Differentially Oblivious Turing Machines

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a machinery that protects any RAM from leaking information about its secret input by observing only the access pattern. It is known that every ORAM must incur a logarithmic overhead compared to the non-oblivious RAM. In fact, even the seemingly weaker notion of differential obliviousness, which intuitively "protects" a single access by guaranteeing that the observed access pattern for every two "neighboring" logical access sequences satisfy (?,?)-differential privacy, is subject to a logarithmic lower bound. In this work, we show that any Turing machine computation can be generically compiled into a differentially oblivious one with only doubly logarithmic overhead. More precisely, given a Turing machine that makes N transitions, the compiled Turing machine makes O(N ? log log N) transitions in total and the physical head movements sequence satisfies (?,?)-differential privacy (for a constant ? and a negligible ?). We additionally show that ?(log log N) overhead is necessary in a natural range of parameters (and in the balls and bins model). As a corollary, we show that there exist natural data structures such as stack and queues (supporting online operations) on N elements for which there is a differentially oblivious implementation on a Turing machine incurring amortized O(log log N) overhead per operation, while it is known that any oblivious implementation must consume ?(log N) operations unconditionally even on a RAM. Therefore, we obtain the first unconditional separation between obliviousness and differential obliviousness in the most natural setting of parameters where ? is a constant and ? is negligible. Before this work, such a separation was only known in the balls and bins model. Note that the lower bound applies in the RAM model while our upper bound is in the Turing machine model, making our separation stronger

Quantum Bounded Query Complexity

We combine the classical notions and techniques for bounded query classes with those developed in quantum computing. We give strong evidence that quantum queries to an oracle in the class NP does indeed reduce the query complexity of decision problems. Under traditional complexity assumptions, we obtain an exponential speedup between the quantum and the classical query complexity of function classes. For decision problems and function classes we obtain the following results: o P_||^NP[2k] is included in EQP_||^NP[k] o P_||^NP[2^(k+1)-2] is included in EQP^NP[k] o FP_||^NP[2^(k+1)-2] is included in FEQP^NP[2k] o FP_||^NP is included in FEQP^NP[O(log n)] For sets A that are many-one complete for PSPACE or EXP we show that FP^A is included in FEQP^A[1]. Sets A that are many-one complete for PP have the property that FP_||^A is included in FEQP^A[1]. In general we prove that for any set A there is a set X such that FP^A is included in FEQP^X[1], establishing that no set is superterse in the quantum setting.Comment: 11 pages LaTeX2e, no figures, accepted for CoCo'9

Engineering Aggregation Operators for Relational In-Memory Database Systems

In this thesis we study the design and implementation of Aggregation operators in the context of relational in-memory database systems. In particular, we identify and address the following challenges: cache-efficiency, CPU-friendliness, parallelism within and across processors, robust handling of skewed data, adaptive processing, processing with constrained memory, and integration with modern database architectures. Our resulting algorithm outperforms the state-of-the-art by up to 3.7x

Communication Complexity and Secure Function Evaluation

We suggest two new methodologies for the design of efficient secure protocols, that differ with respect to their underlying computational models. In one methodology we utilize the communication complexity tree (or branching for f and transform it into a secure protocol. In other words, "any function f that can be computed using communication complexity c can be can be computed securely using communication complexity that is polynomial in c and a security parameter". The second methodology uses the circuit computing f, enhanced with look-up tables as its underlying computational model. It is possible to simulate any RAM machine in this model with polylogarithmic blowup. Hence it is possible to start with a computation of f on a RAM machine and transform it into a secure protocol. We show many applications of these new methodologies resulting in protocols efficient either in communication or in computation. In particular, we exemplify a protocol for the "millionaires problem", where two participants want to compare their values but reveal no other information. Our protocol is more efficient than previously known ones in either communication or computation