The Ouachitonian 1922

The 1922 Ouachita Baptist University yearbook, The Ouachitonian, records the events of this college year. Its goal is to remind readers of pleasant members and enduring friendships formed at OBU, as well as of the students, faculty, staff, organizations, and events that shaped OBU in 1922. Dedicated to Dr. A. M. Croxton in appreciation of his Christian life, his personal interest in every student of Ouachita College, his high ideals and untiring efforts in trying to teach and preach the word of God.https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/yearbooks/1029/thumbnail.jp

The contribution of modern psychology to the understanding of the problem of moral and religious development in the realm of religious education

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston Universit

The Ouachitonian 1920

The 1920 Ouachita Baptist University yearbook, The Ouachitonian, records the events of this college year. Its goal is to remind readers of pleasant memories and enduring friendships formed at OBU, as well as of the students, faculty, staff, organizations, and events that shaped OBU in 1920. Dedicated to Professor Peter Zellars, in appreciation of the influence of his clear Christian life, his personal interests, and ever ready sympathy, his high ideals for Ouachita College and his untiring efforts in helping secure them, this 1920 edition of The Ouachitonian is affectionately dedicated to him.https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/yearbooks/1020/thumbnail.jp

The Ouachitonian 1920

The 1920 Ouachita Baptist University yearbook, The Ouachitonian, records the events of this college year. Its goal is to remind readers of pleasant memories and enduring friendships formed at OBU, as well as of the students, faculty, staff, organizations, and events that shaped OBU in 1920. Dedicated to Professor Peter Zellars, in appreciation of the influence of his clear Christian life, his personal interests, and ever ready sympathy, his high ideals for Ouachita College and his untiring efforts in helping secure them, this 1920 edition of The Ouachitonian is affectionately dedicated to him.https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/yearbooks/1020/thumbnail.jp

Gr\"obner bases of syzygies and Stanley depth

Let F. be a any free resolution of a Z^n-graded submodule of a free module over the polynomial ring K[x_1, ..., x_n]. We show that for a suitable term order on F., the initial module of the p'th syzygy module Z_p is generated by terms m_ie_i where the m_i are monomials in K[x_{p+1}, ..., x_n]. Also for a large class of free resolutions F., encompassing Eliahou-Kervaire resolutions, we show that a Gr\"obner basis for Z_p is given by the boundaries of generators of F_p. We apply the above to give lower bounds for the Stanley depth of the syzygy modules Z_p, in particular showing it is at least p+1. We also show that if I is any squarefree ideal in K[x_1, ..., x_n], the Stanley depth of I is at least of order the square root of 2n.Comment: 13 page

Law, Literature, and the Celebration of Authority

Richard Posner\u27s new book, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, is a defense of “liberal legalism” against a group of modern critics who have only one thing in common: their use of either particular pieces of literature or literary theory to mount legal critiques. Perhaps for that reason, it is very hard to discern a unified thesis within Posner\u27s book regarding the relationship between law and literature. In part, Posner is complaining about a pollution of literature by its use and abuse in political and legal argument; thus, the “misunderstood relation” to which the title refers. At times, Posner suggests that this is the major thesis of the book-he simply wants to rescue literature from its misuse by critics of legalism. By the end of the book, however, it is clear that Posner has no real passion for his claim that great literature is never really about law, that it is always about more exalted things, and that its use in legal or political arguments therefore is improper. Rather, Posner\u27s real concern is the celebration and vindication of liberal legalism, and he is as happy using literature to celebrate liberal legalism as are its critics in making their attack. I will argue that Law and Literature ought to be read primarily as an impressionistic and impassioned celebration of legalism-liberal or conservative-and that the book contributes little to an understanding of either the works of literature or the legal and literary theories which it discusses. Although Posner\u27s interpretations of pieces of literature that deal with legal themes are sometimes surprising and often interesting, those interpretations are transparently dependent on his main agenda, which is a spirited celebration of legalist virtues. Posner\u27s book nevertheless should be of great interest to professional and academic legal audiences. It tells us something important about the distinguishing commitments of liberal legalism and the type of personality which it attracts. That alone, and entirely apart from the merits or demerits of the literary interpretations Posner presents, makes the book\u27s celebration of legalism of great interest. More specifically, I will argue that the “liberal legalism” celebrated and passionately defended in Law and Literature rests on two essentially conservative convictions: (1) that our present law is, for the most part, as it should be, and (2) that our present law is, for the most part, as it must be. Legal authority, as it is presently constituted, Posner teaches, is generally both necessary and desirable; neither can we, nor should we, make fundamental changes in our law. Indeed, the book\u27s impassioned celebrations of legal authority and of what Posner calls the “morality of obedience” to legal authority well illustrate the Critical Legal Studies movement\u27s central and most controversial claim about liberal legal orthodoxy: that it is an essentially conservative and “Panglossian” faith in the virtue and necessity of existing authority-including, but not limited to, legal authority-that motivates as well as defines liberal legalist thought. The lasting importance of Law and Literature may turn out to be that its celebratory and conservative endorsement of authority unwittingly proves at least this aspect of the critics\u27 case. I will also argue in this review that Law and Literature tells us something important about what motivates liberal legalism and what kind of personality is attached to it. It is often assumed, at least in the Critical Legal Studies movement, that the “Panglossian attitude” unique to liberal legalism-the distinctive faith in the virtue and necessity of legal authority-is motivated by “sentimentality,” and, more specifically, by a sentimental view of the relation between our ideals and our law. According to the critics, this sentimentality is reflected in a paradigmatic type of argument, which I will call the “sentimental argument,” in liberal legalist discourse. Thus, liberal legal arguments, according to their critics, typically begin with some independent value or moral ideal, such as efficiency, procedural fairness, or legal equality, as the first premise. The emotional need expressed by this second argument for liberal legalism-and the need which, I will argue, Posner\u27s book makes fairly explicit-is not the sentimental need to see actual authority as perfectly congruent with our moral ideals; rather, it is the need to constrain the individual will by an external authority. If Posner\u27s account of liberal legalism is at all representative, then the appeal of liberal legalism may be that it gives voice to the deep and human need to identify the individual\u27s will, worth, power, and fate with the judgment of a higher, nonnatural, or simply “other” authority. If so, then liberal legalism may continue to resonate in the law school culture despite the barrage of debunking criticism directed against it, because it is the only ideology to do so

Recalling All the Olympians: W. B. Yeats’s “Beautiful Lofty Things,” On the Boiler and the Agenda of National Rebirth

While it has been omitted by numerous critics in their otherwise comprehensive readings of Yeats’s oeuvre, “Beautiful Lofty Things” has been placed among the mythical poems, partly in accordance with Yeats’s own intention; in a letter to his wife, he suggested that “Lapis Lazuli, the poem called ‘To D. W.’ ‘Beautiful Lofty Things,’ ‘Imitated from the Japanese’ & ‘Gyres’ . . . would go well together in a bunch.” The poem has been inscribed in the Yeats canon as registering a series of fleeting epiphanies of the mythical in the mundane. However, “Beautiful Lofty Things,” evocative of a characteristically Yeatsian employment of myth though it certainly is, seems at the same time to fuse Yeats’s quite earthly preoccupations. It is here argued that the poem is organized around a tightly woven matrix of figures that comprise Yeats’s idea of the Irish nation as a “poetical culture.” Thus the position of the lyric in the poet’s oeuvre deserves to be shifted from periphery towards an inner part of his cultural and political ideas of the time. Indeed, the poem can be viewed as one of Yeats’s central late comments on the state of the nation and, significantly, one in which he is able to proffer a humanist strategy for developing a culturally modern state rather than miring his argument in occasionally over-reckless display of abhorrence of modernit

False Idles: The Politics of the "Quiet Life"

The dominant Greek and Roman ideology held that the best human life required engaging in politics, on the grounds that the human good is shared, not private, and that the activities central to this shared good are those of traditional politics. This chapter surveys three ways in which philosophers challenged this ideology, defended a withdrawal from or transformation of traditional politics, and thus rethought what politics could be. Plato and Aristotle accept the ideology's two central commitments but insist that a few exceptional human beings could transcend the good of human activities. Epicurus argues that the human good is private, not shared. Socrates and some of his followers, including especially the Stoics, argue that the activities central to the shared human good are not those of traditional politics