Changing tools to catch the beast: Why the EU studies should take policy seriously, and how this shift could help to understand integration

While the EU is still enlarging its membership and range of actions, the current stalemate of the integration project is pushing the ‘ontological’ question about the nature of the common Europe again at the top of both the political and the research agendas. This paper aims to contribute the debate and display the possibilities of enhancing the comprehension of the ‘supranational beast’ from a policy perspective. The focus hence is shifted on implementation and policy frameworks, and the field of analysis widened to cover the institutional transformations occurred within the administrative dimension both at the national and supranational levels in the last decades. From this perspective, previous findings are revisited to account for the new meaning of the common Europe after the Single European Act, the complexity of the current institutional architecture, and the reasons beneath the stalemate. Finally, the approach is translated into research hypotheses about integration and viable strategies for sustaining it beneath and beyond the usual ‘hard’ institutional re-engineering

Indicators: tools for informing, monitoring or controlling?

Today, indicators are produced and used worldwide; across all levels and sectors of society; by public, private and civil society actors; for a variety of purposes, ranging from knowledge-provision to administrative control. While the use of quantitative data as policy support, including policy formulation, has a long history, recent decades have seen the rise of what some have called an ‘indicator industry’ (for example, Hezri and Hasan 2004), focused especially on the production of environmental and sustainability indicators, within a framework variously called ‘governance by numbers' (Miller 2001; Lascoumes and Le Galès 2005; Jackson 2011), ‘management by numbers’ in public service (for example, Hood 2007) or ‘numbers discourse’ (Jackson 2011, p. 23). Indicators are generally expected to enhance the rationality of policymaking and public debate by providing a supposedly more objective, robust, and reliable information base. Indicators can operate as ‘boundary objects’ (for example, Turnhout 2009; Star 2010), catering to both technocratic and deliberative ideals, by combining ‘hard facts’ and modelling with collective reasoning and ‘speculation’. Research and development work in the area has hitherto overwhelmingly concentrated on improving the technical quality of indicators, while the fate of indicators in policymaking and the associated sociopolitical aspects have attracted little attention. This chapter focuses on this neglected area of indicator research, by providing an overview of the multiple types of existing indicators, as well as their use and influence in various venues of policymaking. Empirical examples are drawn mainly from the fields of environmental and sustainability indicators

From Normative Power to Great Power Politics: Change in the European Union's Foreign Policy Identity. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series. Vol. 5, No. 14 June 2008

[From the Introduction] At the beginning of the twenty-first century, one of the most significant developments in international relations is the important and growing role of the European Union (EU) as a global player in contemporary world politics. But what exactly is that role, how does the EU manage its relations with the external world and what identity does the EU wish to present to that world? In other words, what is the foreign policy identity of the EU? These are questions that analysts and scholars have grappled with since the formal creation of the EU at Maastricht in 1991 (Treaty on European Union). The EU has worked very carefully to foster a specific type of international identity. It is generally seen and theorized as a leader in the promotion of international peace and humanitarian issues. The EU presents itself as a normative force in world politics. It has customarily placed overriding emphasis on international law, democracy, human rights, international institutions, and multilateralism in its foreign policy, while eschewing a foreign policy based on traditional national interests and material gain. The EU has, in fact, explicitly and formally announced these normative goals for its foreign policymaking in the second pillar of the Treaty on European Union, more commonly known as the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy). But in a world that has become markedly more perilous since September 11, 2001, many Europeans consider U.S. unilateralism as dangerous as the putative terrorist activity it is attempting to halt. As a result, are we seeing the foreign policy identity of the EU begin to change? Does the EU see itself as a possible balance against the primacy of the United States? In other words, does the EU show signs of transforming to a more traditional foreign policy orientation; one based on traditional great power politics and geared towards ensuring the most basic of state interests: survival, security and power? This paper will investigate this transforming foreign policy identity of the EU by seeking to answer the following questions: If the EU’s foreign policy identity is indeed changing, then how is it changing, what is it becoming, and most importantly, what is causing it to change? I will argue that the EU’s foreign policy identity is changing from a normative power to an identity based more closely on a great power politics model; and that the influence of epistemic communities or knowledge based networks is a primary catalyst for this change

Implementing Privacy Policy: Who Should Do What?

Academic scholarship on privacy has focused on the substantive rules and policies governing the protection of personal data. An extensive literature has debated alternative approaches for defining how private and public institutions can collect and use information about individuals. But, the attention given to the what of U.S. privacy regulation has overshadowed consideration of how and by whom privacy policy should be formulated and implemented. U.S. privacy policy is an amalgam of activity by a myriad of federal, state, and local government agencies. But, the quality of substantive privacy law depends greatly on which agency or agencies are running the show. Unfortunately, such implementation-related matters have been discounted or ignored— with the clear implication that they only need to be addressed after the “real” work of developing substantive privacy rules is completed. As things stand, the development and implementation of U.S. privacy policy is compromised by the murky allocation of responsibilities and authority among federal, state, and local governmental entities—compounded by the inevitable tensions associated with the large number of entities that are active in this regulatory space. These deficiencies have had major adverse consequences, both domestically and internationally. Without substantial upgrades of institutions and infrastructure, privacy law and policy will continue to fall short of what it could (and should) achieve

"The Limits of Leadership: Germany and the EMS/Yugoslavian Crises"

Since its 1990 reunification, Germany now more than ever dominated the European Union in terms of population and economic power, making it a prime candidate for leading the European integration project. Yet these resources do not convert directly into political influence. Germany's leadership in the EU is conditioned by political forces at the domestic and the EU level, and the institutional setting of the policy area in question. The exercise of German influence depends on which actors are empowered at different times. This empowerment both enabled and constrained German leadership during two recent episodes, both of which have been cited as reasons to be concerned with the future of Germany's participation in the EU. In both cases Germany was unable to engineer a more effective resolution of a serious difficulty than its power might otherwise indicate. The first incident involves the shift from cooperation to acrimony in the European Monetary System between the compromises of the 1991 Treaty on European Union and the crisis in the EMS from September 1992 to August 1993. Germany asserted effective leadership in bringing about the successful negotiation of the monetary provision of the Treaty, but during the ratification stage the country was unable to avert the EMS crisis by instituting a realignment of exchange rates or a reduction in interest rates. The second case involves the EU's response to the break-up of Yugoslavia. Germany was able to bring about the EU's reluctant recognition of the independent Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, but after violence escalated in the region the Germans have been unable to intervene in a more substantial way to help resolve the conflict despite the efforts of Kohl and his cabinet. In both of these cases German leadership was transformed depending on the phase of the policy in question, institutional constraints at the domestic and EU levels, and most importantly, on who was acting on the part of Germany. During these events Germany's executive was empowered in the initial phases of policy (primarily Kohl during Maastricht negotiations; Genscher during the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia), but during the crisis phases the country was prevented from acting more decisively thanks to Germany's constitutional provisions, decentralization of power, and the specific EU arrangements for cooperation in monetary and political affairs. The analysis thus highlights the extent to which European integration can proceed only as institutional norms, rules and procedures at the domestic and the EU levels develop in harmony with each other, particularly in policy areas (such as monetary and political cooperation), where mechanisms at the EU level are inadequate or ineffective

Still the century of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments? Exploring patterns of innovation and continuity

This article re-examines the political interest in and use of ‘new' environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) and other non-regulatory modes of governance. It starts by taking stock of the dynamic debate that has emerged around this topic since the turn of the century. It then contextualizes that debate by examining subsequent challenges to, and transformations in state-led governing and the widely acknowledged rise of 'new governance' more generally. It highlights the mismatch between: (a) the animated discussion of new instruments amongst policy makers and academics; and (b), the less active adoption and performance of them in practice. It makes an overall assessment of the role of instruments - both ‘old' and ‘new' - in the wider debate about governance, and suggests some steps that could be taken by both practitioners and scholars better to understand and possibly even utilise more NEPIs in the future

Deliberative Democracy in the EU. Countering Populism with Participation and Debate. CEPS Paperback

Elections are the preferred way to freely transfer power from one term to the next and from one political party or coalition to another. They are an essential element of democracy. But if the process of power transfer is corrupted, democracy risks collapse. Reliance on voters, civil society organisations and neutral observers to fully exercise their freedoms as laid down in international human rights conventions is an integral part of holding democratic elections. Without free, fair and regular elections, liberal democracy is inconceivable. Elections are no guarantee that democracy will take root and hold, however. If the history of political participation in Europe over the past 800 years is anything to go by, successful attempts at gaining voice have been patchy, while leaders’ attempts to silence these voices and consolidate their own power have been almost constant (Blockmans, 2020). Recent developments in certain EU member states have again shown us that democratically elected leaders will try and use majoritarian rule to curb freedoms, overstep the constitutional limits of their powers, protect the interests of their cronies and recycle themselves through seemingly free and fair elections. In their recent book How Democracies Die, two Harvard professors of politics write: “Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected governments themselves” (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018)

Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies

I develop a formal model of bureaucratic policymaking to investigate why a legislature would choose to delegate authority to a bureaucratic agency whose actions can be controlled, ex post , by an executive with divergent policy preferences. Because the executive and legislature might find different policies to be salient to their constituencies, I demonstrate that executive review of agency rulemaking can benefit both branches of government, relative to legislative delegation without the possibility of such review. In trying to undermine the impacts of executive oversight, agencies propose policies that could benefit the legislature were the executive to choose not to intervene in agency policymaking. Likewise, if the executive does intervene, executive review allows him to implement a policy more desirable than absent such review. This joint-desirability of executive review is more likely when legislative and executive policy preferences are relatively aligned, and when legislative and agency policy preferences are relatively divergent. The broader social welfare consequences of executive review depend on the relative effectiveness of the executive's oversight of agency policymaking. These results provide insight for why mediating lawmaking institutions such as the Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) continue to survive in a separation of powers system despite their potential to advantage one branch of government at the expense of the other.