Phase Transitions for Gödel Incompleteness

Gödel's first incompleteness result from 1931 states that there are true assertions about the natural numbers which do not follow from the Peano axioms. Since 1931 many researchers have been looking for natural examples of such assertions and breakthroughs have been obtained in the seventies by Jeff Paris (in part jointly with Leo Harrington and Laurie Kirby) and Harvey Friedman who produced first mathematically interesting independence results in Ramsey theory (Paris) and well-order and well-quasi-order theory (Friedman). In this article we investigate Friedman style principles of combinatorial well-foundedness for the ordinals below epsilon_0. These principles state that there is a uniform bound on the length of decreasing sequences of ordinals which satisfy an elementary recursive growth rate condition with respect to their Gödel numbers. For these independence principles we classify (as a part of a general research program) their phase transitions, i.e. we classify exactly the bounding conditions which lead from provability to unprovability in the induced combinatorial well-foundedness principles. As Gödel numbering for ordinals we choose the one which is induced naturally from Gödel's coding of finite sequences from his classical 1931 paper on his incompleteness results. This choice makes the investigation highly non trivial but rewarding and we succeed in our objectives by using an intricate and surprising interplay between analytic combinatorics and the theory of descent recursive functions. For obtaining the required bounds on count functions for ordinals we use a classical 1961 Tauberian theorem by Parameswaran which apparently is far remote from Gödel's theorem

Delegated causality of complex systems

A notion of delegated causality is introduced here. This subtle kind of causality is dual to interventional causality. Delegated causality elucidates the causal role of dynamical systems at the “edge of chaos”, explicates evident cases of downward causation, and relates emergent phenomena to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. Apparently rich implications are noticed in biology and Chinese philosophy. The perspective of delegated causality supports cognitive interpretations of self-organization and evolution

Novelty And Surprises In Complex Adaptive System (CAS) Dynamics: A Computational Theory of Actor Innovation

The work of John von Neumann in the 1940's on self-reproducing machines as models for biological systems and self-organized complexity provides the computational legacy for CAS. Following this, the major hypothesis emanating from Wolfram (1984), Langton (1992, 1994), Kaufmann (1993) and Casti (1994) is that the sine qua non of complex adaptive systems is their capacity to produce novelty or 'surprises' and the so called Type IV innovation based structure changing dynamics of the Wolfram-Chomsky schema. The Wolfram-Chomsky schema postulates that on varying the computational capabilities of agents, different system wide dynamics can be generated: finite automata produce Type I dynamics with unique limit points or homogeneity; push down automata produce Type II dynamics with limit cycles; linear bounded automata generate Type III chaotic trajectories with strange attractors. The significance of this schema is that it postulates that only agents with the full powers of Turing Machines capable of simulating other Turing Machines, which Wolfram calls computational universality can produce Type IV irregular innovation based structure changing dynamics associated with the three main natural exponents of CAS, evolutionary biology, immunology and capitalist growth. Langton (1990,1992) identifies the above complexity classes for dynamical systems with the halting problem of Turing machines and famously calls the phase transition or the domain on which novel objects emerge as 'life at the edge of chaos'. This paper develops the formal foundations for the emergence of novelty or innovation. Remarkably, following Binmore(1987) who first introduced to game theory the requisite dose of mechanism with players modelled as Turing Machines with the Gödel (1931) logic involving the Liar or the pure logic of opposition, we will see that only agents qua universal Turing Machines which can make self-referential calculation of hostile objectives can bring about adaptive novelty or strategic innovation

Computability and Evolutionary Complexity: Markets As Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)

The purpose of this Feature is to critically examine and to contribute to the burgeoning multi disciplinary literature on markets as complex adaptive systems (CAS). Three economists, Robert Axtell, Steven Durlauf and Arthur Robson who have distinguished themselves as pioneers in different aspects of how the thesis of evolutionary complexity pertains to market environments have contributed to this special issue. Axtell is concerned about the procedural aspects of attaining market equilibria in a decentralized setting and argues that principles on the complexity of feasible computation should rule in or out widely held models such as the Walrasian one. Robson puts forward the hypothesis called the Red Queen principle, well known from evolutionary biology, as a possible explanation for the evolution of complexity itself. Durlauf examines some of the claims that have been made in the name of complex systems theory to see whether these present testable hypothesis for economic models. My overview aims to use the wider literature on complex systems to provide a conceptual framework within which to discuss the issues raised for Economics in the above contributions and elsewhere. In particular, some assessment will be made on the extent to which modern complex systems theory and its application to markets as CAS constitutes a paradigm shift from more mainstream economic analysis

The Un(solv)able Problem

After a years-long intellectual journey, three mathematicians have discovered that a problem of central importance in physics is impossible to solve—and that means other big questions may be undecidable, too. In Brief: Kurt Gödel famously discovered in the 1930s that some statements are impossible to prove true or false—they will always be “undecidable.” Mathematicians recently set out to discover whether a certain fundamental problem in quantum physics—the so-called spectral gap question—falls into this category. The spectral gap refers to the energy difference between the lowest energy state a material can occupy and the next state up. After three years of blackboard brainstorming, midnight calculating and much theorizing over coffee, the mathematicians produced a 146-page proof that the spectral gap problem is, in fact, undecidable. The result raises the possibility that other important questions may likewise be unanswerable

Logical openness in Cognitive Models

It is here proposed an analysis of symbolic and sub-symbolic models for studying cognitive processes, centered on emergence and logical openness notions. The Theory of logical openness connects the Physics of system/environment relationships to the system informational structure. In this theory, cognitive models can be ordered according to a hierarchy of complexity depending on their logical openness degree, and their descriptive limits are correlated to Gödel-Turing Theorems on formal systems. The symbolic models with low logical openness describe cognition by means of semantics which fix the system/environment relationship (cognition in vitro), while the sub-symbolic ones with high logical openness tends to seize its evolutive dynamics (cognition in vivo). An observer is defined as a system with high logical openness. In conclusion, the characteristic processes of intrinsic emergence typical of “bio-logic” - emerging of new codes-require an alternative model to Turing-computation, the natural or bio-morphic computation, whose essential features we are going here to outline

G\"odel's undecidability theorems and the search for a theory of everything

I investigate the question whether G\"odel's undecidability theorems play a crucial role in the search for a unified theory of physics. I conclude that unless the structure of space-time is fundamentally discrete we can never decide whether a given theory is the final one or not. This is relevant for both canonical quantum gravity and string theory.Comment: 17 pages, prize winning essay awarded by the Kurt G\"odel Circle of Friends Berli