Variable elimination strategies and construction of nonlinear polynomial invariant attacks on T-310

One of the major open problems in symmetric cryptanalysis is to discover new specific types of invariant properties for block ciphers. In this article, we study nonlinear polynomial invariant attacks. The number of such attacks grows as 22n and systematic exploration is not possible. The main question is HOW do we find such attacks? We have developed a constructive algebraic approach that is about making sure that a certain combination of polynomial equations is zero. We work by progressive elimination of specific variables in polynomial spaces and we show that one can totally eliminate big chunks of the cipher circuit. As an application, we present several new attacks on the historical T-310 block cipher that has particularly large hardware complexity and a very large number of rounds compared with modern ciphers, e.g., AES. However, all this complexity is not that useful if we are able to construct new types of polynomial invariant attacks that work for any number of rounds

A note on some algebraic trapdoors for block ciphers

We provide sufficient conditions to guarantee that a translation based cipher is not vulnerable with respect to the partition-based trapdoor. This trapdoor has been introduced, recently, by Bannier et al. (2016) and it generalizes that introduced by Paterson in 1999. Moreover, we discuss the fact that studying the group generated by the round functions of a block cipher may not be sufficient to guarantee security against these trapdoors for the cipher.Comment: to be published on Advances in Mathematics of Communication

Показатели и оценки стойкости блочных шифров относительно статистических атак первого порядка

Получены аналитические верхние оценки надежности различающей и, соответственно, «вскрывающей» статистической атаки первого порядка на блочные шифры. Указанные оценки позволяют ввести теоретически обоснованные показатели стойкости блочных шифров относительно обобщенного линейного, билинейного и ряда других методов криптоанализа. В случае линейной различающей атаки полученная оценка стойкости блочных шифров является более точной по сравнению с ранее известной.Отримано аналітичні верхні оцінки надійності розрізнювальної та, відповідно, «вскриваючої» статистичної атаки першого порядку на блокові шифри. Зазначені оцінки дозволяють ввести теоретично обґрунтовані показники стійкості блокових шифрів відносно узагальненого лінійного, білінійного і низки інших методів криптоаналізу. У випадку лінійної розрізнювальної атаки отримана оцінка стійкості блокових шифрів є більш точною у порівнянні з раніше відомою.Analytical upper estimations of the success probability of a distinguishing and, consequently, a «breaking» first order statistical attack on block ciphers are obtained. These estimations form a foundament for the definition of measures that characterize provable security of block ciphers against generalized linear, bilinear and some other cryptanalysis techniques. For the case of linear distinguishing attack, the obtained estimation of block ciphers security is more accurate that the previous well-known estimation

How Far Can We Go Beyond Linear Cryptanalysis?

Several generalizations of linear cryptanalysis have been proposed in the past, as well as very similar attacks in a statistical point of view. In this paper, we define a rigorous general statistical framework which allows to interpret most of these attacks in a simple and unified way. Then, we explicitely construct optimal distinguishers, we evaluate their performance, and we prove that a block cipher immune to classical linear cryptanalysis possesses some resistance to a wide class of generalized versions, but not all. Finally, we derive tools which are necessary to set up more elaborate extensions of linear cryptanalysis, and to generalize the notions of bias, characteristic, and piling-up lemma