Corruption and Political Competition

There is a growing evidence that political corruption is often closely associated with the rent seeking activities of special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest groups and the incidence of political corruption and determines whether electoral competition can eliminate political corruption. We obtain some striking results. Greater electoral competition serves to lessen policy distortions. However, this in turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition merely serves to alter the type of corruption that eventuates, but cannot eliminate it.Corruption, Lobbying, Political Competition

A principal-agent model of corruption

One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one of which is corrupting), and one agent (who is corrupted). The behaviour of these principals and agent is analysed in terms of the costs and benefits associated with different actions. The model is applied to political corruption in representative democracies, showing that, contrary to common belief, the use of principal-agent models is not limited to bureaucratic corruption

The Political Resource Curse

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor.government spending, corruption, political selection

Korelasi Korupsi Politik dengan Hukum dan Pemerintahan di Negara Modern (Telaah Tentang Praktik Korupsi Politik dan Penanggulangannya)

Based on political corruption study and its correlation to the law and governance in modern countries, this research was aimed at identifying how political corruption correlates to socio-political, socio-economic, socio-cultural, socio-juridical and human right dimensions. To have social relevance to juridical analysis, this research also analyzed the strategy/policy to overcome the political corruption phenomena. Literary analysis and interviews with several experts having relevant scientific competence were the main basis for the research to compose this dissertation. The correlation between variables of the data obtained from the analysis of the content and the norm was described. The phenomena of legally prohibited corruptions were also compared. The political corruption analyzes in several modern countries, it is clear that political corruption has more extensive impact than corruption by the people without political position. The entity of political corruption is closely related with the power. Political corruption always attempts to maintain and extend the power abuse and the need for socio-political order requires equivalent control role in the implementation of the power. Political corruption correlates to human rights violation by governmental heads because political corruption is closely related to the desire to maintain and extend power

Policy compromises: corruption and regulation in a dynamic democracy

This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with political corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency and is supported by a majority of voters. Voters reelect politicians based on observed performance. We study Markov-perfect equilibria of the resulting game, and demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate some corruption and inefficient regulation in political equilibrium. Efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth. Political corruption entails excessive stabilization of aggregate fluctuations.

A Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Persistence of Political Corruption

Using a theoretical model of two-candidate competition, I study the political support for a fully effective and costless reform targeting high level political corruption. I find that when the candidates have a high discount factor, and when the level of political corruption is not too low, both corrupt and honest candidates have incentives to oppose the reform. I also find that a fully informed and fully coordinated electorate can change a candidate's incentives by bundling the reform with high wages and by voting strategically.Political Corruption; Political Economy of Anti-Corruption Reform

Corruption, Clients, and Political MacHines a Response to Professor Issacharoff

Responding to Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 118 (2010) In his comment on political corruption, Professor Samuel Issacharoff questions traditional accounts that aim to squeeze money out of politics entirely. Instead, he focuses on the danger that political spending will promote private influence over government policy. In this response, Professor Stephen E. Sachs argues that private influence is itself too broad a category to control, and that campaign finance policy should be restricted to a more manageable scope. Professor Sachs argues that if protecting the government from private influence is too diffuse a goal, we can at least attempt to protect the government from itself, by ensuring that it does not channel public resources into self-sustaining political machines