Peirce in contemporary semiotics

This essay traces the fortunes of Peirce in contemporary semiotics. Although many accounts of the development of semiotics refer to both Peirce and Saussure as founding fathers of modern sign study, the tangled history of semiotics in the contemporary academy is far less straightforward. Furthermore, general Peirce scholarship has taken routes that do not always converge with those of semiotics. The essay therefore evaluates the shortcomings and successes of Peircean endeavour in semiotics. In appraising the place of Peirce in contemporary semiotics, close attention is paid to the 69-page review of Short's book, Peirce's Theory of Signs, by John Deely (2006) as an example of what is at stake in respect of the issues covered in the essay

Peirce in contemporary semiotics

This essay traces the fortunes of Peirce in contemporary semiotics. Although many accounts of the development of semiotics refer to both Peirce and Saussure as founding fathers of modern sign study, the tangled history of semiotics in the contemporary academy is far less straightforward. Furthermore, general Peirce scholarship has taken routes that do not always converge with those of semiotics. The essay therefore evaluates the shortcomings and successes of Peircean endeavour in semiotics. In appraising the place of Peirce in contemporary semiotics, close attention is paid to the 69-page review of Short's book, Peirce's Theory of Signs, by John Deely (2006) as an example of what is at stake in respect of the issues covered in the essay

Peirce's Semeiotic and the Implications for Aesthetics in the Visual Arts: a study of the sketchbook and its positions in the hierarchies of making, collecting and exhibiting

The thesis argues that a particular aesthetic theory (Esthetics), is implied by Peirce's Semeiotic, and that they have both been clarified when tested from the perspective of a visual art practice involving sketchbooks. This research also constructs and lays out the first 'user friendly' guide to Semeiotically analyse any object, be it emotional, material or conceptual. Findings were generated by comparing Peirce's sporadic writings on esthetics with his more complete Semeiotic, assessing them in situations making artworks, proposing and exhibiting them in public spaces, and analysing meanings of sketchbooks from UK public collections. It was found that in theory: - Peirce's Esthetic power develops from oscillating between the powers to 'form' and 'express' (generalise and specify), while accepting the limits to both powers, revealed by such an oscillation alongside self and hetero criticism. -this entails appreciating what is most or least up to us, enabling the most effect where one is most free and limiting frustration where least free. -a Peircean Esthetic power can be learnt; however it requires that the learner properly wishes to be directed to that goal (EP2:48). Implications for the visual arts through practice: - artists could contribute to all of Peirce's non-native sciences, (Esthetics, Ethics and Logic), as their appreciation of 'feelings' is well trained, if they can also 'formalise'. -art has a part role in natural education (and possibly institutional education) by developing an Esthetic power that Peirce claims could 'humanise and free' the individual (free in a Peircean sense, which may seem like very little freedom to some) (EP2: 147-148). In the conclusion, a summary of these uncovered implications is set against some problems raised by the complexity of the Semeiotic, and the immeasurability of Esthetic progress. Set against that critique is a positive assessment of the effects of the research on the sketchbook practice

What’s in a face? Making sense of tangible information systems in terms of Peircean semiotics

Within this paper, we utilise a delimited area of philosophy to help make sense of a delimited area of design science as it pertains to a class of contemporary information systems. The philosophy is taken from that of Charles Sanders Peirce; the design science is directed at the construction of visual devices in that area known as visual management. The utilisation of such devices within their wider visual management systems we take to be instances of what we refer to as tangible information systems. Tangible information systems use tangible artefacts, such as whiteboards and magnetic tokens, to accomplish information. We particularly use Peircean semiotics to analyse the use of tangible emoticons articulated upon performance boards within a large-scale manufacturing facility. We infer from our analysis of these informative artefacts that certain integrated aspects of Peircean philosophy offers an alternative way of framing notions of a proper design science, design theory and design artefact for the discipline of information systems

Mattering: A Recreation of the Realism of Charles S. Peirce

Mattering' is the process and the product of Reality. It is One from nothing. Whether there is more than one universe as the string theorists argue, is beyond my ken. Fortunately I am not concerned here with epistemology but with understanding. Nor am I preoccupied with revealing Truth. Rather, my purpose is to explore the meaning and consequences of 'mattering': to be able to say that, beyond reasonable doubt, I believe that 'it' matters – that 'it' is 'mattering'. This can be made intelligible by way of reflection on the Pragmatic Maxim of the American polymath Charles S. Peirce [1839-1914] and validated with his systematic method of inquiry. Part 1 of my thesis explores and presents Peirce's work. Part 2 is an exposition of my three part hypothesis of 'mattering', that: 1. value functions as a condition of intelligibility - purpose, as the ground of 'mattering' is dependent on value; 2. power - where power is the capacity to cause - is the enabler of force functioning as actual 'mattering'; 3. 'mattering' is evolutionary realization of universal telos. For Peirce, inquiry is triggered by genuine doubt. His method begins with imagination: with the generation of a hypotheses that, if valid, will relieve the irritation of doubt. Creating my hypothesis of 'mattering' free of consideration of truth was liberating. This is what Peirce called abduction: active imagination which can be considered as reasonable, but only in so far as it can be reasoned from by deduction and induction. This is Mathematics, the first of the heuretic sciences (the branch of sciences which treats of discovery or invention) and its aim is to draw necessary conclusions; Philosophy is the next class of the heuretic sciences, followed by the Special Sciences. The first order of Peirce's second class, Philosophy, is his Phenomenology - his doctrine of categories - the purpose of which is to describe what is before the mind and to show that the description is correct. It is the beginning of discovering meaning, and involves observation of what Peirce called the phaneron (whatever is before the mind) - in my case, my hypothesis. Through differentiation, abstraction or prescision, and dissociation it identifies the three irreducible categories of reality identified by Peirce as First (possibility), Second (actuality) and Third (probability). The second order of his philosophical method is the Normative Sciences of Esthetics (aesthetics), the ideal, Ethics, going for the ideal, and Semeiotic or logic, what can reasonably be hoped for. By practicing what he preached, Peirce built the third order of Philosophy, his Metaphysics of Tychism (chance), Synechism (continuity), and Agape. [In physics, Agape arguably is gravity and the still to be discovered something that will deliver the Holy Grail: the theory of everything.] This is 'mattering'. I argue it is grounded in the values of integrity, respect and transparency, values which are expressed through the enactment (or powering) of 'mattering's' purpose or telos which grows and develops. This is, 'mattering': universal realisation of evolutionary telos. Our species, which evolved, as did the Universe, from the Universe - the process and product of 'mattering' - appears set on a trajectory of ecocide for which we are responsible. One model for understanding this travesty is Freud's scheme of Id (desire) Ego (mediator) Superego (should). If Ego, which makes choices, sides with and empowers the unmitigated, individual wanting that is Id, by ignoring Superego - cooperative imperatives for universal growth and development - Earth's evolutionary trajectory is jeopardised. We ignore the categorial values of integrity, respect, and transparency with which evolutionary universal telos is co-dependent, at our peril. The global dysfunction of Egos, especially those that have commandeered power by disempowering others, can be healed. Together, but only together, we can get back on track and reclaim Earth's and our future. This one Universe from which we evolved and with which we are evolving, can do it, and, even granted that it has been practicing longer, we too can do it: we can make it matter. It matters. It is 'mattering'

Tartu Ülikooli toimetised. Tööd semiootika alalt. 1964-1992. 0259-4668

http://www.ester.ee/record=b1331700*es

Reception of Peirce in Poland

The first mention of Charles Sanders Peirce we find in Polish philosophical literature is in the third volume of Historia filozofii (History of Philosophy) by Władysław Tatarkiewicz, edited for the first time in 1931 in Lwów. Władysław Tatarkiewicz was a Polish philosopher and historian of philosophy and his History of Philosophy has been until now the most popular history of philosophy textbook in Poland. However, in Tatarkiewicz’s History of Philosophy, there is no chapter devoted to Peirce..

Johdattelevia huomioita arkeologian spekulatiiviseen tieto-oppiin

In philosophical metaphysics, speculation is often seen to have value as an ontological concept referring to rational contemplation on the fundamental but unobservable nature of reality. In philosophy of science, on the other hand, speculation is commonly taken as an epistemological notion to mean that a proposition regarding the nature of reality can be possibly either true or false, and that the veracity of a proposition can be tested against empirically observed facts. This simplistic division into speculation as a matter of metaphysics and a matter of empirics also pertains to archaeology where speculation, as an ontological concept pertaining to the unobservable, has had little value. Instead, speculation, as well as the ambiguity and uncertainty introduced with it, have been treated as provisional resorts and epistemological points of elimination. In reviewing the history of archaeology in terms of the common views of the form and constituents of archaeological inference, and in drawing philosophical inspiration from a range of speculative philosophies and contemporary archaeological theorising, this thesis argues that the desirable strategy in the epistemology of archaeology is not the systematic elimination of speculation. In contrast, the thesis takes speculation seriously and contends that it has significance in the epistemology of archaeology as both an epistemological and an ontological notion. The thesis holds that in order to develop an empirically sensitive, ontologically considerate, and ethically sustainable epistemology of archaeology, speculation should be cultivated and cared for as a systematic consideration of the multiplicity of experience. In other words, speculation is to be preserved as a method of thinking otherwise; a countermeasure to the methodological (and the ensuing ontological) simplification risked by adhering to the eliminationist strategies. The practical possibilities towards a speculative epistemology of archaeology are discussed in terms of methodological and theoretical deceleration, a matter that has become increasingly relevant with the recent natural scientific revolution in archaeology. Slowing down, in this context, aims towards a historical understanding of the discipline as a community of practitioners with possibly conflicting concerns and objectives. In this way, the principle of speculative epistemology becomes the perpetual anticipation of the possible practical effects of pursuing truths and realities on epistemologies that entertain different understandings of those concepts.Spekulaatiolla on ollut tieteessä yleensä hyvin marginaalinen rooli. Sen merkitys on ollut ennen kaikkea tuottaa tiedollisia ehdotelmia, jotka voidaan erilaisia päättely- tai tulkintamenetelmiä käyttäen osoittaa joko tosiksi tai epätosiksi. Spekulaation on siis ajateltu heikentävän tiedon luotettavuutta. Tässä väitöskirjassa tutkitaan spekulaation merkitystä arkeologisen tiedontuottamisprosessin osana. Väitöskirjan tutkimuskysymys on, mikä tiedollinen merkitys spekulaatiolla on arkeologian tietoteoriassa, mikäli käsitettä ei alisteta spekulaation vääjäämättömälle eliminaatiolle. Kysymystä lähestytään väitöskirjassa sekä teoreettis-filosofisena että tieteenhistoriallisena ongelmana. Väitöskirjan tieteenhistoriallisen osuuden ja samalla sen aineiston muodostavat arkeologien luonnehdinnat oman tieteenalansa kannalta luonteenomaisista ja luotettavina pidetyistä päättelymenetelmistä. Väitöskirjassa luodaan katsaus arkeologien teoreettisiin kirjoituksiin 1800-luvun jälkipuoliskolta 2000-luvun alkuun ja osoitetaan, että tieteenalan vakiintuneet teoriat ja menetelmät perustuvat liian ihmiskeskeisille tieto- ja tulkintakäsityksille. Arkeologiassa tällaisia ovat olleet ennen kaikkea tieteenfilosofiasta lainatut päättelymenetelmät ja muodollinen logiikkakäsitys sekä semiotiikasta ja fenomenologiasta lainatut kieli- ja ruumiskeskeiset tulkintateoriat. Väitöskirjan filosofisen ja teoreettisen lähtökohdan muodostaa 2000-luvulla arkeologiassa laajalle levinnyt ajatus, että edellä mainitut ihmiskeskeiset tietoteoriat eli epistemologiat saattavat huomaamattakin alistaa arkeologiset tutkimuskohteet inhimilliselle ajattelulle tyypilliselle järkeistämiselle ja samalla vääristää sellaisia olemassaolon muotoja eli ontologioita, joille esimerkiksi epämääräisyys ja sotkuisuus ovat luonteenomaisia. Väitöskirjan kannalta tärkeä ontologinen ajatus onkin, että tiedontuottamisen tavat eivät vain esitä tutkimuskohteita, vaan myös luovat niitä. Näin spekulaatiosta tulee käsite, jolla on sekä epistemologista että ontologista painoarvoa. Spekulaation käytännöllistä merkitystä lähestytään väitöskirjassa tiedepoliittisena ongelmana. Väitöskirjassa osoitetaan, että mikäli arkeologian tavoitteena on mahdollistaa menneisyyden olemassaolo ja ymmärtäminen mahdollisimman monipuolisilla tavoilla, spekulaation roolia tulee korostaa erilaisia tutkimustavoitteita yhdistävänä tiedollisena ulottuvuutena. Näin spekulaatiosta tulee eettinen käsite ja tapa ennakoida omien tutkimustavoitteiden edistämisen käytännöllisiä vaikutuksia tiedeyhteisöön

A world beside itself : Jakob von Uexküll, Charles S. Peirce, and the genesis of a biosemiotic hypothesis

This thesis explores the conceptual origins of a biosemiotic understanding of the human as a consequence of the vital role of signs in the evolution of life. According to this challenge to definitions of man as the sole bearer of knowledge, human society and culture are not only characterised by the use and production of signs, human life and thought are the products of ongoing processes of semiosis. Along with Thomas Sebeok’s argument concerning animal architecture, examples from Modernist and Contemporary art are presented to introduce a new perspective on the natural and cultural significance of acts of inhabitation. By tracing its historical development in the nineteenth and twentieth century via the concept of the environment, this perspective on both human and non-human life is shown to contest those methods of modern science that are rooted in anthropocentrism The precedents of this perspective are then elaborated through an explication of the work of two of the forefathers of biosemiotics: the biologist Jakob von Uexküll and the philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Uexküll’s theory of the Umwelt demonstrated that in order to make sense of its surroundings each living organism must be situated within an integral world of signs. Peirce’s philosophical account of semiotics explained the evolution of signs in terms of processes of habit formation and the abductive power of thought. Together Uexküll and Peirce provide an impetus for reconsidering the metaphorical implications of aesthetics in terms of the semiotic inheritance of ecological systems. While having critically interrogated their differences especially with respect to their derivation from Kantian philosophy and German Idealism, in conclusion, the ideas of Peirce and Uexküll on the reciprocity of life and signs are shown to mutually contribute to a more advanced comprehension of human subjectivity