such basins for proving that the valuation function is a solution to Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential equations. We then derive a dynamical feedback providing an adjustment law regulating the evolution of the portfolios obeying viability constraints until it achieves the given objective in finite time. We shall show that the Pujal—Saint-Pierre viability/capturability algorithm applied to this specific case provides both the valuation function and the associated portfolios.dynamic games; dynamic valuation; tychastic control systems; management of portfolio;

Ambiguity in asset pricing and portfolio choice: a review of the literature

A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that investors’ behavior is not well described by the traditional paradigm of (subjective) expected utility maximization under rational expectations. A literature has arisen that models agents whose choices are consistent with models that are less restrictive than the standard subjective expected utility framework. In this paper we conduct a survey of the existing literature that has explored the implications of decision-making under ambiguity for financial market outcomes, such as portfolio choice and equilibrium asset prices. We conclude that the ambiguity literature has led to a number of significant advances in our ability to rationalize empirical features of asset returns and portfolio decisions, such as the empirical failure of the two-fund separation theorem in portfolio decisions, the modest exposure to risky securities observed for a majority of investors, the home equity preference in international portfolio diversification, the excess volatility of asset returns, the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles, and the occurrence of trading break-downs.Capital assets pricing model ; Investments

Price Formation in Multiple, Simultaneous Continuous Double Auctions, with Implications for Asset Pricing

We propose a Marshallian model for price and allocation adjustments in parallel continuous double auctions. Agents quote prices that they expect will maximize local utility improvements. The process generates Pareto optimal allocations in the limit. In experiments designed to induce CAPM equilibrium, price and allocation dynamics are in line with the model's predictions. Walrasian aggregate excess demands do not provide additional predictive power. We identify, theoretically and empirically, a portfolio that is closer to mean-variance optimal throughout equilibration. This portfolio can serve as a benchmark for asset returns even if markets are not in equilibrium, unlike the market portfolio, which only works at equilibrium. The theory also has implications for momentum, volume and liquidity

Building an Artificial Stock Market Populated by Reinforcement-Learning Agents

In this paper we propose an artificial stock market model based on interaction of heterogeneous agents whose forward-looking behaviour is driven by the reinforcement learning algorithm combined with some evolutionary selection mechanism. We use the model for the analysis of market self-regulation abilities, market efficiency and determinants of emergent properties of the financial market. Distinctive and novel features of the model include strong emphasis on the economic content of individual decision making, application of the Q-learning algorithm for driving individual behaviour, and rich market setup.agent-based financial modelling, artificial stock market, complex dynamical system, emergent properties, market efficiency, agent heterogeneity, reinforcement learning

Markov discrete choice process for dividend policy

This thesis aims to understand the dynamics underlying payout policies for companies listed on the public stock exchange. The dividend policy affects the liquid assets of companies both directly, given the size of the dividend paid, and indirectly, affecting the ability of companies to attract sources of financing in the immediate future. The thesis proposes an optimal dividend payout model that describes managers' behavior. Every year, managers have to choose whether to change their payout policy (by increasing or decreasing dividends) or to maintain the level of dividends paid in the previous period. We assume that the dividend policy is based on observable state variables (earnings at the beginning of the period and payout policy during the last period) and unobservable state variables (conflicts between managers and shareholders/bondholders, idiosyncratic risks and growth opportunities). We derive the optimal dividend policy from the solution of the stochastic discrete choice dynamic programming problem. The model depends on unknown primitive parameters that regulate the expectations of managers on future values of state variables. The maximization of the utility function provides the optimal strategy for the manager. Using annual balance-sheet data for companies operating in the Euro area, we estimate the structural parameters of the model using a nested fixed-point algorithm, and we test whether managers choices are consistent concerning the model predictions