4 research outputs found

    Joint Scheme for Physical Layer Error Correction and Security

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    Security in Wireless Sensor Networks Employing MACGSP6

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    Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have unique characteristics which constrain them; including small energy stores, limited computation, and short range communication capability. Most traditional security algorithms use cryptographic primitives such as Public-key cryptography and are not optimized for energy usage. Employing these algorithms for the security of WSNs is often not practical. At the same time, the need for security in WSNs is unavoidable. Applications such as military, medical care, structural monitoring, and surveillance systems require information security in the network. As current security mechanisms for WSNs are not sufficient, development of new security schemes for WSNs is necessary. New security schemes may be able to take advantage of the unique properties of WSNs, such as the large numbers of nodes typical in these networks to mitigate the need for cryptographic algorithms and key distribution and management. However, taking advantage of these properties must be done in an energy efficient manner. The research examines how the redundancy in WSNs can provide some security elements. The research shows how multiple random delivery paths (MRDPs) can provide data integrity for WSNs. Second, the research employs multiple sinks to increase the total number of duplicate packets received by sinks, allowing sink voting to mitigate the packet discard rate issue of a WSN with a single sink. Third, the research examines the effectiveness of using multiple random paths in maintaining data confidentiality in WSNs. Last, the research examines the use of a rate limit to cope with packet flooding attacks in WSNs

    Physical-layer encryption with stream ciphers

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    Contemporary communication systems are based on modular architectures, where the role of the physical layer is essentially confined to error correction, whereas information security is typically dealt with at the upper layers of the protocol stack. We consider a security architecture that does exactly the opposite: information sequences are first converted to longer channel codewords which are then encrypted using a classical stream cipher. Although this approach requires longer encryption sequences, our analysis shows that the natural randomness of the noisy communication channel can be used effectively against known-plaintext attacks. We also address practical implementation issues in physical-layer encryption and discuss their impact on the system architecture and on the security performance
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