Competition against peer-to-peer networks

In this paper, we consider the competition of providers of information products against P2P networks that offer illegal versions of the information products. Depending on the generic cost factor of downloading—incorporating factors including, among other things, the degree of legal enforcement of intellectual property rights—we find that the firm may employ pricing strategies to either deter the entry of a network or to accommodate it. In the latter case, we find that the equilibrium price moves in the opposite direction of the generic cost factor of downloading. This counter-intuitive result corresponds to a very subtle form of platform competition between the firm and the network. Furthermore, profits for the firm ambiguously decrease when the generic cost factor of downloading declines, whereas total welfare unambiguously increases. This implies that it may well be welfare enhancing to relax the legal enforcements of intellectual property rights.Strategy;

Dynamic Optimal Pricing Strategies for Knowledge-Sharing Platforms

The sharing economy is a fast-growing business model, and the sharing resources have crept from physical assets (e.g., vehicles and houses) to intangible assets (e.g., skills and knowledge). Online knowledge-sharing platforms allow sharers to offer knowledge products in various forms and can generate revenue through charging users subscription and/or transaction fees. How to charge bilateral users is an essential and complex decision-making problem that puzzles knowledge-sharing platforms. This study proposes a dynamic optimal pricing model that involves multiple development stages based on the optimal control theory. In addition, the inherent features of knowledge products and sharers’ social capitals are considered. The applicability and utility of the proposed model is verified through numerical experiments on an empirical dataset from the China’s largest knowledge-sharing platform named Zhihu. The results reveal that the platform can adjust its pricing strategies to achieve different optimization goals and this is conducive to its sustainable development

A Model of Pricing in the Sharing Economy: Pricing Dynamics with Awareness-Generating Adoptions

We develop a model of providers operating on a Sharing Economy platform where consumers first become aware of a product or service, and then consider adopting it. Past adoptions increase the likelihood that future consumers will discover the provider, but awareness also decays over time. We exhibit that pricing dynamics for products and services of short life span are consistent with penetration pricing. For products with longer life spans, the relationship between population awareness and price is non-monotonic, and consistent with a tipping point in the adoption process. Providers price higher when they have either achieved high awareness or have been positioned in a market niche. Fees levied by the platform adhere to the double-marginalization effect. Our model positively explains empirical observations, including the significant price fluctuation and the emergence of niche and superstar providers

Competition against peer-to-peer networks

In this paper, we consider the competition of a monopolistic provider of information products against a peer-to-peer file-sharing network that offers illegal versions of the products. We focus on the role of direct externalities caused by the P2P file-sharing technology rather than the indirect consumption externalities studied previously in the literature. In our model the market structure is endogenous and we characterize three possible scenarios where the firm uses monopoly pricing, network-deterring pricing, and network-accommodating pricing, respectively. We make a full comparative-static analysis of prices, quantities, profits, consumer surplus and total surplus for each of the scenarios as well as a comparison across scenarios. We show that in the case of network-accommodating pricing, the firm sets a higher price when facing a lower generic cost factor of downloading. Furthermore, in all scenarios, profits for the firm unambiguously decrease when the generic cost factor of downloading declines; total welfare unambiguously increases, however, a result that has implications for intellectual property rights enforcement policy. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.</p

Platform Markets and Energy Services

A structural shift from transaction-based, marginal cost pricing to fee-based service business models often accompanies We emergence of “platform” markets, i.e. multi-sided markets where an intermediary captures the value of the interaction between user groups. The many examples include telecommunications, data storage, cinema, music and media, and the automobile industry. Why not electricity? In this paper, we explore how the electricity supply industry can be conceived of as a platform-mediated, two-sided market and the consequences for pricing. Through two cases, a balancing services provider for smart home energy management systems and an electric vehicle charge manager, we show where a platform entrant could position itself in the retail electricity markets between supply companies and end-users. The drivers of such a transition include increased volatility due to renewable generation, the new complexity of roles for end-users, and the introduction of information and communication technologies. Conceiving of electricity as a platform market where new entrants provide an energy optimisation and management service may stimulate a competitive ecosystem and innovation. We suggest that fee-based pricing would enable the objectives of time-varying pricing to be achieved without adversely affecting the most vulnerable customers