Hypercube and Cascading-based Algorithms for Secret Sharing Schemes

Secret sharing is a very useful way to maintain secrecy of private data when stored in a distributed way among several nodes. Two significant questions in this area are 1. how to accommodate new nodes and assign shares to the new nodes, the problem becomes harder if the number of joining nodes or the access structure is not known in advance and can be (potentially) unbounded and 2. to reduce the computational complexity of secret sharing schemes. In this paper we propose two new constructions of such secret sharing schemes based on different combinatorial structures. The first construction is based on generalized paths joining the opposite vertices of a hypercube which has been divided into smaller hypercubes. The second construction is a forest- based construction utilizing a dynamic data structure technique known as fractional cascading. The generalized path we call a pavement is new to this paper. Both our constructions use a new secret redistribution scheme to assign and re-assign shares to nodes. Towards the second question we show that allowing certain trade-offs, the constructions are implementable by $AC^0$ circuits which is the lowest complexity class in which secret sharing and reconstruction is possible. To the best of the knowledge of the authors, none of the similar existing schemes (evolving or dynamic) are $AC^0$ computable and this paper for the first time combines the idea of hypercubes and dynamic data structures with secret sharing for preserving long-term confidentiality of secret data

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usually thought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion in the short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the central and local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates, I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formula were manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent with swing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities with roughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition or conservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus on discretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understate the true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.Bureaucracy, institutions, redistributive politics, electoral competition

Fairness, Efficiency and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age

Whether and how the federal securities laws should restrict insider trading is one of the most hotly debated topics in the securities law literature. Paradoxically, both the theoretical analysis and the legal rules concerning insider trading remain extraordinarily vague and ill-formed. What is the special character of insider trading that leads to this apparently irresolvable puzzle? In this Article, I argue that there is, in fact, nothing special about insider trading that creates this dilemma, but rather there is something special about the nature of information itself. Accordingly, this theoretical dilemma is not limited to insider trading regulation, but rather pervades all areas of intellectual property law. In this Article, I situate insider trading regulation within the larger body of intellectual property law by discussing three potential allocations of the property right in valuable inside information. First, inside information could be treated as a public resource, meaning that a person in possession of inside information could not legally exploit that advantage for personal profit. Such a regime would forbid some or all insider trading by forcing the disclosure to the marketplace of inside information prior to trading. I argue that regulators should reject this alternative because, despite it\u27s proponents\u27 tendency to justify the rule in terms of fairness, this proposal is unlikely to foster fairness in any meaningful way. Alternatively, the property right in valuable inside information could belong to issuers, as the producers of such information. I argue that regulators should reject this alternative because, despite its proponents? tendency to frame their arguments in terms of promoting informational efficiency, a legal regime treating inside information as the property of the issuer is unlikely to further that goal. In fact, such proposals assume an affirmative answer to a question that is fiercely debated in other areas of intellectual property law: does creating a property right in information producers incentivize additional production to the extent necessary to offset the social costs of excluding others from use of the information? Finally, the property right in valuable inside information could reside with outsider traders (traders who possess inside information, but are neither insiders nor constructive insiders of the issuer). I argue that regulators should pursue this alternative because, although there is no need to encourage issuers to create valuable inside information, the need to encourage the dissemination of such information to the marketplace has been recognized for many years. Accordingly, I propose in this Article a system of federal securities regulation that would permit trading by corporate outsiders who did not receive their information in a tip from an insider or constructive insider. Such a system, I argue, provides the hope of filling in the gaps left by the current disclose or abstain system, by encouraging the reflection of material information in stock market price without disclosure of the actual inside information. At the same time, this proposal avoids the perverse incentives and negative impacts on market efficiency attendant in a system that permits insider trading by corporate employees

Fairness, Efficiency and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age

Whether and how the federal securities laws should restrict insider trading is one of the most hotly debated topics in the securities law literature. Paradoxically, both the theoretical analysis and the legal rules concerning insider trading remain extraordinarily vague and ill-formed. What is the special character of insider trading that leads to this apparently irresolvable puzzle? In this Article, I argue that there is, in fact, nothing special about insider trading that creates this dilemma, but rather there is something special about the nature of information itself. Accordingly, this theoretical dilemma is not limited to insider trading regulation, but rather pervades all areas of intellectual property law. In this Article, I situate insider trading regulation within the larger body of intellectual property law by discussing three potential allocations of the property right in valuable inside information. First, inside information could be treated as a public resource, meaning that a person in possession of inside information could not legally exploit that advantage for personal profit. Such a regime would forbid some or all insider trading by forcing the disclosure to the marketplace of inside information prior to trading. I argue that regulators should reject this alternative because, despite it\u27s proponents\u27 tendency to justify the rule in terms of fairness, this proposal is unlikely to foster fairness in any meaningful way. Alternatively, the property right in valuable inside information could belong to issuers, as the producers of such information. I argue that regulators should reject this alternative because, despite its proponents? tendency to frame their arguments in terms of promoting informational efficiency, a legal regime treating inside information as the property of the issuer is unlikely to further that goal. In fact, such proposals assume an affirmative answer to a question that is fiercely debated in other areas of intellectual property law: does creating a property right in information producers incentivize additional production to the extent necessary to offset the social costs of excluding others from use of the information? Finally, the property right in valuable inside information could reside with outsider traders (traders who possess inside information, but are neither insiders nor constructive insiders of the issuer). I argue that regulators should pursue this alternative because, although there is no need to encourage issuers to create valuable inside information, the need to encourage the dissemination of such information to the marketplace has been recognized for many years. Accordingly, I propose in this Article a system of federal securities regulation that would permit trading by corporate outsiders who did not receive their information in a tip from an insider or constructive insider. Such a system, I argue, provides the hope of filling in the gaps left by the current disclose or abstain system, by encouraging the reflection of material information in stock market price without disclosure of the actual inside information. At the same time, this proposal avoids the perverse incentives and negative impacts on market efficiency attendant in a system that permits insider trading by corporate employees

How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru

Which of the democratic checks and balances - opposition parties, the judiciary, a free press -is the most critical? Peru has the full set of democratic institutions. In the 1990s, the secret-police chief Vladimiro Montesinos systematically undermined them all with bribes. We quantify the checks using the bribe prices. Montesinos paid television-channel owners about 100 times what he paid judges and politicians. One single television channel’s bribe was four times larger than the total of the opposition politicians’ bribes. By revealed preference, the strongest check on the government’s power was the news media.

HAIL: A High-Availability and Integrity Layer for Cloud Storage

We introduce HAIL (High-Availability and Integrity Layer), a distributed cryptographic system that permits a set of servers to prove to a client that a stored file is intact and retrievable. HAIL strengthens, formally unifies, and streamlines distinct approaches from the cryptographic and distributed-systems communities. Proofs in HAIL are efficiently computable by servers and highly compact---typically tens or hundreds of bytes, irrespective of file size. HAIL cryptographically verifies and reactively reallocates file shares. It is robust against an active, mobile adversary, i.e., one that may progressively corrupt the full set of servers. We propose a strong, formal adversarial model for HAIL, and rigorous analysis and parameter choices. We show how HAIL improves on the security and efficiency of existing tools, like Proofs of Retrievability (PORs) deployed on individual servers. We also report on a prototype implementation

Design and implementation of applications over delay tolerant networks for disaster and battlefield environment

In disaster/battlefield applications, there may not be any centralized network that provides a mechanism for different nodes to connect with each other to share important data. In such cases, we can take advantage of an opportunistic network involving a substantial number of mobile devices that can communicate with each other using Bluetooth and Google Nearby Connections API(it uses Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), and Wi-Fi hotspots) when they are close to each other. These devices referred to as nodes form a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN), also known as an opportunistic network. As suggested by its name, DTN can tolerate delays and significant loss of data while forwarding a message from source to destination using store and forward paradigm. In DTN, it is of critical importance that the network is not completely flooded and also the message is not tampered or corrupted and readable only to the destined node. Three algorithms have been implemented in the Android platform. The first algorithm [1] focuses on intelligent data transfer based on each node\u27s interest and encourages each node to participate in data transfer by providing incentives and keeping track of the trustworthiness of each node. The second algorithm [2] focuses on the security of the transferred data by fragmenting both data- and key-shares with some redundancy and the destination node can resurrect the original data from the predefined minimum key- and data-shares. The third algorithm focusses on using object detection models and interest-based authorization using [3] to securely transfer and access data across DTN. The corrupted nodes are identified by using one-way keychain hashes created by source/relay nodes for a message which are validated at the destination node --Abstract, page iii

PAS: Predicate-Based Authentication Services Against Powerful Passive Adversaries

Securely authenticating a human user without assistance from any auxiliary device in the presence of powerful passive adversaries is an important and challenging problem. Passive adversaries are those that can passively monitor, intercept, and analyze every part of the authentication procedure, except for an initial secret shared between the user and the server. In this paper, we propose a new secure authentication scheme called predicate-based authentication service (PAS). In this scheme, for the first time, the concept of a predicate is introduced for authentication. We conduct analysis on the proposed scheme and implement its prototype system. Our analytical data and experimental data illustrate that the PAS scheme can simultaneously achieve a desired level of security and user friendliness