ON THE JOURNEY OF OVERSEAS LISTING: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON CHINESE ENTERPRISES TO LIST ON THE HONG KONG STOCK EXCHANGE

The thesis, empirically investigates issues pertinent to the partial privatization of Chinese initial public offerings at home and abroad, especially on issues relating to Chinese enterprises‘ seeking overseas listings. Based on the asymmetric information hypotheses on initial public offerings (IPOs) and cross-border flotation literature, the proposed research includes both short-run and long-run methods, and covers the entire offering process of Chinese firms‘ going public in overseas markets. The investigation begins with an overview of Hong Kong‘s and China mainland‘s financial markets in Chapter II. The limitation of development in the domestic capital market, the desire of bringing Chinese SOEs into the international market, and the appropriate conditions in Hong Kong encourage Chinese companies to issue new shares in Hong Kong. Chapter III provides a comparative analysis on underpricing of Chinese and non-Chinese firms in Hong Kong, in order to discover the influence of asymmetric information on overseas listing and the correspondent offering strategies of Chinese companies and their underwriters. They are normally underwritten by highly reputable bankers, and the overwhelming majority of Chinese firms went public via bookbuilding when the market is on an optimal evaluation base. The average price range seems to be relatively conservative for promoting subscription demands. The potential loss can be partially mitigated by a positive price revision and carefully market timing. Chapter IV focuses on information disclosure and earnings forecasting accuracy in IPO prospectuses with their subsequent effects on aftermarket performance, since the accuracy of information becomes important in influencing IPOs offerings and after-market performance. The IPO profit forecasts errors represent a pessimistic bias on average, but it can be a crucial information resource for their investment decisions. The magnitude of forecasting errors is higher for China-related companies than local shares, indicating a higher asymmetric information level. The forecasts are not rational in the sense that managers correctly incorporate all available information, especially historical profits, in their forecasting. Also, the magnitude of forecasting errors can systematically affect the one-year trading performance. Due to the initial overvaluation, firms with higher initial returns actually underperform in the long run. And Chapter V, in order to discover the ultimate meanings and motives of such overseas listing, directly questions why and how the Chinese government takes so many many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) public in the international market. It concludes Chinese SOEs‘ overseas primary listing takes on the formidable tasks of macroeconomic partial privatization, home market protection, and domestic infantile market development. Large and ‗healthy‘ state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the government‘s supporting industries are more likely to issue their shares on foreign, open, and well-developed stock exchanges when the target market is in good time of pricing and offering, in order to raise more capital, to operate under international standards, to send a positive signal of Chinese economic reform, and to indirectly protect the development of domestic financial market. Consequently, the partial privatization through an overseas primary listing approach is indeed a feasible way to facilitate domestic financial market growth, particularly for countries with a large economy but lack of a well-developed home capital market and a mature trading platform

Government-industry relations in China : a review of the art of the state

For those who have studied the political economy of China since the onset of urban-industrial reform in the 1980s, the state looks considerably less powerful today than it once was. Market mechanisms and state regulation have been brought in to replace direct control and planning, whilst the importance of state ownership has diminished through the effective privatisation of many State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the emergence of new private economic sectors and actors. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the state has withdrawn from economic activity. On the contrary, the state is alive and well and exercising considerable control over the nature of economic activity, albeit in different less direct ways than before

From iron rice bowl to the world's biggest sweatshop: globalization, institutional constraints, and the rights of Chinese workers

This article discusses how China's institutional constraints combine with its integration into the global economy to suppress its workers' rights. The rapid expansion of China's market economy is the consequence of the government's active embrace of global capitalism and global capitalists' ongoing search for new markets and lower production costs. China's traditional socialist labor relationships collapsed as a result of state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform and the emergence of private enterprises. In the wake of these events, China's leaders promulgated new labor legislation and social insurance schemes, but these initiatives fail to safeguard workers' rights effectively. This is because the SOEs fail to compensate their workers properly, local authorities do not actively monitor labor abuses, the judicial system cannot effectively defend workers' rights, and the Chinese government suppresses efforts to organize independent labor unions. In short, global capitalism together with China's authoritarian polity have limited workers' rights and undermined their well-being

Organisational change and development of reformed Chinese township and village enterprises

This article is (c) Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here (http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/8263). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the organisational changes (OCs) and the development of Chinese reformed township and village enterprises (RTVEs), their marketing and R&D strategies, and the impact of changes in terms of overall performance. Design/methodology/approach – A case study methodology involving semi-structured interviews is adopted. The unit chosen is the Guotai International Group (GTIG) in Zhangjiagang, Suzhou, Jiangsu province, China, in which the organisational changes over a period of over 40 years are analysed. Findings – OCs in Chinese RTVEs are found to be driven by a combination of local government plans and market forces. Considering the hybrid nature of the organisation and ownership structures, changes in Chinese RTVEs follow a very much “top-down” approach. Research limitations/implications – The findings imply that managers appointed by the state in RTVEs usually lack the necessary skills in marketing and business management, and can be resistant to organisational changes, such as the willingness to undertake risks. As a result, RTVEs may become stuck in a cycle of low-cost, low-tech products, inhibiting any breakthrough in developing their own quality brands. Originality/value – This is one of few papers studying change over a long span of time to arrive at research findings that will be useful to academic researchers in their future work. The qualitative findings from this paper would also enrich the literatures on organisational change in Chinese RTVEs

Chinese Enterprise Reform as a Market Process

The reform of China's enterprise system increasingly reflects the outcome of China's emerging property rights market. We distinguish between a centrally-directed reform strategy, with characteristics similar to those of a Pigouvian tax, and a market-driven reform process, which captures the essential features of a Coasian approach to social cost. The Coase Theorem postulates that eliminating transaction costs and attaching well specified property rights to public goods that generate externalities will allow uncoordinated economic agents to negotiate institutional arrangements that produce socially efficient allocation of resources. Extending Coase's reasoning to the case of socialist transition ' we argue that reforms that expand competition, move toward well-specified assignment of ownership rights to public enterprises, and reduce transaction costs will motivate the "ultimate" owners, including officials of national and sub-national government agencies, to reconfigure their assets or to combine their assets with those of other jurisdictions and/or private investors to create more efficient ownership arrangements. We review the extent to which China's reforms have established the conditions for an effective market in ownership rights to industrial property. We tabulate progress from 1 980 to present along the three major analytic dimensions inherent in Coase's analysis: competition, property rights, and transaction costs. We conclude that the sheer size and diversity of China's industrial economy will motivate a continuation of decentralized reform initiatives. To support this Coasian reform process, central and provincial governments need to expand initiatives to clarify property rights, particularly the right of alienation, reduce impediments to competition, and facilitate the reduction of transaction costs.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39466/3/wp76.pd

China Employment Law Guide

[Excerpt] This guide comments on the general rules applicable under national Chinese laws and regulations, and the numerous local regulations, rules and practices that continually play a fundamental role in the application of law in China in each case. This guide provides helpful background information but is not a substitute for specific legal guidance, as the applicable rules and practice must be researched and analyzed according to the specific needs and issues of each case