2,356 research outputs found
Local search for stable marriage problems
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical
applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching
students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the
classical formulation, n men and n women express their preferences (via a
strict total order) over the members of the other sex. Solving a SM problem
means finding a stable marriage where stability is an envy-free notion: no man
and woman who are not married to each other would both prefer each other to
their partners or to being single. We consider both the classical stable
marriage problem and one of its useful variations (denoted SMTI) where the men
and women express their preferences in the form of an incomplete preference
list with ties over a subset of the members of the other sex. Matchings are
permitted only with people who appear in these lists, an we try to find a
stable matching that marries as many people as possible. Whilst the SM problem
is polynomial to solve, the SMTI problem is NP-hard. We propose to tackle both
problems via a local search approach, which exploits properties of the problems
to reduce the size of the neighborhood and to make local moves efficiently. We
evaluate empirically our algorithm for SM problems by measuring its runtime
behaviour and its ability to sample the lattice of all possible stable
marriages. We evaluate our algorithm for SMTI problems in terms of both its
runtime behaviour and its ability to find a maximum cardinality stable
marriage.For SM problems, the number of steps of our algorithm grows only as
O(nlog(n)), and that it samples very well the set of all stable marriages. It
is thus a fair and efficient approach to generate stable marriages.Furthermore,
our approach for SMTI problems is able to solve large problems, quickly
returning stable matchings of large and often optimal size despite the
NP-hardness of this problem.Comment: 12 pages, Proc. COMSOC 2010 (Third International Workshop on
Computational Social Choice
Solving Hard Stable Matching Problems Involving Groups of Similar Agents
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when
strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify
structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow
us to design efficient algorithms using elementary techniques. We focus on the
setting in which all agents involved in some matching problem can be
partitioned into k different types, where the type of an agent determines his
or her preferences, and agents have preferences over types (which may be
refined by more detailed preferences within a single type). This situation
would arise in practice if agents form preferences solely based on some small
collection of agents' attributes. We also consider a generalisation in which
each agent may consider some small collection of other agents to be
exceptional, and rank these in a way that is not consistent with their types;
this could happen in practice if agents have prior contact with a small number
of candidates. We show that (for the case without exceptions), several
well-studied NP-hard stable matching problems including Max SMTI (that of
finding the maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of stable
marriage with ties and incomplete lists) belong to the parameterised complexity
class FPT when parameterised by the number of different types of agents needed
to describe the instance. For Max SMTI this tractability result can be extended
to the setting in which each agent promotes at most one `exceptional' candidate
to the top of his/her list (when preferences within types are not refined), but
the problem remains NP-hard if preference lists can contain two or more
exceptions and the exceptional candidates can be placed anywhere in the
preference lists, even if the number of types is bounded by a constant.Comment: Results on SMTI appear in proceedings of WINE 2018; Section 6
contains work in progres
Parameterized Complexity of Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists Through the Lens of Graph Parameters
We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well as on the side of fixed-parameter tractability. Other than for its famous sister problem Stable Marriage which focuses on a bipartite scenario, Stable Roommates with Incomplete Lists allows for arbitrary acceptability graphs whose edges specify the possible matchings of each two agents (agents are represented by graph vertices). Herein, incomplete lists and ties reflect the fact that in realistic application scenarios the agents cannot bring all other agents into a linear order. Among our main contributions is to show that it is W[1]-hard to compute a maximum-cardinality stable matching for acceptability graphs of bounded treedepth, bounded tree-cut width, and bounded feedback vertex number (these are each time the respective parameters). However, if we "only" ask for perfect stable matchings or the mere existence of a stable matching, then we obtain fixed-parameter tractability with respect to tree-cut width but not with respect to treedepth. On the positive side, we also provide fixed-parameter tractability results for the parameter feedback edge set number
Stable Marriage with Multi-Modal Preferences
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now
based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow
each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one
"evaluation mode" (e.g., more than one criterion); thus, each agent is equipped
with multiple preference lists, each ranking the counterparts in a possibly
different way. We introduce and study three natural concepts of stability,
investigate their mutual relations and focus on computational complexity
aspects with respect to computing stable matchings in these new scenarios.
Mostly encountering computational hardness (NP-hardness), we can also spot few
islands of tractability and make a surprising connection to the \textsc{Graph
Isomorphism} problem
How Hard Is It to Satisfy (Almost) All Roommates?
The classic Stable Roommates problem (the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint pairs such that no two agents induce a blocking pair. Herein, each agent has a preference list denoting who it prefers to have as a partner, and two agents are blocking if they prefer to be with each other rather than with their assigned partners.
Since stable matchings may not be unique, we study an NP-hard optimization variant of Stable Roommates, called Egal Stable Roommates, which seeks to find a stable matching with a minimum egalitarian cost gamma, i.e. the sum of the dissatisfaction of the agents is minimum. The dissatisfaction of an agent is the number of agents that this agent prefers over its partner if it is matched; otherwise it is the length of its preference list. We also study almost stable matchings, called Min-Block-Pair Stable Roommates, which seeks to find a matching with a minimum number beta of blocking pairs. Our main result is that Egal Stable Roommates parameterized by gamma is fixed-parameter tractable, while Min-Block-Pair Stable Roommates parameterized by beta is W[1]-hard, even if the length of each preference list is at most five
Adapting Stable Matchings to Evolving Preferences
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in
modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of
Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following
question: for both problems, what is the computational cost of adapting an
existing stable matching after some of the preferences of the agents have
changed. While doing so, we also model the constraint that the new stable
matching shall be not too different from the old one. After formalizing these
incremental versions, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the
computational complexity landscape of Incremental Stable Marriage and
Incremental Stable Roommates. To this end, we exploit the parameters "degree of
change" both in the input (difference between old and new preference profile)
and in the output (difference between old and new stable matching). We obtain
both hardness and tractability results, in particular showing a fixed-parameter
tractability result with respect to the parameter "distance between old and new
stable matching".Comment: Accepted to AAAI 202
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