Energy: A continuing bibliography with indexes (Issue 29)

This bibliography lists 1360 reports, articles, and other documents introduced into the NASA scientific and technical information system from January 1, 1981 through March 31, 1981

Annual Report of the University, 1983-1984, Volumes 1-4

The 1983-84 athletic year could best be characterized as the second vintage year for the women. This was UNM\u27s second complete season under the auspices of the NCAA, and the High Country Athletic Conference, although it was the first year that the Conference had a full time commissioner at the helm. For a second year, the HCAC awarded the High Point Trophy to the school whose teams finished the highest in the eight recognized Conference sports. Again New Mexico was edged out by Brigham Young University for the honors by 4 1/2 points. The women\u27s golf team captured the Conference title, and no other team finished lower than fourth place. Altogether UNM had thirty-eight women athletes selected to be members of their respective All-Conference Teams. Two others were named to their All-Conference Second Team, and three athletes received Honorable Mention

Bowdoin Orient v.115, no.1-27 (1985-1986)

https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/bowdoinorient-1980s/1006/thumbnail.jp

Constructing Cassandra: The social construction of strategic surprise at the Central Intelligence Agency 1947-2001

This dissertation takes a post-positivist approach to strategic surprise, and examines the identity and internal culture of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through the lens of social constructivism. It identifies numerous social mechanisms that created and maintained four key, persistent attributes of the CIA’s identity and culture between 1947 and 2001. These features are: 1) homogeneity of personnel; 2) scientism and the reification of a narrow form of ‘reason’; 3) an overwhelming preference for ‘secrets’ over openly-available information; and, 4) a relentless drive for consensus. It then documents the influence of these elements of the CIA’s identity and culture in each phase of the intelligence cycle (Tasking, Collection, Analysis, Production and Dissemination), prior to four strategic surprises: the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, the collapse of the USSR, and al-Qa’ida’s terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. It concludes that these key aspects of the CIA’s identity and culture created the antecedent conditions that allowed these four strategic surprises to occur, and thus prevented the CIA from fulfilling its mandate to ‘prevent another Pearl Harbor’. This conclusion is supported by contrasting the majority views at the CIA prior to these events with the views of ‘Cassandras’ (i.e. individuals inside or outside the Agency who anticipated the approximate course of events based on reasoned threat assessments that differed sharply from the Agency’s, but who were ignored or sidelined). In so doing, this work shifts the burden of proof for explaining strategic surprises back to the characteristics and actions of intelligence producers like the CIA, and away from errors by intelligence consumers like politicians and policymakers. This conclusion also allows this work to posit that understanding strategic surprise as a social construction is logically prior to previously proposed, entirely positivist, attempts to explain or to prevent it

Bowdoin Orient v.124, no.1-23 (1993-1994)

https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/bowdoinorient-1990s/1005/thumbnail.jp