2,197 research outputs found
Two-Player Perfect-Information Shift-Invariant Submixing Stochastic Games Are Half-Positional
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely
many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a payoff function which
associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We
prove that if the the payoff function is both shift-invariant and submixing,
then the game is half-positional, i.e. the first player has an optimal strategy
which is both deterministic and stationary. This result relies on the existence
of -subgame-perfect equilibria in shift-invariant games, a second
contribution of the paper
Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring
We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring
based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for
those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic
epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows to represent the
knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of
Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use
the abstraction to develop algorithms for some payoff functions.Comment: 28 page
Computer aided synthesis: a game theoretic approach
In this invited contribution, we propose a comprehensive introduction to game
theory applied in computer aided synthesis. In this context, we give some
classical results on two-player zero-sum games and then on multi-player non
zero-sum games. The simple case of one-player games is strongly related to
automata theory on infinite words. All along the article, we focus on general
approaches to solve the studied problems, and we provide several illustrative
examples as well as intuitions on the proofs.Comment: Invitation contribution for conference "Developments in Language
Theory" (DLT 2017
Expectations or Guarantees? I Want It All! A crossroad between games and MDPs
When reasoning about the strategic capabilities of an agent, it is important
to consider the nature of its adversaries. In the particular context of
controller synthesis for quantitative specifications, the usual problem is to
devise a strategy for a reactive system which yields some desired performance,
taking into account the possible impact of the environment of the system. There
are at least two ways to look at this environment. In the classical analysis of
two-player quantitative games, the environment is purely antagonistic and the
problem is to provide strict performance guarantees. In Markov decision
processes, the environment is seen as purely stochastic: the aim is then to
optimize the expected payoff, with no guarantee on individual outcomes.
In this expository work, we report on recent results introducing the beyond
worst-case synthesis problem, which is to construct strategies that guarantee
some quantitative requirement in the worst-case while providing an higher
expected value against a particular stochastic model of the environment given
as input. This problem is relevant to produce system controllers that provide
nice expected performance in the everyday situation while ensuring a strict
(but relaxed) performance threshold even in the event of very bad (while
unlikely) circumstances. It has been studied for both the mean-payoff and the
shortest path quantitative measures.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041
07471 Abstracts Collection -- Equilibrium Computation
From 18 to 23 November 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07471 ``Equilibrium Computation\u27\u27 was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI),
Schloss Dagstuhl.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games
with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a
constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds
even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur
only on terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence
problem is undecidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games
with the same restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained
existence problem for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary
strategies is decidable and analyse its complexity.Comment: 34 page
Simple Stochastic Games with Almost-Sure Energy-Parity Objectives are in NP and coNP
We study stochastic games with energy-parity objectives, which combine
quantitative rewards with a qualitative -regular condition: The
maximizer aims to avoid running out of energy while simultaneously satisfying a
parity condition. We show that the corresponding almost-sure problem, i.e.,
checking whether there exists a maximizer strategy that achieves the
energy-parity objective with probability when starting at a given energy
level , is decidable and in . The same holds for checking if
such a exists and if a given is minimal
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