Energy Management

Forecasts point to a huge increase in energy demand over the next 25 years, with a direct and immediate impact on the exhaustion of fossil fuels, the increase in pollution levels and the global warming that will have significant consequences for all sectors of society. Irrespective of the likelihood of these predictions or what researchers in different scientific disciplines may believe or publicly say about how critical the energy situation may be on a world level, it is without doubt one of the great debates that has stirred up public interest in modern times. We should probably already be thinking about the design of a worldwide strategic plan for energy management across the planet. It would include measures to raise awareness, educate the different actors involved, develop policies, provide resources, prioritise actions and establish contingency plans. This process is complex and depends on political, social, economic and technological factors that are hard to take into account simultaneously. Then, before such a plan is formulated, studies such as those described in this book can serve to illustrate what Information and Communication Technologies have to offer in this sphere and, with luck, to create a reference to encourage investigators in the pursuit of new and better solutions

Dynamic Incentives for Optimal Control of Competitive Power Systems

This work presents a real-time dynamic pricing framework for future electricity markets. Deduced by first-principles analysis of physical, economic, and communication constraints within the power system, the proposed feedback control mechanism ensures both closed-loop system stability and economic efficiency at any given time. The resulting price signals are able to incentivize competitive market participants to eliminate spatio-temporal shortages in power supply quickly and purposively

Dynamic Incentives for Optimal Control of Competitive Power Systems

Technologisch herausfordernde Transformationsprozesse wie die Energiewende können durch passende Anreizsysteme entscheidend beschleunigt werden. Ziel solcher Anreize ist es hierbei, ein Umfeld idealerweise so zu schaffen, dass das Zusammenspiel aller aus Sicht der beteiligten Wettbewerber individuell optimalen Einzelhandlungen auch global optimal im Sinne eines übergeordneten Großziels ist. Die vorliegende Dissertation schafft einen regelungstechnischen Zugang zur Frage optimaler Anreizsysteme für heutige und zukünftige Stromnetze im Zieldreieck aus Systemstabilität, ökonomischer Effizienz und Netzdienlichkeit. Entscheidende Neuheit des entwickelten Ansatzes ist die Einführung zeitlich wie örtlich differenzierter Echtzeit-Preissignale, die sich aus der Lösung statischer und dynamischer Optimierungsprobleme ergeben. Der Miteinbezug lokal verfügbarer Messinformationen, die konsequente Mitmodellierung des unterlagerten physikalischen Netzes inklusive resistiver Verluste und die durchgängig zeitkontinuierliche Formulierung aller Teilsysteme ebnen den Weg von einer reinen Anreiz-Steuerung hin zu einer echten Anreiz-Regelung. Besonderes Augenmerk der Arbeit liegt in einer durch das allgemeine Unbundling-Gebot bedingten rigorosen Trennung zwischen Markt- und Netzakteuren. Nach umfangreicher Analyse des hierbei entstehenden geschlossenen Regelkreises erfolgt die beispielhafte Anwendung der Regelungsarchitektur für den Aufbau eines neuartigen Echtzeit-Engpassmanagementsystems. Weitere praktische Vorteile des entwickelten Ansatzes im Vergleich zu bestehenden Konzepten werden anhand zweier Fallstudien deutlich. Die port-basierte Systemmodellierung, der Verzicht auf zentralisierte Regeleingriffe und nicht zuletzt die Möglichkeit zur automatischen, dezentralen Selbstregulation aller Preise über das Gesamtnetz hinweg stellen schließlich die problemlose Erweiterbarkeit um zusätzliche optionale Anreizkomponenten sicher

Lessons from the Russian Meltdown: The Economics of Soft Legal Constraints

On August 17, 1998, Russia defaulted on its domestic public debt, declared a moratorium on the private banks' foreign liabilities, which was equivalent to an outright default, and abandoned its exchange rate regime. The depth of the Russian meltdown shocked the international markets, and precipitated a period of serious financial instability. It is important to understand the roots of such a crisis to learn about possible lessons on both issues of bank supervision and international stability. While the visible cause of the crisis was an unsustainable fiscal deficit couples with massive capital flight, the critical question concerns the origin of such circumstances. This paper argues that the structure of individual incentives in the Russian legal context, compounded by the exceptional support granted by international institutions to Russia, explains the cycle of nonpayment, capital flight and fiscal unbalances leading to the dramatic 1998 crisis. We offer an interpretative model of noncompliance, cash-stripping and rational collective nonpayment, which led to the fiscal and banking crisis and ultimately to a complete meltdown. In our view, the banking sector was already insolvent prior to the crisis, and contributed directly and indirectly to it. The last section of the paper puts forward a radical medium-term policy proposal for a stable banking and payment system for Russia. Russia needs to create a basic foundation for savings and intermediation by asset restrictions and market segmentation, crude but effective rules used in all underdeveloped systems to restrain asset stripping and opportunism. Concretely, we propose a cautious extension of deposit insurance away from the monopolistic Sberbank and towards a narrow banking layer. The proposal also proposes to restore charter value in the commercial banking sector.

Grid-Connected Renewable Energy Sources

The use of renewable energy sources (RESs) is a need of global society. This editorial, and its associated Special Issue “Grid-Connected Renewable Energy Sources”, offers a compilation of some of the recent advances in the analysis of current power systems that are composed after the high penetration of distributed generation (DG) with different RESs. The focus is on both new control configurations and on novel methodologies for the optimal placement and sizing of DG. The eleven accepted papers certainly provide a good contribution to control deployments and methodologies for the allocation and sizing of DG

Dynamic Incentives for Optimal Control of Competitive Power Systems

This work presents a real-time dynamic pricing framework for future electricity markets. Deduced by first-principles analysis of physical, economic, and communication constraints within the power system, the proposed feedback control mechanism ensures both closed-loop system stability and economic efficiency at any given time. The resulting price signals are able to incentivize competitive market participants to eliminate spatio-temporal shortages in power supply quickly and purposively

CINELDI Annual Report 2020

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