Defending Elections Against Malicious Spread of Misinformation

The integrity of democratic elections depends on voters' access to accurate information. However, modern media environments, which are dominated by social media, provide malicious actors with unprecedented ability to manipulate elections via misinformation, such as fake news. We study a zero-sum game between an attacker, who attempts to subvert an election by propagating a fake new story or other misinformation over a set of advertising channels, and a defender who attempts to limit the attacker's impact. Computing an equilibrium in this game is challenging as even the pure strategy sets of players are exponential. Nevertheless, we give provable polynomial-time approximation algorithms for computing the defender's minimax optimal strategy across a range of settings, encompassing different population structures as well as models of the information available to each player. Experimental results confirm that our algorithms provide near-optimal defender strategies and showcase variations in the difficulty of defending elections depending on the resources and knowledge available to the defender.Comment: Full version of paper accepted to AAAI 201

This Just In: Fake News Packs a Lot in Title, Uses Simpler, Repetitive Content in Text Body, More Similar to Satire than Real News

The problem of fake news has gained a lot of attention as it is claimed to have had a significant impact on 2016 US Presidential Elections. Fake news is not a new problem and its spread in social networks is well-studied. Often an underlying assumption in fake news discussion is that it is written to look like real news, fooling the reader who does not check for reliability of the sources or the arguments in its content. Through a unique study of three data sets and features that capture the style and the language of articles, we show that this assumption is not true. Fake news in most cases is more similar to satire than to real news, leading us to conclude that persuasion in fake news is achieved through heuristics rather than the strength of arguments. We show overall title structure and the use of proper nouns in titles are very significant in differentiating fake from real. This leads us to conclude that fake news is targeted for audiences who are not likely to read beyond titles and is aimed at creating mental associations between entities and claims.Comment: Published at The 2nd International Workshop on News and Public Opinion at ICWS

Information consumption on social media : efficiency, divisiveness, and trust

Over the last decade, the advent of social media has profoundly changed the way people produce and consume information online. On these platforms, users themselves play a role in selecting the sources from which they consume information, overthrowing traditional journalistic gatekeeping. Moreover, advertisers can target users with news stories using users’ personal data. This new model has many advantages: the propagation of news is faster, the number of news sources is large, and the topics covered are diverse. However, in this new model, users are often overloaded with redundant information, and they can get trapped in filter bubbles by consuming divisive and potentially false information. To tackle these concerns, in my thesis, I address the following important questions: (i) How efficient are users at selecting their information sources? We have defined three intuitive notions of users’ efficiency in social media: link, in-flow, and delay efficiency. We use these three measures to assess how good users are at selecting who to follow within the social media system in order to most efficiently acquire information. (ii) How can we break the filter bubbles that users get trapped in? Users on social media sites such as Twitter often get trapped in filter bubbles by being exposed to radical, highly partisan, or divisive information. To prevent users from getting trapped in filter bubbles, we propose an approach to inject diversity in users’ information consumption by identifying non-divisive, yet informative information. (iii) How can we design an efficient framework for fact-checking? Proliferation of false information is a major problem in social media. To counter it, social media platforms typically rely on expert fact-checkers to detect false news. However, human fact-checkers can realistically only cover a tiny fraction of all stories. So, it is important to automatically prioritizing and selecting a small number of stories for human to fact check. However, the goals for prioritizing stories for fact-checking are unclear. We identify three desired objectives to prioritize news for fact-checking. These objectives are based on the users’ perception of truthfulness of stories. Our key finding is that these three objectives are incompatible in practice.In den letzten zehn Jahren haben soziale Medien die Art und Weise, wie Menschen online Informationen generieren und konsumieren, grundlegend verändert. Auf Social Media Plattformen wählen Nutzer selbst aus, von welchen Quellen sie Informationen beziehen hebeln damit das traditionelle Modell journalistischen Gatekeepings aus. Zusätzlich können Werbetreibende Nutzerdaten dazu verwenden, um Nachrichtenartikel gezielt an Nutzer zu verbreiten. Dieses neue Modell bietet einige Vorteile: Nachrichten verbreiten sich schneller, die Zahl der Nachrichtenquellen ist größer, und es steht ein breites Spektrum an Themen zur Verfügung. Das hat allerdings zur Folge, dass Benutzer häufig mit überflüssigen Informationen überladen werden und in Filterblasen geraten können, wenn sie zu einseitige oder falsche Informationen konsumieren. Um diesen Problemen Rechnung zu tragen, gehe ich in meiner Dissertation auf die drei folgenden wichtigen Fragestellungen ein: • (i) Wie effizient sind Nutzer bei der Auswahl ihrer Informationsquellen? Dazu definieren wir drei verschiedene, intuitive Arten von Nutzereffizienz in sozialen Medien: Link-, In-Flowund Delay-Effizienz. Mithilfe dieser drei Metriken untersuchen wir, wie gut Nutzer darin sind auszuwählen, wem sie auf Social Media Plattformen folgen sollen um effizient an Informationen zu gelangen. • (ii) Wie können wir verhindern, dass Benutzer in Filterblasen geraten? Nutzer von Social Media Webseiten werden häufig Teil von Filterblasen, wenn sie radikalen, stark parteiischen oder spalterischen Informationen ausgesetzt sind. Um das zu verhindern, entwerfen wir einen Ansatz mit dem Ziel, den Informationskonsum von Nutzern zu diversifizieren, indem wir Informationen identifizieren, die nicht polarisierend und gleichzeitig informativ sind. • (iii) Wie können wir Nachrichten effizient auf faktische Korrektheit hin überprüfen? Die Verbreitung von Falschinformationen ist eines der großen Probleme sozialer Medien. Um dem entgegenzuwirken, sind Social Media Plattformen in der Regel auf fachkundige Faktenprüfer zur Identifizierung falscher Nachrichten angewiesen. Die manuelle Überprüfung von Fakten kann jedoch realistischerweise nur einen sehr kleinen Teil aller Artikel und Posts abdecken. Daher ist es wichtig, automatisch eine überschaubare Zahl von Artikeln für die manuellen Faktenkontrolle zu priorisieren. Nach welchen Zielen eine solche Priorisierung erfolgen soll, ist jedoch unklar. Aus diesem Grund identifizieren wir drei wünschenswerte Priorisierungskriterien für die Faktenkontrolle. Diese Kriterien beruhen auf der Wahrnehmung des Wahrheitsgehalts von Artikeln durch Nutzer. Unsere Schlüsselbeobachtung ist, dass diese drei Kriterien in der Praxis nicht miteinander vereinbar sind

Use of a controlled experiment and computational models to measure the impact of sequential peer exposures on decision making

It is widely believed that one's peers influence product adoption behaviors. This relationship has been linked to the number of signals a decision-maker receives in a social network. But it is unclear if these same principles hold when the pattern by which it receives these signals vary and when peer influence is directed towards choices which are not optimal. To investigate that, we manipulate social signal exposure in an online controlled experiment using a game with human participants. Each participant in the game makes a decision among choices with differing utilities. We observe the following: (1) even in the presence of monetary risks and previously acquired knowledge of the choices, decision-makers tend to deviate from the obvious optimal decision when their peers make similar decision which we call the influence decision, (2) when the quantity of social signals vary over time, the forwarding probability of the influence decision and therefore being responsive to social influence does not necessarily correlate proportionally to the absolute quantity of signals. To better understand how these rules of peer influence could be used in modeling applications of real world diffusion and in networked environments, we use our behavioral findings to simulate spreading dynamics in real world case studies. We specifically try to see how cumulative influence plays out in the presence of user uncertainty and measure its outcome on rumor diffusion, which we model as an example of sub-optimal choice diffusion. Together, our simulation results indicate that sequential peer effects from the influence decision overcomes individual uncertainty to guide faster rumor diffusion over time. However, when the rate of diffusion is slow in the beginning, user uncertainty can have a substantial role compared to peer influence in deciding the adoption trajectory of a piece of questionable information