199,905 research outputs found
Use of a controlled experiment and computational models to measure the impact of sequential peer exposures on decision making
It is widely believed that one's peers influence product adoption behaviors.
This relationship has been linked to the number of signals a decision-maker
receives in a social network. But it is unclear if these same principles hold
when the pattern by which it receives these signals vary and when peer
influence is directed towards choices which are not optimal. To investigate
that, we manipulate social signal exposure in an online controlled experiment
using a game with human participants. Each participant in the game makes a
decision among choices with differing utilities. We observe the following: (1)
even in the presence of monetary risks and previously acquired knowledge of the
choices, decision-makers tend to deviate from the obvious optimal decision when
their peers make similar decision which we call the influence decision, (2)
when the quantity of social signals vary over time, the forwarding probability
of the influence decision and therefore being responsive to social influence
does not necessarily correlate proportionally to the absolute quantity of
signals. To better understand how these rules of peer influence could be used
in modeling applications of real world diffusion and in networked environments,
we use our behavioral findings to simulate spreading dynamics in real world
case studies. We specifically try to see how cumulative influence plays out in
the presence of user uncertainty and measure its outcome on rumor diffusion,
which we model as an example of sub-optimal choice diffusion. Together, our
simulation results indicate that sequential peer effects from the influence
decision overcomes individual uncertainty to guide faster rumor diffusion over
time. However, when the rate of diffusion is slow in the beginning, user
uncertainty can have a substantial role compared to peer influence in deciding
the adoption trajectory of a piece of questionable information
Simulation of a Texas Hold'Em poker player
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Reference Points and Effort Provision
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low
Determinants and Effects of Reserve Prices in Hattrick Auctions
We use a unique hand collected data set of 6,258 auctions from the online football manager game Hattrick to study determinants and effects of reserve prices. We find that chosen reserve prices exhibit both very sophisticated and suboptimal behavior by the sellers. On the one hand, reserve prices are adjusted remarkably nuanced to the resulting sales price pattern. However, reserve prices are too clustered at zero and at multiples of e 50,000 as to be consistent with fully rational behavior. We recover the value distribution and simulate the loss in expected revenue from suboptimal reserve prices. Finally, we find evidence for the sunk cost fallacy as there is a substantial positive effect on the reserve price when the player has been acquired previously
Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off
We model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies that sort slackers from zealots. Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Finally, even with well-designed personnel policies, there remains an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition
The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Development
It is widely thought that increases in corporate mergers and acquisitions of the sort which the United States has experienced in the recent past lead to a reduction in such long term investment activities as R&D because of a shortened horizon on the part of managers. This paper uses a newly created dataset containing all acquisitions of publicly traded firms in the manufacturing sector in the last ten years to answer some basic questions which pertain to this issue. I find that the firms involved in acquisitions and mergers where both partners are in the manufacturing sector have roughly the same pattern of R&D spending as the sector as a whole and that the acquisition itself does not cause a reduction in R&D activity on the part of these firms. Moreover, the R&D capital thus acquired is valued more highly by the acquiring firm than by the stock market. On the other hand, I also find that the substantial increase in the number and size of acquisitions made by privately held firms in the eighties is concentrated primarily on firms with low R&D intensity which also are in non-R&D intensive industries. Because the pattern of low investment in R&D is longstanding, and because the firms taken over have less rather than more R&D capital than the industry as a whole, it seems unlikely that the recent increase in takeover activity has had a significantly negative effect on R&D spending in these industries.
The Neural Basis of Financial Risk Taking
Investors systematically deviate from rationality when making financial decisions, yet the mechanisms responsible for these deviations have not been identified. Using event-related fMRI, we examined whether anticipatory neural activity would predict optimal and suboptimal choices in a financial decision-making task. We characterized two types of deviations from the optimal investment strategy of a rational risk- neutral agent as risk-seeking mistakes and risk-aversion mistakes. Nucleus accumbens activation preceded risky choices as well as risk- seeking mistakes, while anterior insula activation preceded riskless choices as well as risk-aversion mistakes. These findings suggest that distinct neural circuits linked to anticipatory affect promote different types of financial choices, and indicate that excessive activation of these circuits may lead to investing mistakes. Thus, consideration of anticipatory neural mechanisms may add predictive power to the rational actor model of economic decision-making.neuroeconomics, neurofinance, brain, investing, emotions, affect
Towards a Design Methodology for Decision Support Systems
The authors propose the use of process models for DSS design. The kind of process models suggested are task structures and decision structures with simple graphical syntax and semantics. The process models form the basis for a coherent DSS design methodology, based upon the bounded rationality paradigm. The history of DSS and DSS design is discussed to form a theoretical position. The resulting methodology has been tested and evaluated in a laboratory experiment. The results of this evaluation will be used for continuous improvement of the methodolog
Reference Points and Effort Provision
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.Reference Points; Expectations; Loss Aversion; Disappointment; Experiment
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