Analysis of discrete-time queue with two heterogeneous servers subject to catastrophes

This paper studies a discrete-time queueing system with two heterogeneous servers subject to catastrophes. We obtain explicit expressions for the steady-state probabilities at arbitrary epoch using displacement operator method. The waiting time distribution and outside observer’s observation epoch probabilities are deduced. Various performance measures and numerical results have been investigated.Publisher's Versio

Optimal Pricing Strategies and Customers’ Equilibrium Behavior in an Unobservable M/M/1 Queueing System with Negative Customers and Repair

This work investigates the optimal pricing strategies of a server and the equilibrium behavior of customers in an unobservable M/M/1 queueing system with negative customers and repair. In this work, we consider two pricing schemes. The first is termed the ex-post payment scheme, where the server charges a price that is proportional to the time spent by a customer in the system. The second scheme is the ex-ante payment scheme, where the server charges a flat rate for all services. Based on the reward-cost structure, the server (or system manager) should make optimal pricing decisions in order to maximize its expected profit per time unit in each payment scheme. This study also investigates equilibrium joining/balking behavior under the server’s optimal pricing strategies in the two pricing schemes. We show, given a customer’s equilibrium, that the two pricing schemes are perfectly identical from an economic point of view. Finally, we illustrate the effect of several system parameters on the optimal joining probabilities, the optimal price, and the equilibrium behavior via numerical examples

Optimal and equilibrium balking strategies in the single server Markovian queue with catastrophes

We consider a Markovian queue subject to Poisson generated catastrophes. Whenever a catastrophe occurs, all customers are forced to abandon the system, the server is rendered inoperative and an exponential repair time is set on. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study the balking behavior of the customers and derive the corresponding Nash equilibrium and social optimal strategies. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved